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ABSTRACT 
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Over more than a decade, discussions on “ulusalcılık” became a major topic of debate in 
Turkish politics. A range of political actors, among them those who position themselves 
as liberals, nationalists (ülkücüler) as well as different incarnations of the political left, 
tried to capture the current stance of “ulusalcılık” in different ways with reference to 
different political, social and cultural events of the past decade. Despite its often noted 
ill-definedness, the term “ulusalcılık” has nonetheless found a place in the political 
space. The AKP government and its media supporters appropriate the term „ulusalcılık‟ 
as a neo-Kemalist nationalist movement that reflects tutelary status quo reactions and 
cultural elitism of the laicist middle class groups. While those civil organizations that 
call themselves “ulusalcı” are quite few in actual numbers and vary ideologically, the 
populist discourse of the AKP gradually cast the „ulusalcılık‟ phenomenon as 
antithetical of that of „the people‟ („millet‟); as the suppressive elite that attempts to 
exert tutelary power over the „real people of Turkey‟. This study conceives attempts of 
different political discourses to fix the meaning of “ulusalcılık” as a hegemonic 
struggle. In accordance, the thesis illustrates the articulation of “ulusalcılık” in the 
AKP‟s populist discourse as an empty signifier constituting and combining certain 
elements provided for the enemy figure. Focusing on particular political moments, 
namely the Republican Rallies in 2007, the constitutional referendum in 2010 and the 
Gezi Park protests in 2013, the thesis traces the formation and transformation of 
“ulusalcılık” in the AKP‟s populist discourse in accordance with the AKP‟s changing 
discursive field. 
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ÖZET 
 
“HALK”IN ÖTESĠNDE:  
AKP‟NĠN POPÜLĠST SÖYLEMĠNDE “ULUSALCILIK”IN OLUġUMU 
 
ERDEM KAYSERĠLĠOĞLU 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi Temmuz, 2015 
Tez danıĢmanı: Dr. Banu Karaca 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: AKP, popülist söylem, ulusalcılık, Gezi, Cumhuriyet Mitingleri 
On yıldan fazladır, “ulusalcılık” üzerindeki tartıĢmalar Türkiye siyasetinde önemli bir 
tartıĢma konusu oluĢturdu. Geçtiğimiz on yıl içinde kendisini liberal, ülkücü ya da sol 
siyasetin içinde konumlandıran birçok siyasal aktör, “ulusalcılık”ın mevcut konumunu 
farklı yollardan ve farklı siyasal, sosyal, kültürel olaylara iĢaret ederek anlamaya 
çalıĢtılar. Birçokları tarafından eksik-tanımlanmıĢ olduğu vurgulansa da “ulusalcılık” 
siyasal alan içinde yadsınamaz bir konum elde etti. AKP ve onu destekleyen medya 
araçları tarafından sahiplenildiği Ģekli düĢünüldüğünde, „ulusalcılık‟ vesayetçi statüko 
reaksiyonlarını ve laik orta sınıfların kültürel elitizmini yansıtan neo-Kemalist bir 
milliyetçi hareket olarak tanımlandı. Kendisini “ulusalcı” olarak tanımlayan grupların 
sayıca oldukça az ve ideolojik olarak farklılaĢmasına rağmen, zamanla AKP‟nin 
popülist söylemi „ulusalcılık‟ olgusunu „millet‟in zıttı olarak tanımladı; „gerçek Türk 
milleti/halkı‟ karĢısında vesayetçi güç uygulayan baskıcı elitler. Bu çalıĢma, farklı 
siyasal söylemlerin “ulusalcılık”ın anlamını sabitleme çabalarını bir hegemonya 
mücadelesi olarak irdeler. Böylelikle, bu tez, düĢman figürü için kullanılan belirli 
bileĢenleri oluĢturan ve birleĢtiren bir boĢ gösteren olarak „ulusalcılık‟ın AKP‟nin 
popülist söyleminde eklemlenmesini sergiliyor. 2007 Cumhuriyet Mitingleri, 2010 
anayasa referandumu ve 2013 Gezi protestolarına odaklanırken, bu tez AKP‟nin değiĢen 
söylem zemini ıĢığında „ulusalcılık‟ın kurulması ve dönüĢümünü takip ediyor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. “Ulusalcılık” As An Ill-defined Conceptual Term 
Despite its wide use in the Turkish political context, the term “ulusalcı” has a 
confusing effect with regard to its conceptual range. “Ulusalcılık” has been a disputed 
phenomenon since the late 1990‟s and more significantly after the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP) came to rule in the 2002 general 
elections. Within this period a range of political actors, among them those who 
positioned themselves as liberals, nationalists (ülkücüler) as well as different 
incarnations of the political left, tried to capture “ulusalcılık” either as an ideology or 
movement, or contextually as both of them, in different terms in accordance with their 
political background. Despite varied appropriations of the term, debates on “ulusalcılık” 
gained currency after the rise of political Islam during the 90‟s and in the early 2000‟s 
with the AKP‟s coming to power. Regarding this time period, analyses on the 
phenomenon as well as the dominant political discourse commonly accepted 
“ulusalcılık” as a reactionary neo-nationalist movement against the AKP‟s reformist 
administration and neoliberal restructurings in the political, economic and cultural 
fields. However, since different ideological positions addressed the “ulusalcı” 
phenomenon with indefinite and varied references, histories and political groups, as a 
matter of fact the term remained ill-defined in conceptual terms (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 46; 
Gürpınar, 2011, p. 22; Reyhan, 2012, p. 13). Since the early 2000‟s, newspaper analysts 
and political actors gradually addressed the “ulusalcı” phenomenon varied to an extent 
to encompass far racist pan-Turkic movements, Kemalist left-wing movements, 
eurosceptics and anti-American movements, certain political parties, secular urban 
middle classes, bureaucratic cadres of the Kemalist state form etc. Therefore, beside the 
controversial scope of the debate, “ulusalcılık” and its constitutive elements have not 
been comprehensively conceptualized due to varied appropriations of the term across 
political discourses both in positive and negative terms.  
2 
 
Although mainstream debates addressing „ulusalcılık‟ focus on the encounters 
between left and right wing nationalist movements or new forms of national anxieties 
that emerged after the 90‟s, the term “ulusalcı” does not strictly refer to established 
“milliyetçi/ultra-nationalist” political movements and their party manifestation in the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/MHP) and Great Union Party 
(Büyük Birlik Partisi/BBP) (pan-Turkic nationalist movements, the ülkücü). The word 
“ulusalcı” is derived from “ulus” and, similar to the term “millet”, it means “nation”. 
Therefore, both “milliyetçi” and “ulusalcı” are synonymous and refer to “nationalism” 
as a conceptual term. Contrary this similarity, discursive appropriation of both terms 
differs across political movements and this difference distinguishes meanings of 
“ulusalcı” and “milliyetçi” with regard to their contextual references. On the discursive 
level, the term “ulus” is the modernized version of “millet” since it distracts itself from 
connotations of the Ottoman millet system and specific reference to the Islamic 
community, ümmet (Bora, 2011).  In this line of reasoning, the neo-Kemalist nationalist 
discourses and certain branches of the leftist literature preferred the term “ulusal” in 
order to avoid conservative right-wing charge of the term “milli”. For example, in the 
70‟s, left-wing Kemalist intellectuals utilized the term “ulusal” (national) while 
addressing the national question from a universalist point of view. However, this 
terminological difference of “ulusalcı” did not constitute a peculiar political discourse 
till the 2000‟s, and the term “ulusal” referred basically nationalist ideologies of 
Kemalist and anti-imperialist leftist movements (Reyhan, 2012).  
In this study, contrary to conceptualization of the phenomenon as a movement or 
cultural identity resurging under specific dynamics, I question the discursive articulation 
of “ulusalcılık” in the AKP‟s populist discourse as an empty signifier which rhetorically 
combined and condensed varied signifying elements. Regarding the attempts of 
different political discourses to fix the meaning of “ulusalcılık” as a hegemonic 
struggle, I attempt to analyze how the AKP‟s populist discourse appropriated “ulusalcı” 
reference as a constitutive element in the configuration of the enemy figure. Therefore 
conceptualizing “ulusalcılık” as a discursive entity, which the AKP‟s changing 
discursive terrains metonymically (re)configured along 2007, 2010 and 2013 periods, 
this approach can be considered as an attempt to reveal how the AKP‟s discourse 
hegemonically contextualizes the antagonistic relations over the political field when the 
debates on „ulusalcılık‟ are addressed. Based on this framework, in the introduction 
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party, I first cover dominant arguments in the academic literature on “ulusalcılık”. 
Secondly, I illustrate how the meaning of “ulusalcılık” shifts across discursive fields of 
different political movements. While comparing different quotes from different 
opinions about the condition of “ulusalcılık” in the political tensions, I argue that the 
indefiniteness of the meaning of „ulusalcılık‟ is a result of the hegemonic struggle to 
locate the phenomenon onto a meaningful discursive terrain. Lastly, I discuss how the 
AKP‟s discourse casted the phenomenon „ulusalcılık‟ as the anti-people community 
disrupting the AKP‟s developmentalist services as well as the inner well-being of 
Turkey. 
According to the academic literature on the issue, “ulusalcılık” emerged as a 
neo-nationalist political ideology due to socio-economic turmoil during the 1990‟s in 
Turkey (Bora, 1994; Erdoğan, 2001). In this line of analyses, two major dynamics have 
been addressed; acceleration of globalization and destabilization of established socio-
political relations at the local level, and deepening of conflicts between the state and the 
civil society due to rising demands of ethnic and religious identities which eventually 
challenged the hegemony of the Kemalist state form. Thus, the academic research 
produced so far argued that while established Kemalist hegemony was dissolving, 
“ulusalcılık”, being a defensive neo-nationalist discourse, emerged as a synthesis of 
former left and right wing nationalist ideologies.  
In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the expansion of neoliberal 
restructuring throughout the 80‟s, transnational companies and global financial 
institutions within the commodity market organized new form of capitalism which by-
passed the administrative logic of the nation state. New international division of labor 
and mass communication tended to deterritorialize local norms and established power 
relations while replacing them with moral and political ambivalences. Theories of 
globalization argued that restricting function of nation states would fade away under the 
rapid transformation of boundaries by constant spatial and temporal flows. According to 
this opinion, economic, political and cultural dynamics of globalization would weaken 
nation state establishments as well as nationalist sentiments. As a matter of fact, on the 
one hand new judicial and economic agencies at the global level, on the other hand 
emerging ethnic and cultural demands at the local level challenged and restricted local 
interests of national power elites. However, nationalism as an ideology, symbolism and 
movement remained as a potential dynamic (Smith, 1999). Although theoretical 
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approaches on post-nationalism assumed that nation-states lost their substantial 
importance on localizing “citizenship” and “identity” through globalization (Hansen, 
2009), new forms of ethnic and religious nationalisms resurged along the process of 
globalization. In the face of those local and interregional confrontations, “reactionary 
movements endeavoring to reassert national sovereignty and seeking to impose ethnic 
and cultural uniformity” occurred (Richmond, 1994). Thus, rather than eliminating, 
globalization and neoliberalization grounded nationalist responses (Juergensmeyer, 
2002; Worth, 2002). In everyday relations, nationalism kept operating along ordinary 
routines and commemorative instruments; and hence, reminded national identities 
through a routinely habituated language (Billig, 1995).  
1.2. “Ulusalcılık” Between The 1990‟s And The 2000‟s 
Globalization proliferated identity politics and new social formations at the 
national level which were based on cultural and ethnic demands (Kalb, 1999). 
Reflecting these dynamics, the rise of Kurdish and Islamic movement in the 90‟s denied 
the hegemony of Kemalist state establishments. On the one hand, publicity of the 
Kurdish question increased as a result of the alienation between Kurdish citizens and the 
state throughout the 90‟s, armed struggle of the PKK and rising human rights discourse 
at the international level (Yeğen, 2007). On the other hand, Islamic movement gained 
increasing electoral success at the municipal and parliamentarian levels with the 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in the early 90‟s. In a period when the left-wing 
movement and its intellectuals have been marginalized by the state violence, Islamic 
movement utilized dynamics of globalization while gaining support of liberal 
intellectuals as well as large exploited masses with their conservative populist rhetoric 
on the “just order” (ÖniĢ, 2001). Therefore, the rise of Kurdish and Islamic movements 
pushed Kemalist principles on cultivating a modern, homogenized and secular people 
towards a crisis. In the face of these changes, while the tutelary interventions of the 
military and the judiciary cadres were increasing, citizens prone to Kemalist nationalism 
shared a feeling of insecurity and distrust considering the rise of Kurdish and Islamic 
movements as well as involvement of restrictive international agencies. As a result, 
while official nationalist discourse on the national unity and independence reoccurring 
and mobilizing masses, syntheses of a neo-nationalist discourse gradually popularized 
in this transitionary period.  
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Under these dynamics, Kemalism, being the official ideology of the Turkish 
Republic, gradually lost its power on creating consent in the face of emerging counter-
hegemonic demands. On the one hand, restrictions of global agencies such as the EU 
and the IMF injured fantasies of an independent and self-sufficient nation state. On the 
other hand academic and public debates criticized the Kemalist doctrine as a 
“patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical 
and cultural experience of the people in Turkey” (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997, p. 4). 
Revisionist historiography and social science studies criticized the truth regimes of 
Kemalist modernization project on national myths, the Kurdish and Armenian questions 
and assertive secularism of state apparatuses (Gürpınar, 2013). Although, the state-
society relations have been heavily criticized in this period, Kemalist state ideology 
maintained itself along different layers of everyday life under different forms of 
reproduction and reification (Navaro-Yashin, 2002). As a result of these 
transformations, secularist, modernist and developmentalist principles of the Kemalist 
state ideology moved to the private sphere while Kemalist non-governmental 
organizations emerging at the civil society level.  
 As Islamic movement gradually occupied the public sphere, official Kemalist 
ideology and nostalgic sentiments attached to it found a new life at the public domain 
through consumption of symbolic commodities, personal items and popular icons 
commemorating the Kemalist state at the private and civil society levels (Özyürek, 
2006). Under this neoliberal political culture, Kemalist non-governmental organizations 
established, such as the Ataturkist Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce 
Derneği/ADD) in 1989 and the Association for the Support of Contemporary Living 
(Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği/ÇYDD) in 1989. Through publishing magazines 
and organizing social assistance campaigns on education and family issues, these 
Kemalist non-governmental organizations aimed to reinstitute the Kemalist principles at 
the civil society level. Fear of losing privileges as a result of the confrontation of the 
Kemalist principles and transformation of the Kemalist state form reflected a shared 
feeling of victimhood in the political perception of such neo-Kemalist organizations 
(Erdoğan, 2000). In a political climate in which national self-confidence was in decline 
and concerns about the survival of the Kemalist principles were rising, official Kemalist 
nationalism transformed into different sub-branches of neo-Kemalist nationalisms at the 
discursive level. 
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One of the earliest studies trying to capture the relational configuration of neo-
nationalist discourses during the 90‟s was Tanıl Bora‟s article published in 1994, titled, 
“Türkiye‟de milliyetçilik söylemleri: melez bir dilin kalın ve düzensiz lügatı”1. In his 
article, Bora stated that official Kemalist nationalism, which he identified as the root 
language of Turkish nationalist lexicon on national unity and independence, has been 
reconfigured by two major dynamics. On the one hand, a reactionary nationalist 
discourse dramatized the notion of survival of the state through combining radical 
nationalist ideologies, center-right parties and center-left ideologies in the light of 
isolationist anti-Western themes.  On the other hand, a pro-Western neo-nationalist 
discourse merged national interests with globalization dynamics. This branch of neo-
Kemalist discourse, which was appropriated by urban middle classes, big finance 
groups and media elites, stated that being prone to the Western ideals and liberal 
economy could actualize the Kemalist principles on reaching the “modern civilization”2. 
Based on this distinguishing dynamic of being prone to or against Westernism and 
globalization, Bora schematized four sub-branches of neo-nationalist discourses. In this 
analysis, Bora referred to “ulusalcılık” as a synthesis of official Kemalist nationalism 
and the left-wing Kemalist discourse during the 60‟s and the 70‟s3 which he titled as 
“Kemalist ulusçuluk”. However, what distinguished “ulusalcılık”, to Bora, from the 
left-wing Kemalism was the fact that within the political tensions of the 90‟s the 
emphasis of “ulusalcı” neo-nationalist discourse on “secularism” replaced the “anti-
imperialist” aspect of Kemalist ulusçuluk (Bora, 1994).  
 
 
                                                          
1 For the English version of the article see Bora, T. (2003) Nationalist Discourses in Turkey. The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 102: 2/3. 2003 
2 For a detailed analysis portraying the relation between transformations during the 90‟s and their impact on the 
articulation of pro-Western neo-Kemalist nationalism with regard to the concept “white Turk” see Kozanoğlu (1995) 
and Günal (2001). Considering the formation of the AKP‟s political discourse, discussions on “white Turk” became a 
significant reference within the general debate on “ulusalcılık”. Although it has been overused in media discussions 
as a pejorative label implying secular elitism, the term “white Turk” conceptually addresses the trauma of the 
Kemalist modernization project after the 80‟s and problematizes the Orientalist roots of the Kemalist imaginary on 
Turkishness and civilization. Criticizing the Turkish nation-building project from the perspective of postcolonial 
literature and class conflicts, the conceptualization of “white Turk” refers to the constitutive dichotomies of 
imagining the Turkish identity as a homogeneous, enlightened and civilized nation. For further reading on how 
Turkish modernization project reproduced Eurocentric reactions towards ethnic and religious identities and how this 
effected the trauma of the Kemalist elite after the 80‟s see Zeydanlıoğlu (2008). 
3Studies defining “ulusalcılık” as a reincarnation of the left-wing nationalism relates ideological roots of “ulusalcı” 
political movement to the Kadro journal in the 1930‟s, to intellectual circles of the Yön-Devrim movement in the 60‟s 
and to the Aydınlık movement. For further reading analyzing historical connections among those intellectual circles 
and left-wing movements in Turkey see Aydın (1998), Aydın (2002), Zileli (2004), Grigoriadis & Özer (2010) and 
Gürpınar (2011). 
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1.2.1. Debates on “Ulusalcılık” After The 2000‟s and During The AKP Era 
When we consider the socio-political crises of the 90‟s Bora‟s statements can be 
considered as valid. On the one hand increased involvement of the Islamic movement in 
the mainstream politics and conservative cultural codes in the public life, on the other 
hand the February 28 military intervention in 1997 which forced the Welfare Party 
government from power eventually strengthened the secular concerns within the neo-
Kemalist discourse during the 90‟s. However, by the end of the 90‟s and with the 
AKP‟s coming to power in the 2002 general elections, academic literature gradually 
addressed “ulusalcı” neo-nationalism in accordance with a different conceptualization. 
In this line of explanation, several analyses identified “ulusalcılık” with the rising 
euroscepticism, anti-globalization reactions, and more significantly with the conspiracy 
logic. 
 The AKP, as an Islamic-oriented conservative government, applied a reformist 
political agenda which continued the IMF economic plan and neoliberal privatizations, 
while pragmatically prioritizing accession negotiations with the EU. Within this 
political climate, on the one hand, in line with the EU criteria Kurdish and Armenian 
questions and recognizing Cyprus became controversial issues which were heavily 
criticized by both public figures and bureaucratic state cadres. In this era, neo-
nationalist discourses perceived these phenomenons and intellectual actors bringing 
them to the current state as traitors of national causes. On the other hand, global 
agencies like the IMF and the World Bank restricted the national economic model and 
the AKP government at the rule applied the neoliberal plan in collaboration with those 
institutions. Based on this conceiving, neo-nationalists voicing anti-Western reactions 
stated their concerns about “threats” against the national unity while addressing 
“betrayals to the nation” by the “imperial forces” and their local “collaborators”. During 
the time period, certain intellectual circles, covering left-wing nationalist, neo-
Kemalists and ethnic-radical nationalists, and Kemalist state cadres from the military 
and the judiciary gathered under the shared perception of threats against the territorial 
unity. As a result, anti-globalization tendencies and euroscepticism shaped the defensive 
tone of neo-nationalist discourses in the socio-political turmoil of the early 2000‟s under 
the AKP rule.  
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According to many, elementary manifestation of this neo-nationalist, isolationist 
and eurosceptic “ulusalcılık” was the so-called Sevres Syndrome. To the advocates of 
the theory of the Sevres Syndrome, ulusalcı groups formed a discourse based on 
nationalist anxieties of partitioning. Beyond the debate on „ulusalcılık‟, discourse on the 
separation of the territorial integrity contains a deep-rooted conspiratorial rhetoric 
reaching back to Ottoman times. Commonly loaded with nationalist, religious and anti-
Semitic constituents, paranoiac narrations of different political movements on the 
separation effect how the national unity as well as its enemies as secret threats are 
imagined
 4
.  
The basic assumption characterized the Syndrome was the mode of perception 
insisting that the Europeans were attempting to take over the country and their local 
collaborators were trying to separate and sell out the national territory. This line of 
conceptualization of the phenomenon argued that “ulusalcı” identity emerged as a result 
of the reactivation of traumatic memory of the Treaty of Sevres (TaraktaĢ, 2008; 
Grigoriadis & Özer, 2010; Yılmaz, 2011; Cevik & Tas, 2013; Gürpınar, 2013). This 
conceptualization argued that “ulusalcı” ideology conceived Kurds, Islamists and liberal 
intelligentsia as collaborators of imperial forces which were trying to divide Turkey in 
order to expel it from the Euro-Christian lands. Reflecting this neo-nationalist 
imaginary, certain popular fictions, like Şu Çılgın Türkler (Those Crazy Turks) (2005) 
and Metal Fırtına (Metal Storm) (2004), have been published and widely consumed in 
the market. On the one hand this popular nationalist genre mobilized nationalist 
sentiments of ethnic proud, patriotism and self-sacrifice, on the other hand certain 
authors, such as Ergün Poyraz and Soner Yalçın, wrote conspiracy books about the 
leading cadres of the AKP through which they argued that Tayyip Erdoğan and 
Abdullah Gül were crypto-Jews and the AKP was a project of the Jewish lobby.  
Bora in his article “Nationalist discourses in Turkey”, published in 2011 as the 
revised version of his former article, redefined “ulusalcılık” in accordance with 
transformation of the inner elements of the debate due to rising anti-globalism, 
euroscepticism and fear of disintegration. Bora argued that “ulusalcılık” became a 
distinguished ideological manifestation representing the nationalistic fanaticism, 
                                                          
4 For a detailed analysis on the inheritance of the constituents of the Sevres Syndrome from the Ottoman times, and 
an illustration of how conspiracy theories appropriated by different political ideologies reproduce anxieties regarding 
anti-Semitic tropes as paranoiac narrations, see Nefes, Türkay S. (2013) Political parties‟ perceptions and uses of 
anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Turkey. The Sociological Review. Vol. 61, pp. 247-264 
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perception of isolationist threats and conspiring mentality. Based on this framework, 
Bora defined “ulusalcı” language as a hybrid discursive system appropriated by varied 
social sector, including the military officers, Kemalist nationalists and national-
socialists. In sum, to Bora, “ulusalcı” symbiosis has “popularized the ethnicist-racist 
mind-set and conspiracy theories” (Bora, 2011). 
Following this line of reasoning, Özkırımlı, in his article “The Changing Nature 
of Nationalism in Turkey” (2011), stated that the neo-nationalist term “ulusalcılık” 
affiliated with former nationalistically charged terms like “patriotism”, “millet”, 
“ulusçu” etc. While highlighting the indeterminate relationality between these terms 
within the context of nationalism, Özkırımlı questioned in his article how Turkish 
nationalism was imagined under different competing narratives. He argued that each of 
the term resembled the continuous struggle for hegemony in defining the meaning of 
being a “Turk”. Therefore, Özkırımlı stated that each of the ideological terrains utilized 
contextually these different terms while appropriating Turkish nationalism in 
accordance with the rules of their discursive fields. Thus, he argued, different narratives 
on “Turkishness” determined the positionings in the political field through constituting 
relations of oppositions. Based on this framework, Özkırımlı situated those competing 
nationalist discourses in Turkey in the light of a topographic mapping which he settled 
according to two determining axes intersected vertically; secularism/anti-secularism line 
and Westernism/anti-Westernism line. In the light of this topographic approach, 
Özkırımlı defined “ulusalcılık” as a synthesis of official nationalism and its rivals 
(namely left-Kemalism and neo-liberal nationalism) and located “ulusalcı” actors onto 
the intersection between the anti-Western pole and secular pole (Özkırımlı, 2011). In 
line with this positioning logic, Özkırımlı‟s diagram situated political parties like the 
Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/CHP), the Labor Party (İşçi 
Partisi/ĠP) and civil-military bureaucracy together at the “ulusalcı” pole. In doing so, 
his diagram differentiated the MHP while locating the party onto the anti-
Westernism/anti-secularism pole. Lastly, Özkırımlı‟s mapping situated the AKP at the 
Westernism/anti-secularism pole.   
1.3. Different Appropriations of “ulusalcılık” As a Discursive Entity 
This topographic approach in mapping the competing nationalist discourses onto 
analytical settings can be considered as pragmatically true in descriptive terms for it 
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illustrates the major lines of demarcation across different appropriations of Turkish 
nationalism. However, what is misleading is that setting those political parties under the 
categorical definition of “ulusalcı” intrinsically assumes that each of those political 
parties at the anti-Western/secular pole utilize the same vocabulary of the “ulusalcı” 
discourse, while disregarding the heterogeneity of social actors within each of them. 
Moreover, Özkırımlı‟s logic which sets the diagram and axes of it (namely the 
Western/anti-Western line and secular/anti-secular line), freezes different appropriations 
of the meanings of “West” and “secular” which in fact vary along different political 
conjunctures and across different political parties addressed. However, Özkırımlı‟s 
mapping implies that within the hegemonic struggle of these actors, their discursive 
references to “West” and “secularism” conceive the same universal understanding of 
those determinants; thus, those political parties within the map are distinguishable (as 
well as identifiable) since they either accept or reject “West” and/or “secularism” as 
self-defined positions.  Putting these critiques, what do we see if we analyze 
comparatively how those political parties mentioned above appropriate “ulusalcılık” 
according to the laws of their discursive fields? If “ulusalcılık” is a hybrid discursive 
system maintained by varied social identities, how can we decide which appropriation 
of the “ulusalcı” phenomenon can be considered as the systematic representation of 
“ulusalcılık”? Arguing that these narratives are struggling for hegemonic domination 
over each other and hence constituting the political space through relations of 
oppositions, how and in what way the struggle among discursive fields configure us and 
other relations while referring to the phenomenon “ulusalcılık”? In other words, how the 
meaning of “ulusalcılık” as a shorthand definition changes across political discourses 
and constitutes different conceptions of “ulusalcı” as a discursive entity which is either 
included or excluded along differing discursive fields? Through the examples below, I 
will exemplify how different discursive appropriations of “ulusalcı” as an empty 
signifier configure varied us and other dichotomies in the political field. In doing so, I 
will illustrate how different articulatory practices determine the hegemonic meaning of 
“ulusalcı” depending on the contingent formation of discursive fields.  
 The main opposition party in the parliament, the CHP, has long been criticized 
by different groups, like social democrats, liberals, leftists and the AKP cadres, for not 
eliminating the “ulusalcı” circles within the party. Addressing these critiques, leader of 
the party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu stated that they were both “ulusalcı” and social democrat 
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since, to Kılıçdaroğlu, “ulusalcılık” meant nothing but developmentalist nationalism. 
Being one of the six Kemalist principles, Kılıçdaroğlu defined “ulusalcılık” as 
“milliyetçilik” in the context of left-wing Kemalism. 
They are asking us this question: Are you an ulusalcı or a social democrat? One 
of our six arrows is milliyetçiliki, and its Turkish translation is ulusalcılık. Of 
course we are milliyetçi; of course we are ulusalcı. Being an ulusalcı does not 
mean being a racist; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk defined the term in the best way it 
could be. [...] Our understanding of ulusalcılık focuses on the independence of 
this country, on the interests of this country. We are not the descendants of the 
followers of a political approach that is deployed to market the Republic of 
Turkey. [...] Our ulusalcılık embraces the kind of mentality that believes in its 
people, trusts and loves its people and that fights to that effect; it does not 
subcontract the country for the benefit of others, yet it wishes to raise free 
individuals and bring justice to the country. We are ulusalcı, but at the same 
time we are social democrats.
 5
(Emphasis added) 
In the context of Kemalist ulusçuluk, Kılıçdaroğlu positioned “ulusalcılık” with 
reference to universalist conceptualizations like the individual liberty, social justice, and 
national developmentalism. In this line of formulation, Kılıçdaroğlu equated 
“ulusalcılık” with Kemalist “milliyetçilik” while discursively identifying them with 
social democracy. In doing so, he appropriated “ulusalcılık” in positive terms and based 
on this framework stated that the CHP was an “ulusalcı” political party unlike those 
racist nationalists or those traitors selling off the country. As opposed to such enemy 
figures, Kılıçdaroğlu‟s formulation of “ulusalcılık” defined “the people” through 
universalist and developmentalist references. 
 Doğu Perinçek, leader of the Labor Party (ĠĢçi Partisi /ĠP), on the other hand, 
conceived “ulusalcılık” differently while defining the term within an anti-imperialist 
nationalist discourse.  According to Perinçek, neoliberal leftists and imperialists were 
trying to conspire against the Ulusalcı-Milliyetçi front, organized within the CHP, the 
ĠP and the MHP, in order to hinder their struggle for anti-imperial national 
independence.  
                                                          
5 “Bize soruyorlar: siz ulusalcı mısınız sosyal demokrat mısınız? Yahu bizim altı okumuzdan biri milliyetçilik, 
türkçesi de ulusalcılık. Elbette ki milliyetçiyiz, elbette ki ulusalcıyz. Ulsalcılık kafatasçılık değildir; bunu en güzel 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tanımlamıĢtır. [...] Bizim ulusalcık anlayıĢımız bu ülkenin bağımsızlığı üzerine 
endekslenmiĢtir, bu ülkenin çıkarları üzerine endekslenmiĢtir. Biz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‟ni pazarlamakla görevli bir 
siyasal anlayıĢtan gelmiyoruz. [...] Halkına inanan, halkına güvenen, halkını seven, bunun için mücadele eden, 
baĢkalarının taĢeronluğunu yapmayan, bu ülkede özgür bireyin olmasını isteyen, adaletin olmasını isteyen bir 
anayıĢtır ulusalcılığımız. Biz ulusalcıyız ama aynı zamanda sosyal demokratız.” (Kılıçdaroğlu‟ndan önemli 
açıklamalar. (Janary 22, 2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22415635.asp) 
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Look at those Neoliberal Leftists of ours, who say “let us distance ourselves 
from milliyetçilik.” None of them draws lines of demarcation between 
themselves and Kurdish Nationalism driven by US. Nor do they have any 
problem with the so-called Turkish nationalists guided by US. They always 
target Atatürk. I wish we drew the lines of border between imperialism and 
ourselves! Given the circumstances, why do they designate borders between 
Ulusalcılık and Milliyetçilik? Would it not be more righteous if we held 
ourselves at a distance from imperialism? Neither a distance nor a border, let us 
form a front against imperialism! Let us unite our nation and found an 
independent country! Well, those who insist on saying, “let us draw boundary 
lines against milliyetçilik,” object to the formation of such a milli cephe 
(national front). They want the vatansever (patriot) groups within CHP, ĠP, 
MHP to fight one another about drawing a line of demarcation between 
Ulusalcılık and Milliyetçililk and they want to keep the co-president of the 
Greater Middle East Initiative of US in power!
 6
 (Emphasis added) 
Perinçek defined the actors in the “Ulusalcı-Milliyetçi” front as “patriotic 
masses”. On the one hand this discursive constitution of “ulusalcılık” designated the 
national front as “us” fighting for the anti-imperialist liberation of the country, on the 
other hand anti-US and eurosceptic reactions situated certain leftist intellectuals, 
“pseudo Turkish nationalists” and the Kurdish movement as enemies threatening 
“Ataturkist” republic. Similar to Kılıçdaroğlu, Perinçek identified “ulusalcılık” with 
“milliyetçilik”, however through discursively merging them with anti-imperialist 
patriotism and ethnic nationalism. Excluding “liberals” and “the US” as enemy figures, 
Perinçek‟s formulation of “ulusalcılık” determined the meaning of “the people” as 
“millet” within the context of isolationist and anti-global emphases. Although the 
emphasis on “ulusalcılık” shifted from social democracy-Kemalist nationalism to 
patriotism-anti-imperialist nationalism, in a different discursive field Metin Çulhaoğlu 
rejected the relation between patriotism-anti-imperialism and “ulusalcılık”. Çulhaoğlu, a 
socialist intellectual involved in leftist political parties like the Turkish Communist 
Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/TKP) and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük 
ve Dayanışma Partisi/ÖDP), argued that “ulusalcı” actors were composed of middle 
classes without having a leftist ideology; and hence they cannot be defined as 
“patriotic”:  
                                                          
6“ġu “milliyetçiliğe sınır çekelim” diyen Neoliberal Solcularımıza bakın, hiçbiri ABD güdümlü Kürt Milliyetçiliği 
ile aralarına sınır çekmiyor. ABD güdümlü sözde Türk milliyetçileri ile de sorunları yok. Hedefleri hep Atatürk! 
Sınırı emperyalizmle aramıza çeksek! Bu durumda Ulusalcılık ile Milliyetçilik arasına niçin sınır çekiliyor? Sınırı, 
emperyalizmle aramıza çeksek daha doğru olmaz mı? Hatta sınır da değil, emperyalizme karĢı hep birlikte cephe 
tutsak! Milletimizi birleĢtirsek ve bağımsız bir ülke kursak! ĠĢte “sınır çekelim” diye tutturanlar, bu milli cephenin 
oluĢmasına karĢılar. Ġstiyorlar ki, CHP, ĠP, MHP içindeki vatansever kitle, birbiriyle Ulusalcı-Milliyetçi savaĢı yapsın 
ve ABD‟nin BOP EĢbaĢkanı iktidarda kalsın!” (Perinçek, D. (March 16, 2014). “Ulusalcılık ile milliyetilik arasına 
sınır çekmek” kimin görevi?. Aydınlık. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/ulusalcilik-ile-
milliyetcilik-arasina-sinir-cekmek-kimin-gorevi-makale,35797.html) 
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Could not they call themselves “yurtsever” (patriot) without meddling with such 
terms as ulusalcılık? Aspiring to dissociate itself from milliyetçilik, which is 
pregnant with such fascistic tendencies as racism, however finding yurtseverlik 
inadequate and thinking that this concept has been adopted by communists, the 
middle class rationale has eventually come up with the term “ulusalcılık” and 
decided upon that
7
. (Emphasis added)
 
 
In similar lines, Merdan Yanardağ, another socialist intellectual involved in the 
ÖDP and the orthodox Marxist SoL newspaper,  stated that anti-imperialist attitude of 
“ulusalcı” groups cannot be considered as “patriotism” since their nationalism reflected 
modernist enlightening nationalism of petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, both Çulhaoğlu and 
Yanardağ appropriated “ulusalcılık” in negative terms from a leftist nationalist 
conceptualization. However, more important than this comparison, Yanardağ argued 
that the “liberals” were purposively identifying “ulusalcılık” with “patriotism” in order 
to degrade leftist patriotism and reduce it into nationalism. Yanardağ stated: 
Liberals today address such movements as yurtseverlik, ulusalcılık and 
milliyetçilik that have different meanings and dimensions both as a concept and 
political stance as if they were all same and identical; they deliberately mix these 
terms with one another. [...] Furthermore, yurtseverlik has been made equal to 
milliyetçilik and it is evaluated almost in the same category as xenophobia.8  
Thus, according to Yanardağ, liberals were conspiring against leftist patriots 
through calling them “ulusalcı”. Therefore, Yanardağ distinguished “ulusalcılık”, 
“patriotism” and “nationalism” and positioned the “liberals” as an enemy figure against 
“patriots”. Conceiving “liberals” as an enemy figure was a common theme in the 
perception of the ultra-nationalists (ülkücü) circles, as well. Ümit Özdağ, then member 
of the MHP and became the party‟s MP in the 2015 elections, argued as follows: 
“[C]onservative democrat and liberal circles accused and still accusing Ülkücü 
[Ultranationalist] Movement of being ulusalcı in order to defame Turkish nationalists”9. 
Özdağ in his column article stated that “milliyetçi” and “ulusalcı” could not be 
                                                          
7“[U]lusalcılık gibi Ģeyleri karıĢtırmadan kendilerine “yurtsever” diyemezler miydi? [I]rkçı-faĢizan yönelimlere gebe 
milliyetçilikten (ulusçuluktan) kendini ayırmak isteyen, ancak yurtseverliği de „yetersiz‟ bulup ayrıca bu kavramın 
komünistler tarafından sahiplenildiğini düĢünen orta sınıf aklı, sonunda „ulusalcılık‟ kavramını icat edip bunda karar 
kılmıĢtır” (Çulhaoğlu, M. (December 12, 2012). ġu „ulusalcılık‟ meselesi. SoL. Retrieved May 4,2015, from 
http://haber.sol.org.tr/yazarlar/metin-culhaoglu/su-ulusalcilik-meselesi-64768) 
8“Bugün yurtseverlik, ulusalcılık ve milliyetçilik gibi birbirinden farklı anlamlara ve oyluma sahip akımlar liberaller 
tarafından hem bir kavram hem de bir politik tutum olarak bir ve aynı anlamda ele alınmakta, kasıtlı olarak 
karıĢtırılmaktadır. [...] Dahası, yurtseverlik, milliyetçilikle eĢitlenerek neredeyse yabancı düĢmanlığı ile aynı 
kategoride değerlendirilmektedir.” (Yanardağ, M. (March 6, 2009). Milliyetçilik, Yurtseverlik, Ulusalcılık. SoL. 
Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://haber.sol.org.tr/yazarlar/merdan-yanardag/milliyetcilik-yurtseverlik-ulusalcilik-
1745) 
9“[M]uhafazakâr demokrat ve liberal çevreler özellikle Türk milliyetçilerini ve Ülkücü Hareketi karalamak için 
Ülkücü Hareketi ulusalcı olmakla suçlamıĢlardır ve suçlamaktadır” (Özdağ, Ü. (February 2, 2011). Milliyetçilik ve 
ulusalcılık arasındaki farklar. Yeniçağ. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from  
http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/milliyetcilik-ve-ulusalcilik-arasindaki-farklar-17124yy.htm  
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considered as identical political groups since the latter was a leftist movement affiliated 
with Western life style and dictated their alienated ideologies to the people from above. 
Thus, “ulusalcı” understanding of “nationalism”, to Özdağ, was different from 
“milliyetçi” understanding of nationalism. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who was the leader of 
the racist-ultranationalist BBP, emphasized the same characteristics of “ulusalcı” groups 
while defining them as “Jacobins”: “We are not at the same position with the ulusalcı 
point of view which is Jacobin, commanding, conservative and suppressing millet in the 
name of the state” 10 . Although Yazıcıoğlu and Özdağ negated “ulusalcılık” while 
defining them as having elitist and dictating reactions, both of the ultranationalists 
stated that “ulusalcılık” and “milliyetçilik” shared the same fears about the territorial 
integrity and imperial threats against national unity. Thus, discursive appropriation of 
“ulusalcılık” within the ultranationalist circles positioned “ulusalcılık” conditionally, 
being both an elitist enemy and nationalist ally, while opposing “liberals” as traitors 
deceiving the public image of “milliyetçi” groups through calling them “ulusalcı”.   
As illustrated above, we can argue that depending on the positions within the 
political field the meaning of “ulusalcı” differs across discursive fields. Therefore, we 
can state that those political actors which are defined as “ulusalcı” in the dominant 
political discourse do not share the same “ulusalcı” vocabulary. On the contrary, 
different political discourses articulate “ulusalcılık” as different discursive entities. If 
we take the AKP‟s formulation on “ulusalcılık” into account, it can be observed that the 
situation does not change and the AKP‟s discourse configures “ulusalcılık” within a 
different set of relationality. During its more than a decade long rule in the government, 
the AKP circles and the pro-government media time to time addressed “ulusalcılık” 
under different contexts depending on the dynamics of those peculiar periods. For the 
economic concerns of the introduction part, I will not exemplify debates within the pro-
government media on the issue, but analyze how discourse of the pro-government 
media constituted “ulusalcılık” along different time periods in the coming chapters. 
However, quotes from Erdoğan‟s speeches below can be regarded as the dominant 
mode of conceiving the phenomenon “ulusalcılık” in the discursive field of the AKP. 
Erdoğan‟s formulation positioned “ulusalcı” groups as the antithetical of “the people” 
                                                          
10“Jakoben, tepeden inmeci, tutucu, devletin adına millet ezen ulusalcı anlayıĢlarla aynı yerde değiliz” (Muhsin 
Yazıcıoğlu: Orduyu göreve çağırmak vatanperverlik değil (April 10, 2007). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/roportaj/muhsin-yazicioglu-orduyu-goreve-cagirmak-vatanperverlik-degildir-39446  
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while designating the relation between the AKP and “the people” as an essential social 
bond for the actualization of economic and social justice in Turkey.  
We are the guarantee for the unity and togetherness in this country. Those 
calling themselves ulusalcı tried to interrupt our path; they could not and will 
not manage it. Those being prone to be the extensions of ulusalcı groups should 
not expect anything from us, they will not get it. We are the representatives of 
the people [millet]. You routed our path, and we will continue to walk on that 
path.
11
 (Emphasis added) 
In his formulation, Erdoğan on the one hand identified the AKP as the true 
representative of the “people”, on the other hand positioned “ulusalcı” groups as 
inhibiting forces trying to manipulate the tie between the people and the AKP. While 
stating that the AKP became the grant for the unity and peace in the country, Erdoğan 
defined “ulusalcı” groups as the enemy figure trying to prevent the AKP‟s services to 
the “people” and to “the nation”.  Quotation below crystallized this mode of 
appropriating “ulusalcılık” in the AKP‟s dominant discourse which defined “ulusalcı” 
groups hegemonically as the anti-people community. Erdoğan, during a speech about 
education of female students, expanded his focus from the headscarf issue to “ulusalcı” 
groups and to the national unity while dichotomizing “ulusalcı” to “millet/the people”.  
There is nothing like ulusalcı in this country any longer, there is the reality of 
millet; you will concede it. This country belongs to all of us, you will concede it. 
This country belongs to women at the same extent it belongs to men. You will 
not achieve to separate the freedom and rights of my sisters having headscarves 
and those who have not from each other; they are going to walk hand in hand, 
together. Seventy six million, including women, men, children, youngsters and 
elders, Turk, Kurd, Alevis, Sunni… We all own this country. At this country we 
all belong to the first class, and we are all one, a union; and we are Turkey all 
together.
12
 (Emphasis added) 
In his statement, Erdoğan rhetorically combined different social elements as the 
real people of Turkey; all equal and all as together. On the one hand, Erdoğan‟s 
formulation homogenized those social groups through rhetorical construction of 
                                                          
11 “Biz bu bu ülkede birliğin, beraberliğin dayanıĢmanın sigortasıyız. Bu ülkede ulusalcı geçinenler önümüzü 
kesmeye çalıĢtılar, kesemediler, kesemeyecekler. Ulusalcıların uzantısı olmaya aday olanlar bizden bir Ģey 
beklemesin, bulamayacaklar. Biz milletin temsilcisiyiz. Bizim rotamızı siz çizdiniz, bu yolda da yürümeye devam 
edeceğiz.” (Erdoğan: Ulusalcı geçinenler önümüzü kesemediler, kesemeyecekler. (January 20, 2013). T24. Retrieved 
May 4, 2015, from http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-ulusalci-gecinenler-onumuzu-kesemediler-
kesemeyecekler,221946) 
12 “Artık bu ülkede ulusalcı diye biĢey yok, bu ülkede artık millet gerçeği var; bunu göreceksiniz. Bu ülke hepimizin 
ülkesi, bunu göreceksiniz. Bu ülke ne kadar erkelerin ülkesiyse o kadar da kadınların ülkesi[.] Bu ülkede baĢı açık 
kardeĢlerim ile baĢı örtülü kardeĢlerimin özgürlüklerini, haklarını birbirinden ayıramayacaksınız; el ele, beraber 
yürüyecekler. 76 milyon, kadın, erkek, çocuk, genç, yaĢlı, Türk, Kürt, Alevi, Sünni... Hepimiz bu ülkenin sahibiyiz. 
Hepimzi bu ülkede birinci sınıfız ve hepimiz biriz, beraberiz, ve birlikte Türkiye‟yiz.”(Artık bu ülkede “ulusalcı” yok 
“millet” var. (October 11, 2013). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/video-
galeri/artik-bu-ulkede-ulusalci-yok-millet-var/10457) 
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equivalentiality under the Turkish national identity, on the other hand differentiated this 
popular identity from “ulusalcı” groups as an enemy violating the imagined harmony 
and unity of an inner totality. Thus, distinguished from above examples, the AKP‟s 
discursive articulation positioned the “ulusalcı” phenomenon as an excluded social 
enemy through rhetorically constituting an antagonism between the “real people” of 
Turkey and “ulusalcı” groups.  
1.4. Aim of The Research And Methodology 
As a result of the discussion above I argue that although varied actors in the 
political space utilized the same literal term “ulusalcı”, articulation of “ulusalcılık” 
constituted different discursive objects depending on different discursive fields and it 
effected the configuration of relations of oppositions over the political field. Therefore, 
both conceptual discussions and public debates in the political field regarding 
“ulusalcılık” remain imprecise and ill-defined. This hypothetical judgment does not 
deny that there emerged an isolationist defensive nationalism, which circulated in 
different branches of social segments covering the tutelary cadres of bureaucracy and 
public level actors, and hence popularized an agitated language of a chauvinist neo-
nationalism. However, locating this emerging phenomenon onto a group identity and as 
a movement, i.e. the act of giving a name and inserting an objective quality to it in order 
to hegemonically fix contingent imprecisions, is not free from power relations over the 
political field and set of judgments that they configure. Regarding the main theoretical 
framework of this thesis, we can argue that hegemonic struggle to fix the meaning of 
“ulusalcı” and configuring the political field through relations of oppositions, 
accordingly, effected the way “the people” and its constitutive elements are articulated 
discursively. As exemplified above, the content that attempted to hegemonically capture 
the meaning of “ulusalcılık in relation to “the people” shifted across political discourses.  
Based on this framework, this thesis aims to understand the formation of 
“ulusalcılık” in the populist discourse of the AKP. Tracing how the AKP discursively 
articulated the position of “ulusalcılık” in different time periods is crucial for 
understanding the configuration of enemy figures in the AKP‟s discursive field. 
“Ulusalcılık” became a broader discussion during the AKP government till 2002, and 
varied social actors recurrently addressed “ulusalcı” phenomenon with regard to key 
political crises of the era; such as political assassinations by the deep state forces, the 
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Republican Rallies period, the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials and during the Gezi 
demonstration. Therefore, this approach, can shed light on how the hegemonic 
discourse of the AKP attempted to arrest the meaning of “ulusalcılık” while addressing 
these controversial events and accordingly the perennial problems of the mainstream 
Turkish politics; such as democracy, tutelary regimes, military coup d‟états, status quo, 
bureaucratic elites etc. Secondly, through utilizing populist discourse theory, this study 
attempts to analyze the political logic behind the AKP‟s appeals to the people. The AKP 
claims itself as the true representative of the people, their economic and political 
interests and cultural values. In doing so, the AKP‟s rhetorical reference to “the people” 
on the one hand constitutes popular subjectivities, on the other hand interpellates “the 
people” in the light of certain social and moral codes and administrative technologies. 
Such codes function in bordering the social space and excluding certain elements over 
it. Therefore, discursive constitution of “the people” inevitably necessitates the 
configuration of “the other” through which a popular identity is assigned a sense of its 
own. Thus, the thesis, lastly, can be helpful in illustrating how the AKP‟s populist 
discourse configures the political space in the light of changing social dynamics, 
dislocates identities and hegemonically fixes them over “the people” and “anti-people” 
poles through articulating social antagonisms.   
1.4.1. Populist Discourse Theory, Hegemony And Rhetorical Constitution of The 
Social 
Populism has long been defined by academics in the field as a slippery concept 
having varied and vague descriptions which eventually lacked a comprehensive and 
confidential understanding of social movements (Laclau, 1977; Canovan, 1982; Bjerre-
Poulsen, 1986). Beside this elusive character, certain theoretical approaches on the issue 
addressed populism as a degrading pejorative label through which they classified 
populist movements as politically weak mass movements which lacked in reasonable 
and long term claims (Taggart, 2000). As opposed to those theories, Laclau 
conceptualizes populism as a royal road to understand the ontological constitution of the 
political (Laclau, 2005). Laclau‟s theory of populism is based on three sets of categories 
which are discourse, hegemony and rhetoric. Grounded on this theoretical framework, 
Laclau‟s populist discourse theory analyzes the political logic which constitutes “the 
people” discursively through hegemonic articulation of the political space.  
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Laclau defines discourse as the structuration of a certain meaningful field which 
pre-exists and determines the limits of perception, thought, objectivity and action 
(Laclau, 2007). Laclau does not restrict discourse to literary forms but states that any 
relationality over the social plays a role in constituting signifying elements and hence 
discursive fields. Therefore, rejecting the discursive/extra discursive dichotomy this 
conception of discourse considers words and actions, ideologies and movements 
(Laclau, 2005, pp. 13, 68) as signifying elements. Laclau‟s discourse theory differs from 
Saussurean linguistic and structuralism, since he conceptualizes language not as an 
enclosed totality but as a precarious totality effect. Defining the language as a signifying 
system of differences assumes that the language is a centered totality and that totality is 
present in each act of signification. In other words, this conceptualization of 
signification necessitates that the language as a totality sustains its systemic structure 
through the signifying chain which determines the meaning of objects. However, for the 
conceptual understanding of totality requires grasping the limits of the system, the idea 
of totality paradoxically necessitates something beyond the systemic limits; an excess, 
which disrupts the idea of totality. Although this differential other makes the idea of 
totality impossible, it is at the same time necessary in order to conceive the limits of a 
whole. Therefore, the totality is always incommensurable and cannot be grasped 
conceptually as an enclosed system. However, totality is produced as an effect of a 
temporary dislocation and demarcation of a negative difference, which means exclusion 
of a constitutive other. Thus, “if the systematicicty of the system is a direct result of the 
exclusionary limit, it is only that exclusion that grounds the system as such” (Laclau, 
2007). Based on this conceptualization of signification, Laclau states that through the 
excluded element the totality reaches a sense of its own cohesion, which means that 
“vis-à-vis the excluded element, all other differences are equivalent to each other- 
equivalent in their common rejection of the excluded identity” (Laclau, 2005, p.70). 
Thus, identity is a result of the tension between equivalential and differential logics. In 
sum, to Laclau, totality is always a failed totality since its representation as an identity is 
only possible through contingent effect of equivalential bonds as opposed to the 
excluded elements constituting the difference. The relation between the equivalential 
and differential logics takes us to the notion of articulation and configuration of the 
social field. 
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Articulatory practices constitute and organize the social space. Laclau and 
Mouffe define articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such 
that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001). In doing so, articulatory practice structures discursive fields in which elements 
occupy differential positions. Discursive formation is never sutured totally and the 
relationality among elements is always open to contingent dislocations and 
rearticulations. However, what articulation achieves is the temporary fixation of those 
heterogeneous social elements in the light of a simplifying and homogenizing logic. 
Based on Laclau‟s theory of populism, we can summarize the effects of articulation at 
two operational levels. One is that homogenization necessitates subversion of 
differences into equivalences, and this is nothing but an operation of analogy as a 
metaphorical transposition (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 110). Therefore, Laclau argues 
that rhetorical elements like metaphor, metonymy, and catachresis play a constitutive 
role in organizing social elements and configuring the political space
13
. Secondly, 
rhetorical articulation of the social space
14
 and simplification of differential elements 
goes along with the configuration of an antagonistic frontier
15
. This frontier divides the 
social space into two incommensurable camps which are structured around two 
incompatible equivalential chains. This tropological process attempts to dislocate and 
analogically fix different social elements as monopolized discursive identities onto two 
antagonistic poles which eventually designate “us and other” positions. At this moment, 
one difference, without ceasing to be an isolated element, takes up the representation of 
those incommensurable elements along the equivalential chain. And hence, this 
privileged signifier temporarily arrests the content of the pole in which it has been 
overdetermined. Laclau defines “this operation of taking up, by a particularity, of an 
incommensurable universal signification” as hegemony (Laclau, 2005, p. 70). At the 
political level, this is nothing other than the rhetorical articulation of varied signifying 
elements under the force of a particular privileged signifier, i.e. an empty signifier like 
“people”, as opposed to the other side of the antagonistic frontier, i.e. the “enemy” 
(“There is nothing like ulusalcı in this country any longer, there is the reality of millet… 
                                                          
13 For further discussion on the relation between metonymy and metaphor, and their effect on the maintenance of 
hegemony see Laclau (2001) 
14 For further discussion on the rhetorical constitution of the social space and the political identities accordingly see 
Laclau (2008), Kaplan (2010), Riha (2011) and Povinelli (2012).  
15 For further discussion on the constitution of antagonistic frontiers and their effect on the production of the political 
field see Panizza (2005), Stavrakakis (2005) and Arditi (2010). 
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Seventy six million, including women, men, children, youngsters and elders, Turk, 
Kurd, Alevis, Sunni… We are Turkey all together”).  
In sum, this theoretical approach on populism grounds a framework based on 
discursive totalization, hegemony and privileged signifiers which operate in knotting 
and representing varied elements as identical to each other and in opposition to a 
constituted enemy camp.  According to Laclau, configuration of the discursive field and 
hegemonic fixation of social elements on it can be conceptualized as tropological 
operations. Therefore, rhetorical operations, being more than mere literal formations, 
play a constitutive role in configuring and operating the social space. Rhetorical 
articulation of social elements constitutes equivalential chains among incompatible 
social groups which metonymically combine them as identical to each other over a 
contiguous setting. Then, a particularity, hegemonically encapsulating the whole from 
within, operates as a metaphoric figure through substituting the whole with its name. 
Therefore, what hegemonically fixes heterogeneous and contingent constituents is the 
performative force of naming which temporarily captures incommensurable entities as a 
totality effect; as Laclau puts it, the name is the ground of the thing (Laclau, 2006, p. 
109). Based on this conceptual relationality, we can talk about rhetoricity of 
articulation, discursivity of the political field, and rhetorization of politics. “The 
people”, then, is a discursive constitution whose content is arrested hegemonically as a 
result of the rhetorical articulation of the political field. Regarding the configuration of 
enemy figures, the same operating logic is also valid. Based on this theoretical 
background, my thesis focuses on the “ulusalcı” element being one of the constituents 
of the enemy figure in the populist discourse of the AKP. Different than those academic 
studies conceptualized “ulusalcılık” as a movement or ideology, this approach tries to 
locate “ulusalcı” phenomenon from a relational perspective and traces the hegemonic 
attempts of the AKP‟s discourse in capturing the meaning of the term.  
1.5. Research Design 
Based on this argumentative ground, in the thesis I illustrate how the AKP‟s 
discourse configure the political space, us and other relations, and the hegemonic 
content which determine the constitutive elements of “ulusalcı” being an enemy figure 
as opposed to the “people”. Chapters of the study analyzing the articulatory practices of 
the AKP based on textual analysis of political speeches of then Prime Minister Tayyip 
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Erdoğan and certain spokesmen of the AKP, and news paper columns from the pro-
government media instruments. I utilized to a large extent column articles and news 
narrative structures from Yeni ġafak daily and Star Daily between the periods from 
2007 to 2013. In some quotes, in order to cite the full speeches of political actors 
without editorial cuts, I utilized Hurriyet newspaper. Configuration of the AKP‟s 
discourse cannot be fully comprehended unless the pro-government media is taken into 
consideration. Yeni ġafak and Star newspapers are important resources in order to 
follow the mobilization of the pro-AKP columnists towards being a part of the AKP 
cadres. For example, Yalçın Akdoğan, one of the main ideologues of the AKP and 
involved in Yeni ġafak and Star dailies as a columnist in different time periods, became 
the head-advisor of the President Tayyip Erdoğan and currently serving as the AKP‟s 
MP. Yiğit Bulut, a Star columnist who gained a controversial reputation after his 
conspiratorial declarations during the Gezi Park protests, became the advisor of the 
President Erdoğan, as well. Similarly, Mehmet Metiner, who was a columnist in Yeni 
ġafak and Star, became the party‟s MP in the 2011 and 2015 general elections. 
Following this line of mobilization, Yasin Aktay, an academic and Yeni ġafak 
columnist, Markar Eseyan, a Yeni ġafak columnist, and Orhan Miroğlu, a Star 
columnist, became the AKP‟s MPs in the 2015 general election. Although these 
newspapers included critical voices previously, most of those columnists either left 
mentioned dailies or have been fired along the years and especially after the Gezi Park 
protests. Currently these newspapers mostly function as the propaganda instruments of 
the AKP government and they recurrently cover socio-political tensions with a 
conspiring logic
16
. I considered this parallelism in Erdoğan‟s rhetoric along his speeches 
and discourse of the pro-government media as a constitutive relationality which 
configure the AKP‟s dominant political discourse. 
The thesis focuses on three time periods which are the Republican Rallies period 
in 2007, the constitutional referendum period in 2010, and the Gezi Park protests in 
2013. Regarding the dynamics of the era, 2007 period was crucial for it included on the 
                                                          
16  In the past years, oppositional voices criticized intimidating language and un-skeptical stance of the pro-
government media against alleged accusations and evidences provided for the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, and the 
KCK investigations. After the Gezi protests and December 17-25 corruption case, discourse of the pro-government 
media highly utilized conspiracy theories. These newspapers argued that the Gezi Park protests were one step of a 
planned coup against the AKP government organized by the “interest lobby” which was a term manufactured with 
anti-Semitic connotations. In similar lines, regarding the 17/25 corruption scandal, the pro-government media argued 
that international forces were collaborating with the Gülen movement in order to overthrow the AKP government, 
which they defined as the “Big scenario” and the “global coalition”. In order to strengthen this conspiring logic, Yeni 
ġafak published some documents through which they argued that Fethullah Gülen was a crypto-Jew.  
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one hand a chain of political assassinations targeted different groups like the Christian 
community, a judge in the State Council and Hrant Dink. At the time, “ulusalcılık” was 
a highly controversial topic debated as a neo-nationalist wave, and many social sectors 
including the pro-government media identified this chain of assassinations with 
“ulusalcı” organizations. Beside, 2007 period covered the election period. Tayyip 
Erdoğan was the AKP‟s possible candidate for the presidency and this situation led 
certain crises between state bureaucracy, parliament and the military to emerge with 
regard to concerns on secularism and Islamization. Based on this framework, in the first 
chapter I focused on the Republican Rallies, being a series of mass demonstrations 
concerned on secularism and Kemalist principles, for it became one of the major 
references in the AKP‟s discursive field regarding the rise of “ulusalcılık”. Accordingly, 
I analyzed how the AKP articulated its discourse along rising social and bureaucratic 
reactions against decisions of the party. In the first chapter I argued that the AKP‟s 
political appeal was based on a populist discourse and the notion of „ulusalcı‟ was a 
constitutive element in this discursive field. Discursive formulations of the AKP 
enabled the party and pro-government media to confront oppositional voices as extra-
parliamentarian impeding forces against reformist attempts of the government. 
Erdoğan‟s political rhetoric depended on two interrelated aspects; a developmentalist 
discourse facilitating an image of the elected government in the service of its people, 
and a rhetorical reference to the ballot box that constituted „the people‟ as a popular 
subject in decision making. In the light of this discursive field of the AKP, components 
of the anti-people pole and „ulusalcı‟ as a constituent of it were configured accordingly, 
as well. During the 2007 period of the Republican Rallies, legislative crises and political 
assassinations discourse of the pro-government media defined „ulusalcılık‟ 
hegemonically as „deep state‟ organizations targeting the AKP government through 
manipulative terror acts. 
In the second chapter, I focused on the constitutional referendum period in 2010. 
As a result of a series of crises between the judiciary and the parliament, the AKP 
attempted to prepare an amendment package which aimed to change the composition of 
the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu/HSYK), 
and appointment procedures of judges in the HSYK. Within this era, the AKP‟s political 
discourse highly addressed such notions as “status quo”, “tutelage”, “bureaucratic elite” 
and “secular white middle classes”. Questioning the rhetorical combination of “deep 
23 
 
state” aspect with “status quo” through the “ulusalcı” reference, in the second chapter I 
analyzed whether political discourse of the AKP and elements in it transformed during 
the 2010 constitutional referendum era. While tracing conceptualization of “white Turk” 
and “status quo” attributed to the anti-people camp, I emphasized that in this period the 
rhetoric of the AKP articulated the antagonism between „democratic change‟ and 
„tutelary mentality‟ as the center of its discursive field. Therefore, in contrast to 2007, 
constant reference to „tutelage/status quo‟ took the place of the privileged capacity of 
the „deep state‟ in constituting the enemy pole. In light of this shift, tropes such as 
„mentality of the CHP‟, „secular whites‟ and „status quo elites‟ configured the 
antagonistic frontier between the people and anti-people camps. Based on the field of 
discursive articulations, the rhetoric of the AKP defined the anti-people camp as the 
„elite No voters‟ who were in favor of „exclusionist status quo‟ while resisting 
„democratic changes‟. According to this discursive field, in the period of 2010 
constitutional referendum, the AKP and pro-government media defined „ulusalcılık‟ as 
a constitutive component of the anti-people pole representing „educated, laic, white 
supporters of status quo/tutelary forces‟.  
In the third chapter, after following the AKP‟s majoritarian and authoritarian 
turn in policy making and in the general political discourse, I focused on the Gezi Park 
protests in 2013. My aim in this chapter was, which can be regarded as the general 
concern of the thesis as well, how and why the AKP cadres and the pro-government 
media attempted to capture the meaning of the Gezi protests as an “ulusalcı” uprising 
more significantly during the first couple of weeks of the ongoing protests. I argued that 
during the protests there configured a contingent counter-hegemonic appropriation of 
the “people” in the discursive field of the demonstrators along the streets which 
eventually confronted the AKP‟s hegemonic political discourse. In order to overwhelm 
this confrontation of their representational regime, the AKP attempted to hegemonically 
dominate the political space through configuring a counter-discourse which would 
arrest the meaning of the Gezi protests as an enemy organization. Although there were 
shifts and indefinite appropriations, dominant discourse of the AKP mobilized the 
constitutive elements of the enemy figures configured along 2007 and 2010 periods in 
order to mobilize the memory of “ulusalcı” components. In doing so, the AKP‟s 
discourse articulated the Gezi protests as a coup attempt organized by “ulusalcı” forces 
of the “old Turkey” and international forces including the “interest lobby” and the 
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international media. In sum, I argued that based on this counter-discourse the pro-
government media and the AKP cadres addressed “ulusalcı” notion as a metaphoric 
substitute of former enemy figures; such as “white Turk”, “exclusionary laicists”, 
„mentality of the CHP‟, “coup supporters”, “old Turkey” etc. This metonymic 
(re)articulation through the hegemonic fixation of “ulusalcı” reference, discursively 
merged inner enemy figures with conspiracy elements like the “interest lobby” within 
the AKP‟s counter-discourse.  
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2. „ULUSALCILIK‟ AS „DEEP STATE‟ 
2.1. Rise of The AKP And Defensive Nationalism From 2002 To 2007 
After a dramatic socio-economic crisis in the early 2000‟s, the AKP came to 
power in the 2002 general elections. Gaining 34 percent of overall votes, the AKP put 
an end to ongoing coalition governments that had been in rule throughout the 90‟s. 
Since then, the AKP has increased its vote rates in each election and remained as the 
majority government in the parliament. This became the era throughout which Turkey 
experienced major shifts and changes with regard to its state ideology, constitutional 
reforms, economic and international programs, and socio-cultural realms. Behind this 
success, a major legitimacy crisis in the late 2000‟s paved the way for the AKP in 
gaining such extensive legislative power. Not only local tensions but also changing 
global and regional politics contributed to this transformation in Turkey (Keyman & 
ÖniĢ, 2004). On the local level, growing corruption cases within political parties and 
breakdown of bureaucratic accountability, rising inflation rates due to political 
instability, and hence, the collapse of economic system resulted with the 2001 economic 
crisis. Considering the social realm, human rights violations and the suppression of 
demands for eventually led certain demands for change to be raised by religious and 
ethnic groups. On the one hand, the after-effects of February 28 military intervention 
deepened the laic-anti-laic conflict; on the other hand state-supported extralegal 
violence against Kurds resulted with a political deadlock producing further social crises 
(Özkazanç, 2002). Under these conditions, shared feelings of despair and idea that 
legislative bodies were ineffective in solving these tensions have resulted in a major 
legitimacy crisis.  
Apart from these local tensions, global dynamics of the era also pushed Turkey 
to reform its inner and international relations. The 9/11 attacks shocked the US and 
European Union, and resulted with the rise of a need to control radical Islam in the 
Middle East. In accordance there emerged the aim to make Islam moderate and to 
enable integration of the Middle East to global relations. That would eventually mean 
26 
 
transforming authoritarian and bureaucratic political systems towards a de-centralized 
and liberalized state forms (Uzgel, 2009). According to the US, Turkey was an 
exemplary case for reconciliation of Islam and democracy. In the local level these 
interventionist and restructuring attitudes, together with claims of the EU on the Cyprus 
issue, gradually evolved into a rising wave of anti-Westernism and isolationist 
nationalism. Instigating a climate of reactionist radicalization, rising tensions of the era 
eventually ended up with a shared distrust towards coalition parties in the government, 
and hence with a major legitimacy crisis. 
Beside political turbulences, economic interests of big finance groups also 
played a crucial part considering the crises which carried the AKP to the legislative 
power as a reformist government. Top local business groups demanded a reformist 
government in the face of economic deadlocks and instabilities due to insufficient 
coalition parties. Therefore, those finance groups supported a restructuring process that 
would integrate the closed economy model into open neoliberal market. Besides, 
Anatolian finance groups composed of local conservative bourgeoisie, favored election 
of a liberal minded government for that situation would increase their economic 
possibilities in a globally integrated economy (Patton, 2007; GümüĢçü & Sert, 2009). 
Out of these dynamics and demands for change, the AKP managed to gain the 
governing power out of a legitimacy crisis and economic collapse in the early 2000‟s. In 
this period, the AKP justified their liberal minded reformism and anti-radical stance 
against the National Outlook (Milli Görüş/MG) tradition through the pragmatic 
formulation of “conservative democracy”.  
According to the AKP‟s ideologues, the understanding of “conservative 
democracy” separated the AKP from the MG tradition while prioritizing social 
reconciliation, integration of global and local economies, and tolerance towards 
different identities (Akdoğan, 2006). Yalçın Akdoğan, who was one of the main 
ideologues of the AKP and currently the head advisor of President Tayyip Erdoğan, 
defined conservative democracy as an attempt to reformulate and discharge the political 
tensions that emerged as a result of the central state form, which isolated demands of 
the periphery. Akdoğan, in his article “The Meaning of Conservative Democratic 
Political Identity” published in 2006, highlighted certain causes for the constant 
emergence of conflicts within such a political system. He stated that the AKP‟s effort to 
reform established political structures had to be based on putting „reconciliation‟ further 
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instead of the „conflict‟ between the center and the periphery. Regarding this 
dichotomous relation, Akdoğan argued that the AKP had to translate demands of the 
periphery while concerning the common interests of the center in order to implement 
reforms for legislative and economic changes. While accusing former representatives of 
the MG tradition for their lack of such an integrationist perspective, Akdoğan argued 
that radical interest of Islamist parties justified interventions of the secular military and 
bureaucratic cadres (Akdoğan, 2006, p. 61). Akdoğan, while admitting that political 
Islam was not endurable under the realpolitik of Turkey, stated that  
The JDP is not trying to regenerate and duplicate problematic past applications 
of conservatism; rather it seeks to reshape the concept of conservatism within 
the socio-cultural structure of Turkey through development of a more reasonable 
approach to politics, while at the same time absorbing lessons from past failures 
(Akdoğan, 2006, p. 55). 
Conservative democrat identity enabled the AKP to have a positive image in the 
eyes of international and local actors regarding its breaking with the MG tradition. 
Therefore, through adapting a multicultural language and reformist perspective, the 
AKP‟s conservative democrat discourse helped eliminating suspicions of the secularist 
liberal groups, as well as the military and bureaucratic cadres (ġimĢek, 2013). Through 
their attempts to introduce the party, ideologues and founders of the AKP tried to 
formulate new set of oppositions on the political field. In times of a socio-economic 
turmoil, the AKP gained a remarkable popular support in the 2002 general elections 
while former coalition parties could not achieve to pass the ten percent election 
threshold. As a result of an economic crises and a shared distrust against inefficient 
political structures, the AKP‟s gaining such a popular sympathy can be analyzed in the 
light of the literature on populist practices. In accordance with this line of 
conceptualization, Panizza argues that populist practices emerge due to “the failure of 
existing social and political institutions to confine and regulate political subjects into a 
relatively stable order” (Panizza, 2005). In such a period of socio-political 
unsettlements, the AKP tried to integrate different social segments through configuring 
a new political discourse. In doing so, the AKP reformulated alignments and political 
frontiers among social groups in order to “fix and unhinge the divides that constitute 
populist identities” (Panizza, 2005, p. 17). 
The rupture from political Islamism of the MG movement enabled further 
support to the newly emerging AKP for two reasons. Firstly, this differentiation would 
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invalidate the tension between political Islam and laicism, and shield the party from 
interventions of military and judiciary officers of the Kemalist state establishment. 
Secondly, the promise of global integration would enable a support of liberals, 
democrats and secular finance groups. This reformist image of the AKP discursively 
merged premises on democratization and economic rationalization to each other. This 
integrationist approach addressed EU accessions as a way to legitimize new 
formulations of the AKP on political and economic globalism (Özkazanç, 2002). 
Considering the early years of the AKP, in accordance with this paradigm “the party 
leadership reaped the benefits of globalization and potential EU membership as a means 
of constructing and sustaining a broad-based electoral coalition” (ÖniĢ, 2007, p. 252). In 
addition, the AKP continued the IMF plan of austerity which had been formulated by 
Kemal DerviĢ for the former coalition government. In this way, the AKP provided a 
discourse covering such notions as economic development, expansion of individual 
freedoms and consolidation of democracy (GümüĢçü &Sert, 2010; CoĢar & Özman, 
2004) from a neoliberal and pragmatic perspective. Thus, on the one hand, through 
restructuring requirements of the EU negotiations the governing party displayed itself as 
accommodate to Kemalist principles on modernization and civilization; on the other 
hand, through implementing the IMF regulations the AKP strengthened its ties with 
secular business groups and liberals. 
After the election and till 2005, however, the AKP program oscillated between 
conservative regulations and democratic reforms. The AKP prioritized the promotion of 
conservative figures from its electoral circles through clientelistic patronage networks. 
Moreover, considering the privatization of state property the AKP favored conservative 
bourgeoisie during auctions. Therefore, while the Anatolian bourgeoisie and 
conservative middle classes increased their involvement in the economic field, Islamic 
codes became more explicit in the cultural field (ÖniĢ, 2007; Öktem, 2011). Beside 
these social and cultural transformations, statements of the AKP cadres on alcohol, 
headscarf, and adultery issues made the party controversial for the secular bureaucratic 
cadres at the military and judiciary levels. 
Regarding the foreign politics of the AKP, this tension between the AKP and the 
bureaucratic cadres has grown in years due to the government‟s support of the EU 
accession criteria which was requesting Turkey to open seaports and airports to Cyprus, 
and recognize cultural rights of Kurds and religious groups. However, after long 
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endured negotiations the EU offered a “privileged partnership” status for Turkey rather 
than an equal membership. This situation eventually diminished the credibility of EU 
membership at the public level while at the same time triggering feelings of humiliation 
and chauvinistic nationalism (Patton, 2007; Avcı, 2011). Beside this rising reactionist 
tendency against demands of the international actors, the EU‟s pressure on Turkey to 
recognize the Armenian genocide eventually resulted with the emergence of a defensive 
nationalist block (ÖniĢ, 2007). Merging left and right wing reactionary nationalist 
circles, this defensive nationalist wave manifested a fear towards the erosion of national 
sovereignty and partition of the territorial unity by foreign forces and their local 
collaborators. Culminating towards a general skepticism against EU and USA, 
defensive nationalist reactions perceived the current situation as the second Sèvres 
(Guida, 2008). In this political atmosphere between 2002 and 2007, the term “ulusalcı” 
started to be circulated along debates of columnists and analyses of journalists with 
reference to effects of this rising neo-nationalist wave. In a newspaper article, Fuat 
Keyman defined this neo-nationalist dynamic as an integration of leftist ideology and 
nationalist isolationist tendencies. He called this emerging ideology „milliyetçi-
ulusalcı‟: 
[Today] we encounter a milliyetçi-ulusalcı leftist ideology that has turned its 
face to the state instead of turning it to the society; that is interested in the 
powers of security and sovereignty instead of the problems of social justice and 
that aims at protecting the existing state-centered system against the world 
instead of changing and transforming Turkey on the basis of democratization.
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Within this overall atmosphere, EU skepticism and chauvinist radicalism have 
merged reactionary sentiments of nationalist left and right politics to each other. This 
defensive block consisted of former anti-imperialist Kemalist leftists and radical 
nationalist parties. In 2002, news reports stated that Ġlhan Selçuk, a leftist intellectual 
and Cumhuriyet daily columnist, after a meeting with the MHP deputies declared that 
they agreed on common concerns about the EU threat against national unity. Within the 
same period, a group of active and retired bureaucratic personnel from the military and 
the judiciary started to establish paramilitary units whose ostensible appearance were 
civil society organization. Having different titles like “the Union of Patriotic Forces” 
                                                          
17 “[B]ugün, „yüzünü topluma değil devlete dönmüĢ, sosyal adalet sorunlarıyla değil güvenlik ve egemenlik 
süreçleriyle ilgilenen ve Türkiye'yi demokratikleĢme temelinde değiĢtirmeyi ve dönüĢtürmeyi değil, var olan devlet-
merkezci sistemi dünyaya karĢı korumayı amaçlayan milliyetçi-ulusalcı bir sol ideoloji‟ var karĢımızda.” (Keyman, 
F. (April 10, 2005). Milliyetçi-ulusalcı sol. Radikal. Retrieved May 7, 2015, from  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=4552) 
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(Vatan Sever Kuvvetler Birliği) or “National Forces Society” (Kuvayı Milliye Derneği), 
these paramilitary groups included certain figures who were detained in the Ergenekon 
trial in 2008, such as the lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz and retired general Veli Küçük18. 
Consisting of far-right nationalist parties, certain leftist intellectuals, military and 
judiciary cadres, these organizations gathered in order to “revive the Kuva-i Milliye 
soul and counterbalance the imperialist powers” (Grigoriadis & Özer, 2010). Column 
discussions and newspaper articles called this emerging phenomenon as the Coalition of 
Red Apple (Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu). Journalists argued that the Coalition was 
combining „ulusal sol‟ (nationalist left) and ultra nationalist parties like the MHP and 
the BBP. According to the news of the era, a number of those so-called civil society 
associations were detected in having extra-legal assassinations in different regions of 
Turkey
19
.  
In this political climate, beside the rising defensive nationalist reactions, political 
assassinations started to emerged in different regions of the country. In November 2005, 
one week after the EU negotiations were started, a bookshop has been bombed in 
ġemdinli, a Kurdish province in the eastern Turkey. Inhabitants of the town captured a 
car after the bombing, and they found that two of the bombers were military officers 
and one was an ex-PKK informant. Along the turmoil, habitants attacked police and 
gendarmerie stations and local people gave deaths throughout protests (Öktem, 2011). A 
number of investigations under the article 301, a law code that criminalized insult to 
„Turkishness‟, targeted Elif ġafak, Baskın Oran, Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink who 
declared their opinions on the Armenian question (Onar, 2007). While the rising 
nationalist atmosphere publically threatened and degraded such intellectuals, in Trabzon 
Father Andrea Santoro was shot dead by a sixteen year old killer in February 2006. 
During the same year in May, the Cumhuriyet newspaper has been bombed. One week 
after the bombing, a judge of the Council of State, Yücel Özbilgin, was killed by a 
radical Islamist while the headscarf issue was controversially debated. A couple of 
                                                          
18 Kemal Kerinçsiz is a Turkish nationalist lawyer and was the leader of Grand Lawyer‟s Association who became a 
disputed figure after he has filed cases against a number of artists, intellectuals and journalists including Orhan 
Pamuk, Elif ġafak, Baskın Oran and Hrant Dink. Through the law code 301, a code that criminalized any “insult” to 
Turkishness, Kerinçsiz made official complaints against more than a hundred public intellectuals who expressed their 
thougts at different platforsm on the Armenian and human rights questions. Both the retired general Veli Küçük, who 
played a pivotal role in the organization of paramilitary deep state units, and Kerinçsiz were charged with being 
involved in the Ergenekon terror organization and sentenced to life imprisionment as a part of the Ergenekon trials. In 
2014, Kerinçsiz and Küçük, together with all convicts in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, have been released after 
the Constitutional Court‟s decision for a retrial.  
19See: Vatanseverlik' yarıĢındaki örgütler emekli asker dolu-Al sana 'sivil' toplum! (February 17, 2007). Radikal. 
Retrieved May 9, 2015, from http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=213197 
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months later, in January 2007 Hrant Dink
20
 was shot from behind by a seventeen year 
old killer. 
In the aftermath of these events, Ekrem Dumanlı, one of the leading columnists 
in Gülen Movement‟s newspaper Zaman, interpreted the situation as the manipulative 
activity of deep state forces in order to agitate and manipulate political climate in the 
country. Dumanlı defined these activities as that of a clique of undemocratic elites 
organizing manipulative acts, while he defined them as „ulusalcı‟:  
There are various labels tagging ulusalcılık. Leftism, rightism, Islamism… 
Scrape off these labels; there is only one truth beneath them: Comitadjism. A 
small clique that could not digest democracy conceals its leftism under the guise 
of milliyetçilik or cloaks its trade in a guise of sectarianism. The range of 
identities prepared through the mentality of a Russian nested doll consists of 
moves aiming at confusion. The fact that an elite clique who regards itself as the 
true owners of the regime undergoes into gang formation, comes through every 
activity shaking Turkey and then puts the blame on innocent people in a very 
shameless fashion is not vain. With the techniques of psychological war they 
have been familiar with all along, they try to drag the public into different 
adventures. But their endeavor is just futile…21 
Dumanlı defined the constituents of „ulusalcılık‟ majorly as an elite clique 
within the state having ties with deep state forces. Dumanlı stated that this exclusive 
clique was utilizing deep state forces in order to manipulate public peace and maintain 
their power through anti-democratic means. Here, in this frame of explanation the term 
„ulusalcı‟ did not address the public realm, but defined as paramilitary activities 
controlled by the state elite.  
Therefore on the one hand rising defensive nationalist and reactionist 
isolationism at the public level, on the other hand rising paramilitary organizations and 
                                                          
20 Hrant Dink was a Turkish-Armenian journalist and public intellectual who was well-known for his struggle for 
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and social rights. In several cases, he was prosecuted for denigrating Turkishness. In 
January 19, 2007, Dink was shot from behind by a member of the Alperen organization which is the youth 
association of the racist-Turkish nationalist Great Union Party (BBP). After his assassination investigations revealed 
how the killer was guided and protected by the intelligence service, gendarmerie and the Istanbul police. In line with 
this, although Dink‟s lawyers argued that the assassination was an organized criminal act including civil servants and 
police officers, the court overlooked the murder and elaborated the case on the base of a mere criminal act. In 
October 2014, The Supreme Court of Appeals decided that the investigation violated the principle of effective 
investigation and overturned the verdict of initial the trial process which paved the way for a retrial of the convicts.   
21“Ulusalcılığı ambalajlayan çok değiĢik etiketler var. Solculuk sağcılık. Ġslamcılık... Bu etiketleri kazıyın; altından 
tek bir gerçek çıkacaktır: Komitacılık. Demokrasiyi içine sindirememiĢ dar bir zümre kâh milliyetçilik postuna 
bürünüp solculuğunu gizliyor kâh tarikatçılık kisvesine sarılıp tüccarlığını. MatruĢka mantığı ile hazırlanmıĢ 
kimlikler silsilesi, kafa karıĢtırmaya yönelik hamlelerden oluĢuyor. Kendini rejimin gerçek sahibi sayan elit bir 
zümrenin ulusalcılık oluĢumuyla çete yapılanmalarına girmesi, Türkiye'yi sarsmaya yönelik her eylemin içinden 
bunların çıkması; sonra da büyük bir arsızlık içinde bu güruhun masum insanları suçlaması, boĢuna değil. Öteden beri 
aĢina oldukları psikolojik harp teknikleriyle kamuoyunu baĢka mecralara sürüklemeye çalıĢıyorlar. Ancak nafile...” 
(Dumanlı, E. (February 13, 2007). Milliyetçilik, Ulusalcılık, Komitacılık. Zaman. Retrieved May 9, 2015, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekrem-dumanli/milliyetcilik-ulusalcilik-komitacilik_499565.html) 
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political assassinations organized by deep state forces eventually mobilized concerns on 
the territorial unity, secularism and the AKP‟s relations with international actors. Within 
this era, Turkey witnessed the Republican Rallies in April 2007. While the period of 
office for the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was about to end in May and Tayyip 
Erdoğan was a strong possible candidate of the AKP government, these series of 
meetings were organized against Erdoğan‟s candidacy while voicing concerns on 
secularism and national unity. 
2.2. Shifting Definitions of „ulusalcı‟: Agitating Organizations, Laicist Elites, 
Masons? 
 In what follows, regarding the tensions of the era, I will first briefly describe the 
elementary features of the Republican Rallies, groups involved and claims they voiced. 
Secondly, I will analyze the AKP‟s political discourse in capturing the series of Rallies 
in the light of basic components Erdoğan‟s rhetorical formulations as well as analyses 
of the pro-government media. In doing so, I will illustrate how those discussed tensions 
of the era effected the hegemonic articulation of the meaning of the term „ulusalcı‟ in 
the 2007 Republican Rallies period. From the perspective of articulation and discourse 
theory, I will question how the AKP‟s political discourse captured and fixed the 
meaning of “ulusalcı” through hegemonic articulation of the political field. Considering 
the relation between discourse and configuration of the meaning, Laclau states that “the 
very possibility of perception, thought and action depends on the structuration of a 
certain meaningful field which pre-exists any factual immediacy” (Laclau, 2007, p. 
541). From this perspective, objective quality of phenomenons are not pre given, but 
rather they are configured along “fixing and unfixing, sedimentation and reactivation, 
quilting and dissemination in the differential field of the particulars” (Gaonkar, 2012, p. 
190).  In accordance, while stating instable usages of the term “ulusalcı” in the AKP‟s 
discursive field- namely those shifts across references to „Masons‟, „laicist elites‟ within 
bureaucracy agitating crowds, and „deep state‟- the analysis will trace how contingent 
articulation of events overdetermined „ulusalcı‟ term as a meaningful totality out of 
heterogeneous social elements.  
The Republican Rallies were organized by a variety of groups and associations 
mostly sharing a common feeling of threat against national independence and laicism. 
Voicing their considerations on such issues, groups involved in the Republican Rallies 
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majorly aimed to prevent Erdoğan from being the president in the 2007 parliamentarian 
elections. Under this motivation, beside supports of the Council of Higher Education 
(Yükseköğretim Kurulu /YÖK), the CHP and then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the 
Ataturkist Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği/ADD) was leading the 
organizing committee. ġener Eruygur, who was a retired military officer, was heading 
the ADD in this period. At the beginning of April 2007, the Nokta journal published 
dairies of a retired navy commander, and ġener Eruygur was reported there as the 
organizer of two coup plots which had been prepared in 2003 and 2004. In addition to 
this military aspect within the organizing committee, one of those paramilitary 
associations, Association of National Forces Anew (Yeniden Kuvayi Milliye Derneği), 
published an invitation call in Cumhuriyet newspaper before the first meeting in 
Ankara.  In the announcement letter, the association stated that:  
Wake up Turkish nation! Are you aware of the danger? Do you want to throne a 
president in accord with Atatürk‟s Çankaya and Atatürk? Did you take an oath to 
keep alive and protect the laicism at the outset and Ataturk‟s present the Turkish 
Republic as your honor? For the sake of undividable integrity of the motherland, 
do you want to let the souls of our martyrs we lost during the Independence War 
to rest in peace?
22
  
Having references to skeptical tensions on partitioning and laicism mentioned 
above and trying to mobilize the memories of Atatürk and the War of Independence, 
such paramilitary associations aimed to identify the Rallies with another war of 
independence in order to secure laic Kemalist principles from the AKP cadres. 
Including retired and active state officers, the organizing committee gained further 
support from political parties like the ĠP, the CHP and the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Parti/DSP). Moreover, the oppositional media, several university 
rectors, military and legislative officers declared their support to the Rallies (Grigoriadis 
& Özer, 2010). At the beginning of April, the ADD was having visits to the parliament 
and making appointments with the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in order to 
announce the meeting to a larger public sphere and gain further support. 
 The pro-government media addressed the organizing committee while defining 
them as „ulusalcı‟. Discussing attempts of this organizing committee, pro-government 
media stated that „ulusalcı‟ organizers were hardly getting any public support. Yeni 
                                                          
22 “Uyan Türk Ulusu! Tehlikenin farkında mısınız? Atatürk‟ün Çankayasına, Atatürk‟e yakıĢır CumhurbaĢanı 
oturtmak istiyor musunuz? BaĢta laiklik olmak üzere Ata‟nın bize emanet ettiği Türkiye Cumhuriyetini sonsuza kadar 
yaĢatmaya ve namusunuz gibi korumaya ant içtiniz mi? Vatanımızın bölünmez bütünlüğü için KurtuluĢ 
SavaĢımızdaki Ģehitlerimizin aziz ruhlarını Ģad etmek istiyor musunuz?” (Cumhuriyet. April 7, 2007) 
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ġafak, while reporting the call of the former President Süleyman Demirel to rise up 
against the governing AKP, stated as follows: “Calling people to streets hand in hand 
with retired generals, Demirel could only find support from ulusalcı associations”23. 
Defining the organizing committee as „ulusalcı‟, Star newspaper reported appointments 
of the ADD and the ÇYDD with the president Ahmet N. Sezer as follows: “Sezer 
accepts ulusalcı groups”24. Along these debates, a sub-committee of university rectors 
was making announcements for university students to attend the coming meeting. Yeni 
ġafak stated that the meeting organization was aiming to manipulate the presidency 
elections. This formulation implicitly differentiated the organizing committee, as 
„ulusalcı‟ from the crowds as the public base of the upcoming meeting. On the other 
hand, putting this distinction, Yeni ġafak daily stated that the organizing committee was 
not able to gain public consent, but, manipulating the political atmosphere in order to 
provoke more people against the Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP. Therefore, 
rather than conceiving the meeting as public demands of several groups for secularism 
and Kemalism, pro-government media defined the meeting preparations as attempts for 
„manipulation‟ while addressing the „ulusalcı‟ organizing committee as the „agitating‟ 
force behind the plot. According to this discursive definition of the Republican Rallies, 
the pro-government media implied that the meeting organization was an attempt to 
violate presidency elections through provoking crowds in the streets.  
 Yasin Aktay, who was a scholar and Yeni ġafak columnist who became the 
AKP‟S MP after 2015 general elections, also defined the organizing committee as 
„ulusalcı‟. Unlike the formulations quoted above, Aktay addressed „ulusalcılık‟ while 
focusing on the rising neo-nationalist wave within the era. In his analysis, Aktay 
referred to the „state forces‟ behind such „ulusalcı‟ organizations:  
Milliyetçilik does not rise out of blue from “people‟s exploitation of the 
situation.” This rise of milliyetçilik requires a kind of state initiative, power and 
support. Everyone sees the fact that there is an untouchable state power behind 
all of the groups that have been emerging lately in the name of ulusalcılık. Many 
university rectors add fuel to the flames of milliyetçilik. They explicitly and 
blatantly drag students and university professors to ulusalcı rallies.25 
                                                          
23 “„Darbe heveslisi‟ emekli askerlerle kolkola halkı sokağa çağıran Demirel, ancak birkaç üyeli ulusalcı derneklerden 
destek bulabildi” (PeriĢan Süleyman. (April 2, 2007). Yeni Şafak. p.1)  
24“Sezer‟den ulusalcı Kabul” (Sezer‟den ulusalcı kabul. (April 5, 2007) Star. p. 13) 
25“Milliyetçilik de durduk yerde halkın “durumdan vazife çıkarmasıyla” yükselmiyor. Bu yükseliĢ de bir tür devlet 
inisiyatifi, iradesi, desteği ister. Türkiye'de son zamanlarda ulusalcılık adına ortaya çıkan grupların hepsinin arkasında 
dokunulamayan bir tür devlet gücü olduğunu herkes görüyor. Bir çok üniversitenin rektörü milliyetçilik ateĢine 
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Although Aktay primarily questioned the rising nationalist atmosphere rather than 
addressing on the organizing committee, he utilized similar themes like „agitation‟ and 
„deep state involvement‟ within „ulusalcı‟ groups. Another columnist of Yeni ġafak, 
Yusuf Kaplan, being an Islamist academician and former editor of Yeni ġafak, analyzed 
the rise of „ulusalcı‟ phenomenon in his column article titled “Ulusalcı virus dynamites 
Turkey” 26 . In his formulation, traces of previous themes likewise dominated the 
contextualization; such as manipulation, interference of the state, interrupting the well 
being of the nation etc. But more importantly, Kaplan grounded his formulation of 
„ulusalcılık‟ on the tension between secularism and Islam in Turkey. Kaplan‟s 
description of ongoing events attempted to capture rising „ulusalcı‟ phenomenon onto 
the dichotomy between Turkey‟s Islamic roots and suppressing ideology of the secular 
state elite. In doing so, Kaplan‟s discursive formulation knotted different aspects like 
„agitation‟ and „deep state manipulation‟ together with the reference to „status quo‟: 
It is necessary to speak without indulging in any circumlocution. A virus that is 
named ulusalcılık has been all around in recent years. It utters threats, hatches 
various plots and schemes actions that will threaten the future of the country, 
distort its stability and dynamite its presence. What are its grounds for all this? 
To save the country! […] In effect, the true power in this country is this virus of 
ulusalcılık that constitutes the backbone of the power, turning “laicism” into a 
primitive religion and using it as the sword of Damocles at every opportunity. 
This virus of ulusalcılık wants to confine Islam into only private space. After 
converting to Islam, this society told the whole world principal things and 
undertook key roles in building the world history. Therefore, the history, the 
memory, the past, the present and the future of this society is Islam; they are 
bounded by Islam. However, secularism is the name and the address of the 
annihilation that dissolves this society, makes its children drug addicts, provokes 
national or local racists; legitimizes corruptions, thefts, and immodesty; turns 
men into men‟s wolf; fetishizes human‟s selfishness, pleasures, and interests; 
estranges humans from their humanity; freezes and destructs human 
consciousness against the wallet.[...]All of these are the viruses that laik and 
ulusalcı actors gave Turkey as presents and planted because they have 
monopoly over the governmental and non-governmental sources of power and 
they are the true controllers of the country. When the civil section of this 
country, namely the vast majority of the country, reached the position where 
they can direct the fate and future of the country, they either took coup d‟états or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
körükle gidiyor. Öğrencileri ve öğretim üyelerini açıkça ulusalcı mitinglere pervasızca sürüklüyor.” (Aktay, Y. (April 
9, 2007). Yükselen milliyetçilik ve belirsiz kimlikler. Yeni Şafak. p. 9) 
 
26See: Kaplan, Yusuf. (April 10, 2007). Ulusalcı virus Türkiye‟yi dinamitliyor. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 11, 2015, 
from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/yusufkaplan/ulusalci-virus-turkiyeyi-dinamitliyor-4645?mobil=true 
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were executed, or suspended from politics, or pushed and shoved.
27
 (Emphasis 
added) 
Here, Kaplan interconnected different facets of the „us and them‟ formulations in 
an antagonistic form addressing secularism-Islam conflict in Turkey. Constitution of a 
discursive opposition between the „secular state elite‟ and „the people of Islam‟ 
identified „ulusalcılık‟ as a component of the „elite status quo‟. We can analyze 
Kaplan‟s formulations of „ulusalcılık‟ in three integrated layers of interpretation. First, 
Kaplan stated that „ulusalcı virus‟ was a contemporary phenomenon. Resonating with 
the previously discussed identification of „ulusalcı‟ with „agitation and manipulation‟, 
Kaplan also stated that „ulusalcılık‟ was a threat against the future well-being of the 
country, its stability and inner peace. However, in the second layer, Kaplan‟s frame of 
explanation attached „ulusalcılık‟ to a larger debate on the conflict between laicism and 
Islam in the modernization history of Turkey. Along his formulations, Kaplan stated 
that behind the „ulusalcı virus‟ there was the omnipotent secular state elite repressing 
the Islamic spirit of the „real people‟ of Turkey. While he identified Islam with the 
actualization and self-realization of “this society”, Kaplan situated „secularism‟ as the 
evil/enemy that disrupted democratization progress of the nation by its “actual” people. 
Finally, this antagonistic line demarcated a split over the social space.  Metonymically 
knotting „ulusalcılık‟ with „laicism‟, Kaplan discursively identified „ulusalcı virus‟ with 
the secular state elite. Therefore, Kaplan positioned ulusalcılık‟ as one of the constituent 
of the anti-people camp while articulating „the people‟ in the light of Islamic moral 
codes as the repressed underdog. In the light of this discursive framework, the 
antagonistic frontier that divided the social into two poles determined the constitutive 
features of „laicist ulusalcılar‟ as the status quo elites and „the people‟ as the Islamic 
essence of the people of Turkey. 
                                                          
27“Sözü evirip çevirmeden söylemek gerekiyor. Son yıllarda adına ulusalcılık denen bir virüs kol geziyor her tarafta: 
Tehditler savuruyor, türlü tezgâhlar tertip ediyor, ülkenin geleceğini tehdit edecek, istikrarını bozacak, huzurunu 
dinamitleyecek eylemler planlıyor: Gerekçesi ne? Vatanı kurtarmak! [...] Bu ülkenin gerçek iktidarları, iktidarının 
omurgasını oluĢturan, “laikliği” ilkel bir din hâline getirerek her fırsatta demoklesin kılıcı gibi kullanan bu ulusalcı 
virüstür. Ulusalcı virüs, Ġslâm'ın sadece kiĢisel alana hapsedilmesini istiyor. Bu toplum, müslüman olduktan sonra, 
dünyaya esaslı Ģeyler söylemiĢ; dünya tarihinin yapılmasında kilit roller oynayabilmiĢtir. O yüzden bu toplumun 
tarihi, hafızası, dünü, bügünü ve geleceği Ġslâm'dır, Ġslâm'la mukayyettir. Oysa sekülerlik, bu toplumu çözen; 
çocuklarını uyuĢturucu müptelâsı yapan; ulusal ya da lokal ırkçılıkları kıĢkırtan; yolsuzlukları, hırsızlıkları, 
arsızlıkları meĢrûlaĢtıran; insanı insanın kurdu yapan; insanın bencilliğini, hazlarını, çıkarlarını fetiĢleĢtiren; insanı 
insanlığından uzaklaĢtıran, insanın vicdanını cüzdan karĢısında donduran, yok eden bir yokoluĢ mevsiminin adı ve 
adresidir. [...] Bütün bunlar, Türkiye'ye laik, ulusalcı aktörlerin hediye ettiği ve köksaldırdığı virüslerdir. Çünkü sivil 
ve sivil olmayan iktidar kaynakları onların tekelindedir. Ve ülkeyi asıl onlar kontrol etmektedir. Bu ülkenin sivilleri, 
yani kahir ekseriyeti, bu ülkenin kaderine, geleceğine yön verecek bir konuma geldiğinde, ya darbeler yemiĢtir; ya 
asılmıĢtır; ya siyasetten uzaklaĢtırılmıĢtır; ya da itilip kakılmıĢtır.” (Ibid: footnote 26) 
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 Discursive configuration of an antagonistic frontier reduces simultaneously the 
heterogeneity of the social space into two incompatible poles. This becomes the 
precondition of the constitution of identities over the political field. Laclau‟s discourse 
theory of populism understands the constitution of the political field in relation to 
contingent articulation of this internal frontier over the social. Laclau states that 
“populism involves the division of the social scene into two camps. This division 
presupposes the presence of some privileged signifiers which condense in themselves 
the signification of a whole antagonistic camp” (Laclau, 2005, p. 87). Along with this 
division, differential signifying sequences are negotiated within the discursive field. 
Therefore, as an effect of hegemonic articulation and fixing of instabilities one 
difference assumes the representation of the totality. However, since the social space is 
fundamentally heterogeneous and unevenly open to dislocations, conceptual definition 
of society as a totality is incommensurable. Thus, „totality‟ is represented only as a 
totality effect through the force of an empty signifier. This privileged signifier, such as 
„the people‟ or „us‟, constitutes a privileged center structuring an internal logic of 
equivalence. At the opposite end of the pole, performative force of another privileged 
signifier has to constitute the enemy figure as a homogeneous camp, as well; such as 
„status quo‟ or „ulusalcı‟. According to Laclau, the signification process conceived in 
this manner is a tropological investment which rhetorically combining social elements 
through metaphoric and analogical operations. In sum, within the given conjuncture the 
precarious order of the social space is partially fixed through a hegemonic discourse 
which rhetorically dislocates and fixes particularities through the force of an 
antagonistic frontier. In light of this discursive configuration, atomized social elements 
gain their meaning with reference to a structured center that is constituted due to this 
totalizing power of the discourse (Torfing, 1999, pp. 85-93). Considering Yusuf 
Kaplan‟s above quote, together with previous definitions like „agitation‟ and „deep 
state‟, the term „ulusalcı‟ gains its meaning as the secular guardian state power having 
ties with guardian state forces that repress civil demands of „the people/us‟ in order to 
impose laicism. 
In the following days „ulusalcı‟ debate tied to another subtopic in newspapers: 
Mason lobbies. Yeni ġafak continued its reference to „agitation‟ and reported that the 
organizing committee was forcing certain civil society associations to attend the Rallies 
in larger numbers. According to the news report, one of those associations forced to join 
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the meetin by ulusalcı organizers complained that among the organizers there included 
Masons and Lions associations together with foreign foundations
28
. Besides, Yeni 
ġafak‟s narration stated that the organizing committee has also invited “an association 
who embraced Abdullah Öcalan‟s thoughts” while implying the terror aspect of meeting 
organizations. On the other hand, Star daily related rising “ulusalcı wave” to an inner 
conflict between two Mason lobbies in Turkey due to a political disagreement. 
According to many who watch closely the Masonic community, there is a 
conflict between „Ulusalcı‟ and „Evrenselci‟ [Globalists] groups. While Ulusalcı 
groups highly interested with politics, Evrenselci groups argues that the Masons 
should stay outside the politics. In this respect, the rise of Ulusalcı wave puts the 
Masons in panic.
29
 
The themes of Masons and missionary are recurrent conspiracy figures in the 
right wing political discourses constituting relations of oppositions as a dichotomy 
between good and evil (Özman & Dede, 2012). Based on this line of reasoning, Star 
daily tied „ulusalcı‟ debate to „Mason lobbies‟ in a way to refer an outside force waiting 
in disguise to interrupt and agitate the political dynamics under the current condition. 
Moreover, those integrated aspects of “foreign foundations” and “Öcalan supporters” 
further invested to the constitution of an enemy figure while discursively relating the 
debate on „ulusalcılık‟ to terror organizations and foreign threats. Although there were 
such instabilities and shifts which disrupted the hegemonic representation of 
„ulusalcılık‟ in the pro-government media discourse, through the constitution of an 
internal frontier „ulusalcı‟ became a constitutive element in configuring the anti-people 
pole. In pages below, I will investigate the constitution of the antagonism which 
dichotomized the people and anti-people camps through analyzing then Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdoğan‟s statements. Analyzing his meeting speeches and interviews, I will 
question whether Erdoğan‟s interpretations of current tensions differed from the 
discursive definitions of the pro-government media regarding the conception of 
„ulusalcı‟ organizations.  
 
                                                          
28  See. „Mitinge katıl‟ baskısı. (April 5, 2007). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/mitinge-katil-baskisi-38934 
29 “Masonların dünyasını yakından bilen pek çok kiĢiye gore, kendi aralarında „Ulusalcılar‟ ve „Evrenselciler‟ 
çatıĢması yaĢanıyor. Ulusalcılar siyasetle yakından ilgilenirken, evrenselciler masonluğun siyasetin dıĢında tutulması 
gerektiğini savunuyor. Bu çevrelerdeki „Ulusalcı‟ dalganın yükseliĢi, masonları paniğe sürüklüyor” (Hür ve Kabul 
edilmiĢ ulusalcılar. (April 3, 2007). Star. p. 10) 
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2.3. Erdoğan‟s Appeal to The „People‟: Rhetorical Reference to The Ballot Box 
And The Discourse on Developmentalism 
In continuation with the discourse of the pro-government media, Erdoğan, along 
his speeches, constantly referred to the same themes of „agitation‟ and „manipulation‟. 
However, unlike the way the pro-government media addressed the organizing 
committee, Erdoğan neither labeled this enemy pole as „ulusalcı‟, nor he referred to a 
rising neo-nationalist atmosphere. Throughout his statements while rhetorically 
excluding activities of the organizing committee for the Rallies, Erdoğan rather called 
the anti-people camp „gangs‟ with a criminalizing and blaming emphasis. He basically 
framed his dichotomizing rhetoric onto two levels: the „ballot box‟ and a 
developmentalist discourse. While constant reference to the „ballot box‟ grounded the 
AKP‟s discourse on the parliamentarian legitimacy of their power in the government, 
developmentalist discourse invested to the populist identification of the party with „the 
people‟ through excluding „others‟ as violators and agitators against the well-being of 
the country. In below quotation, Erdoğan addressed the organizing committee as 
„gangs‟ while he opposed their attempts with reference to popular will of the „nation‟ 
and democratic parliament: 
Look, you remember certain gangs from the past; now those gangs cannot find 
any clients for themselves. Why? Because no one gives credit to those who want 
to cast a shadow over this period when the country has been all over green and 
spring flowers has blossomed. You must remember they [rally organizations] go 
from one door to another. But they cannot find many buyers. Why? Now, 
common sense is meeting at one place. If it is democracy, democracy does not 
mean uniting at the wrong place. Democracy is to unite at the majority of the 
people. And now, Turkey walks towards that direction. ...The nation will make 
them pay for this at the ballot box. [.] Why? Because others cannot cue us in any 
possible way. Only the nation can cue us. You say, “Sovereignty unconditionally 
belongs to the nation,” then you attempt to discharge the nation‟s right to 
sovereignty, as you wish.
 30
 (Emphases added) 
Following the same pattern of reasoning, during an interview with Ahmet Hakan, a 
journalist in Hürriyet newspaper, Erdoğan stated as follows: 
                                                          
30“Bakın belirli çeteler vardı hani, geçmiĢte; artık o çeteler bile kendilerine müĢteri bulamıyor. Niye; ülkenin bu her 
tarafı yemyeĢil olmuĢ, bahar çiçekleri açmıĢ bir dönemine gölge yapmak isteyenlere, artık kimse pirim vermiyor. 
Hatırlıyorsunuz, dolaĢıyorlar [miting örgütlerini kastediyor] kapı kapı. Ama pek müĢteri bulamıyorlar. Niye? Artık 
aklıselim bir yerde buluĢuyor. Eğer demokrasiyse, demokrasi yanlıĢta birleĢmek değildir. Demokrasi, halkın 
çoğunluğunda birleĢmektir. Ve Ģu anda bu güzergahta yürüyen bir Türkiye var. ... Bunun faturasını, millet var ya, 
sandıkta kesecek[.] Niye, çünkü, bize bir yerler sufle edemez, herhangi sufle. Bize ancak millet sufle eder. 
Parlamentoda 'Egemenlik kayıtsız Ģartsız milletindir' diyeceksin, ondan sonra milletin egemenlik hakkını kalkıp 
kendine göre buradan böyle göndermeye çalıĢacaksın” (Kapı kapı dolaĢan çeterler var. (April 2, 2007). Zaman. 
Retrieved May 12, 2015 from http://mobil.zaman.com.tr/politika_kapi-kapi-dolasan-ceteler-var_521935.html)  
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There may gather a huge crowd [at the meeting], too. However, I want to say 
that such huge crowd will not bring any solution. The ballot box brings the result 
and this result is the parliament. The parliament will perform its constitutional 
right. The sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation and this is secured 
by the constitution. Thos who cannot bear this are the ones involved in such 
endeavors.
31
 (Emphasis added) 
There are different but interconnected patterns in Erdoğan‟s formulations. In 
three parts I am going to analyze them; configuration of the antagonistic frontier, 
interpellation of „the people‟ through rhetorical reference to the ballot box, and the 
AKP‟s developmentalist discourse legitimizing discursive identification of „balloting‟ 
with the party‟s legislative legacy. 
Erdoğan, in his speeches, distinguished two groups, the people as millet and 
gangs. While pro-government media addressed the organizing committee as „ulusalcı‟, 
Erdoğan defined these groups as attempts of „gangs‟. Connotating Star‟s and Yeni 
ġafak‟s definitions on „agitation‟ and „manipulating forces‟, the term „gangs‟ also 
referred to an excluded group trying to penetrate into the inner totality through means of 
violence and disruption in order to abuse the well-being of „us‟ for their own interests. 
In accordance, Erdoğan defined activation of these groups of „gangs‟ as attempts to cast 
shadow onto the flourishing well-being of the country. In similar lines, this exclusionary 
rhetoric of Erdoğan dichotomized „the people‟ as millet/nation and „foreign powers‟ 
while referring to the theme of „cuing‟. This emphasis, in Erdoğan‟s rhetoric, implied 
that behind the meeting organization there remained external forces agitating and 
manipulating crowds. Based on such aspects of „external forces‟ and „manipulation‟, 
Erdoğan‟s formulation configured the upcoming Republican Rallies as an enemy 
organization gathering agitated crowds that were directed by “gangs”. In fact, however, 
the organizers were consisted of a multitude of social groups; ranging from ex-military 
members, rectors, lawyers, unionists, academicians to several civil society 
organizations. In the discourse of the AKP, however, Erdoğan‟s rhetorical formulation 
casted this heterogeneous complex of social elements, who were mainly concerned with 
secularism and the AKP‟s political agenda, as an organization of „gangs‟ while 
excluding variety of constituents as an anti-people community. Under a dichotomizing 
                                                          
31“Büyük bir kalabalık da toplanabilir [mitingi kastediyor]. Ama ben bütün bu kalabalıkların bir sonuç getirmediğini 
söylemek istiyorum. Sandık bir netice ortaya koyar ve bu netice parlamentodur. Bu parlamento anayasal hakkını 
kullanacak. Egemenlik kayıtsız Ģartsız milletin ve bu anayasamızın teminatı. Bunu hazmedemeyenler iĢte bu tür 
çırpınıĢlar içinde.” (Hakan, Ahmet. (April 4, 2007). Çankaraya sıkıĢtırması ile futbol muhabbeti. Hürriyet. Retreived 
May 14, 2015 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/6265207.asp) 
 
41 
 
logic and eliminating the inner verities, Erdoğan defined organizers of the meeting as 
„anti-democratic gangs‟ who were against decisions and well-being of „the 
people/millet‟. 
Throughout his statements, Erdoğan tried to inscribe a frame of explanation 
while defining the organization for the Rallies as manipulations against the interests of 
„the people‟. Laclau states that “there is no emergence of a popular subjectivity without 
the creation of an internal frontier” (Laclau, 2005, p. 38). According to Laclau, 
contingent formation of such splits in the social realm is a necessary condition for a 
society to reach a sense of its own as a result of the demonization of a certain section. 
Similar to the dichotomy between „gangs‟ and „the people‟, Laclau argues “vis-à-vis 
this excluded element, all differences are articulated as equivalent to each other” 
(Laclau, 2005, p. 70). This exclusion through a differential logic (i.e. „gangs‟ or 
„ulusalcı organizations‟), in return, positions those variations over the inner field along 
an equivalential articulation and configures „the people‟ as a homogenized popular 
subjectivity. Having the common feature of being opposed to the „other/enemy‟, there 
constituted is the „us‟ (i.e. „the people/millet).  
A second point I want to make with regard to Erdoğan‟s above logic of 
demarcation is that this simplification of heterogeneity into a single „other‟ is 
constituted through a grounding reference to „democratic legislation‟. While Erdoğan 
defined the democratic realm in a deterministic relation with the ballot box, this 
conceiving of popular voting defined „balloting‟ as the true representation of the total 
will of „the people/millet‟. Therefore, through defining voting as the actualization of the 
national will, the AKP‟s discourse legitimized the rhetorical identification of the will of 
„the people‟ with that of the party. The political discourse of the AKP interpellated „the 
people/millet‟ as identical to the legislative power of the party. Thus, configuring the 
conflict between „the people‟ and „gangs‟, the antagonistic frontier in the political 
discourse of the AKP constituted the political field along the tension between „anti-
democratic gangs‟ and „popular will of the people‟.  
Erdoğan‟s formulations rhetorically configured the political field through a 
significant act of the appeal to the people. Stavrakakis argues that in populist discourse, 
appeal to „the people‟ occupies a central place (Stavrakakis, 2005). Populism as a 
discourse operationalizes „the people‟ as a signifier and constitutes the political space 
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that is based on an oppositional difference. Therefore, in order to make this reference to 
„the people‟ make meaningful as a signifier of an inner totality, an antagonistic 
demarcation has to be invested. Out of the above discussions, it is clear that Erdoğan 
configures an exclusionary frontier that works according to the logic of difference. 
Erdoğan excludes a group of organizers out of the heterogeneous complex of the social 
space as „gangs‟ and with an antagonistic relation to „the people‟. Thus, „the people‟ as 
a totality, in the political rhetoric of Erdoğan, has been maintained through the master 
reference to „democratic legislations‟.   
Besides this grounding reference to ballot box and „democratic legislation‟, 
Erdoğan also utilized a developmentalist discourse. Along his speeches, Erdoğan 
recurrently reminded that what distinguished the AKP government from former 
governments in office were their development projects, successful economic plans 
serving to the interests of the people, and achieving increase in the national wealth. 
Based on this developmentalist discourse, Erdoğan addressed the enemy figure as those 
inhibiting forces disrupting the projects and investments of the AKP government. While 
separating „the people/millet‟ from “those who cannot bear the well-being of Turkey”, 
Erdoğan appealed to the people to make their judgment at the ballot box. 
The nation shows them another door to go. The nation will make them pay for 
what they have done. Those who have been no avail to Turkey, those who have 
not been fit the bill... Can they understand the progress Turkey has made?
32
 
Erdoğan‟s political rhetoric integrates this developmentalist discourse to an 
elusive but encapsulating formulation of the enemy figure through his populist 
addressings (Türk, 2014, p. 211). Within this developmentalist discourse, in above 
quotation Erdoğan also differentiated organizers of the Republican Rallies from the 
crowds in the streets. Also highlighted by the AKP spokesman Bülent Arınç, this 
distinction defined the gathering of crowds as a democratic right rather than an 
„agitation‟ against the upcoming presidency elections. This identification of the meeting 
as a democratic gathering was important, since after the Ergenekon trial began in 2008 
the AKP‟s discourse tended to identify the Republican Rallies as one of the steps of a 
designed coup attempt against the AKP government. As a result of this shift, the 
rhetorical distinction between the organizing committee and crowds would be erased 
                                                          
32 “Millet onlara baĢka kapıya diyor. Bunun faturasını millet kesecek. Türkiye‟de taĢ üstüne taĢ koymamıĢ, bir çivi 
çakmamıĢ olanlar... Bunlar Türkiye‟nin nereden nereye geldiğini anlayabilirler mi?” (Millet çetelere pirim vermiyor. 
(April 3, 2007). Yeni Şafak. p. 13) 
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and the organizations for the Rallies would be defined as an anti-government agitation 
by „coup supporters‟. However, although in the given period both Erdoğan and the pro-
government media remarked the distinction between the organizing committee and the 
crowds, the AKP‟s discourse excluded the Rallies as an anti-people organization while 
integrating developmentalist aspects into his discursive reference to „ballot box‟:  
We are never disturbed by these protests as long as such meetings are held 
within the framework of law and within the lines democracy designated. We 
always respect such meetings. They include different movements, these and 
those. I suppose we probably have earned immunity against them by now; we 
have grown accustomed to them, they made us. They will have no impact from 
now on. But the nation despises them; mark my words. This is the work of love; 
this is the work of ambition. We love our nation; we love our country and nation. 
Without that love, none of these works [investment and service] could have taken 
place. We will show the world what this nation is capable of; we will show it 
again. We are not going to decelerate and slow our pace until reaching the 
enlightened tomorrows that are on the horizon today. But our nation, god 
willing, will put up the best demonstration on the ballot boxes on November 4. I 
believe that our nations trust in and the love for AK Party is growing day by day 
and it will do so. As Turkey advances, our bonds, our bonds of love will 
strengthen more and more.
33
 (Emphasis added) 
In above quotation, we can trace the constituents of a populist discourse. 
Considering the dynamics of the time and the upcoming parliamentarian voting for 
presidency elections in April 2007, Erdoğan discursively combined certain societal 
aspects in order to demarcate an anti-people camp. According to this formation, 
constant reference to „the people‟ invested to the division of the social space as two 
antagonistic camps. First, through formulating a rhetoric on economic investments and 
progress, Erdoğan‟s rhetorical appeal crafted an image of the government in the service 
of its people in order to exclude a group of agitators that “cannot bear” this relation 
between the party and the people. Secondly, reminding the tireless effort of the party for 
„the love of the people‟, Erdoğan addressed the „hatred of the nation‟ against those 
meeting organizations. While voicing the feelings of the people against the Rallies, 
Erdoğan, lastly, advised „the nation‟ to reflect their decision at the ballot box, which he 
                                                          
33  “Bunlardan [eylemler] hiçbir zaman rahatsız olmayız. Yeter ki bu tür toplantılar yasalar çerçevesinde, 
demokrasinin belirlediği çizgiler içerisinde olsun. Her zaman bu tür toplantılara saygılıyız. Bunların içinde hareketler 
var, Ģunlar var, bunlar var. Artık bunlara karĢı da herhalde muafiyet kesbetmeye baĢladık, alıĢtık, alıĢtırdılar, 
sağolsun. Artık bunların bir tesiri olmaz. Ama millet bunlara nefretle bakıyor, bunu bilin. Bu aĢk iĢidir aĢk, sevda 
iĢidir sevda. Bizim milletimize sevdamız var, vatanımıza, milletimize sevdamız var. O sevda olmazsa bu iĢler 
[yatırım ve hizmet] olmaz. Bu milletin nelere muktedir olduğunu göstereceğiz dünyaya, yeniden göstereceğiz. Bugün 
ufukta beliren aydınlık yarınlara ulaĢıncaya kadar hızımızı kesmeyeceğiz, tempomuzu düĢürmeyeceğiz. Ama en 
güzel gösteriyi inĢallah 4 Kasım'da sandıklarda milletimiz yapacak. Ġnanıyorum ki milletimizin AK Parti'ye olan 
inancı ve muhabbeti her geçen gün artıyor, artacak. Türkiye yol aldıkça bağlarımız, gönül bağlarımız daha da 
güçlenecektir.” (Cumhuriyet. April 11, 2007) 
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identified as the manifestation of democratic legitimacy and popular will. In Erdoğan‟s 
statements, “the people as a rhetorical source, figure and effect is voiced” (Povinelli, 
2012) in the form of a hatred against the meeting organizations. According to Erdoğan‟s 
formulation, „the people‟ would make their judgment against those organizations at the 
ballot box while favoring the dedicated AKP government and its developmentalist 
ambitions. Therefore, Erdoğan‟s formulation on the one hand interpellated „the 
people/nation‟ as a popular subject through the rhetoric on developmentalism. On the 
other hand, calling „the people‟ to reflect their „hatred‟ against „those who cannot bear‟ 
at the ballot box integrated developmentalist rhetoric to the discourse on 
parliamentarian legitimacy of the party. Although rhetoric of the AKP constituted „the 
people/millet‟ as a popular subject, the other side of the frontier, namely the anti camp, 
was not statically defined, yet; rather it shifted from „ulusalcı‟, „gangs‟, „Masons‟ to 
„those who cannot bear the economic growth‟.   
Certain pro-government media actors shared Erdoğan‟s emphasis on the „ballot 
box‟ in similar lines of thought. For example, a columnist in Yeni ġafak, Hakan 
Albayrak analyzed the relation between political parties and needs and decisions of the 
people in one of his articles. Albayrak accused CHP for the party did not take the voice 
and reactions of the people into enough consideration.  
CHP does nothing to win the nation. It does have not a bit of interest in the true 
problems of the nation. CHP does not direct itself to the nation nor does it 
address the nation. It does not compete with AK Party that is honored by the 
elector’s courtesy, but with the ulusalcı groups for which the people have a low 
regard and that have a low regard for people. CHP does not aim an election 
victory; this party that requires a thousand of witnesses to certify its quality as a 
political party tries to gain favor in the “ulusalcı market” that is worth two-a-
penny. [...] They should quit politics before they see the farthest bottom of the 
ballot box and lose their credit. They should either found a new “ulusalcı”/kuva-
yı milliye (national forces) association or join in Ataturkist Thought Association. 
Without troubling themselves with accountability vis-à-vis the nation, they can 
harangue on bigoted laicism there as much as they want.
 34
(Emphasis added) 
Albayrak‟s formulation reproduced the populist formation of the AKP‟s 
discourse. In the quotation, Albayrak addressed “decisions and needs of the people” 
                                                          
34“Milleti kazanmak için hiçbir Ģey yapmıyor CHP. Milletin gerçek sorunlarıyla zerre kadar ilgilenmiyor. Millete 
yönelmiyor, millete hitap etmiyor. Seçmenin teveccühüne mazhar olan Ak Parti'yle değil, halka metelik vermeyen ve 
halkın da metelik vermediği „ulusalcı‟ gruplarla yarıĢıyor. Seçim zaferlerinde gözü yok; üç kuruĢluk 'ulusalcı 
piyasası'nda prim yapmaya çalıĢıyor parti demeye bin Ģahit isteyen bu parti. [...]  Sandığın dibini boylayıp karizmayı 
iyice çizdirmeden siyaseti bıraksınlar. Yeni bir „ulusalcı‟ / „kuva-yı milliyeci‟ dernek kursunlar veya Atatürkçü 
DüĢünce Derneği'ne iltihak etsinler. Orada, millete hesap verme derdi filan olmadan, istedikleri kadar fanatik laiklik 
söylevi çekebilirler.” (Albayrak, H. (April 9, 2007). CHP neden ADD‟ye iltihak etmiyor?. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 
14, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hakanalbayrak/chp-niye-addye-iltihak-etmiyor-4626) 
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ideologically as pre-determined demands and interpreted the AKP‟s success as a result 
of serving to those interests of the people. In doing so, to Albayrak, the AKP gained the 
favor of the people as opposed to the CHP. According to the columnist, what 
differentiated both parties was the ability to appeal and gain the trust of the people; in 
other words hearing their voice. Referring to the ballot box as the representation of the 
true voice of the people, Albayrak discursively identified „the people‟ with the AKP, 
while opposing the CHP for its affiliations with „ulusalcı‟ groups. Thus, this frame of 
articulation dichotomized the AKP and „ulusalcı‟ groups with constitutive reference to 
„decisions of the people‟ and popular voting. While reproducing the AKP‟s political 
discourse, in the quote above „ulusalcı‟ groups identified with the organizing 
committee; namely the ADD and paramilitary associations. Moreover, Albayrak‟s 
formulation put a significant emphasis on „fanatic laicism‟; therefore, „laicism‟, similar 
to Kaplan‟s quote above, became the differentiating denominator in discursively 
separating the „voice of the people‟ and the disinterested secularist concerns of 
„ulusalcı‟ groups. 
2.4. „Ulusalcılık‟ Gains Its Temporary Fixation Along The Deep State Acts 
Until now, I have analyzed varying forms of contextualization provided for 
„ulusalcı‟ while illustrating how those differential references constituted political 
identities in the light of an antagonistic frontier. I compared Erdoğan‟s speeches and 
discourse of the pro-government media, and argued that populist formation of the 
AKP‟s discourse functioned in representing „us‟ and „other‟ camps through indefinite 
formulations. This discursive articulation recollected elements of „Öcalan‟ and terror, 
„Masons‟ and foreign forces, „gangs‟ and agitation, and „laicist elite status quo‟. Such 
analogical combinations attempted to fix heterogeneous elements rhetorically as 
contiguous to each other as the anti-people pole. In constituting this enemy figure the 
AKP‟s discourse dichotomized the political field as „millet and others‟. However, in the 
AKP‟s discursive field, the term „ulusalcı‟ was not the privileged signifier for the 
configuration of the anti-people pole. Yet, the antagonistic frontier made these 
metonymic combinations representable as a rhetorically constituted unity over the 
syntagm of an anti community. In below pages, I will analyze the period encapsulating 
the Republican Rallies and its aftermath from the perspective of the AKP‟s discursive 
field. While tracing how the term „ulusalcı‟ gained its contingent fixation in the light of 
extra-legal assassinations by deep state organizations of the era, I will analyze how the 
46 
 
AKP‟s discourse hegemonically arrested the meaning of the „ulusalcı‟ term in 2007 
period along the rising deep state acts.  
Within those controversies of the period illustrated above, state bureaucracy and 
military officers increased their involvement in the ongoing debates about the 
presidency elections. In this time period, Erdoğan kept silent on declaring his possible 
candidacy which eventually increased ongoing suspensions and polarization. 
Considering the parliamentarian elections for the presidency, the head of the YÖK 
Erdoğan Teziç stated that two-third of the MP‟s in the parliament (367 seats) has to be 
present during parliamentary votes according to constitutional laws. The head of the 
CHP, Deniz Baykal, was stating that his party would boycott the parliament if Erdoğan 
would insist on his candidacy and not negotiate. If that would become the case, 
parliamentarian voting would be cancelled due to lack of presence of the required seats 
and hence the presidency elections would be blocked. Beside this possible constitutional 
crisis, commonly defined during the era as the “367crisis”, the Head of the General 
Staff YaĢar Büyükanıt expressed his concerns on the headscarf issue and threats against 
laicism. While implying Erdoğan as the candidate of the AKP for the presidency, 
Büyükanıt declared that any possible candidate has to be “secular not just in word but in 
essence” (Baran, 2008). In sum, a political crisis circulating around bureaucratic, 
parliamentarian, military and civil society levels was at the door.  
One day before the first meeting to be held in Ankara in April 14, then President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer gave a speech at the War Academy. There he strongly criticized 
the government and said: “Political regime in Turkey, since the founding of the 
Republic, has never faced such a threat but in current situation. For the first time in its 
history, fundamental values of the laic Republic are made controversial” 35 . In a 
response at the same day, Erdoğan opposed Sezer‟s statements while continuing his 
former references to rising economic development and democratic legislations: 
Sezer‟s statements are quite wrong, the people disagrees with him. What exactly 
left the regime in danger? Is it possible for an economic system to develop in a 
country where there is political instability and threats against democracy? Do 
                                                          
35  See. Rejim büyük tehlike altında. (April 14, 2007). Hürriyet. Retrieved May 14, 2015, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6330947.asp 
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foreign investors will to come to a country under threats against its regime? I do 
not believe that the majority of our people share such concerns.
36
 
 Along these tensions and the polarized atmosphere, the first meeting of the 
Republican Rallies gathered hundreds and thousands people in Ankara. According to 
different sources, number of participants was announced variably from three hundred 
thousand to one million. The square and highways were decorated with national flags. 
Different segments of the society participated in the meeting who were concerned about 
the AKP‟s supposedly Islamic agenda and weakening of the Kemalist principles. 
Sharing these anxieties, more than ten university rectors and thousands of university 
students, political parties like the CHP, the DSP and the IP, retired and active military 
officers like ġener Eruygur and HurĢit Tolon, several public intellectuals and artists, and 
a number of civil society organizations involved in the meeting in Ankara. During the 
meeting, the crowd highlighted certain slogans, such as “Turkey is laic and will remain 
as laic”, “Sheikhs and mullah cannot stay at Çankaya”, “Imam of the USA, for how 
much did you betray your country?”, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal”. Nur 
Serter, being the assistant manager of the ADD during the era and later the CHP‟s MP 
from Izmir, encouraged lawyers, universities and Kemalist military in her speech for 
speaking out if the unity of Turkey would intended to be shattered: 
Can those who cannot say „How happy is the one who says I am a Turk‟ stay at 
Çankaya? Can they protect the honor of Turkey? We want a president who rules 
Turkey from Turkey; a president who would not give in to imperialism and EU 
politics. We want a president who will not compromise the ultimate freedom of 
the country and protect the nation state.
37
  
Bekir CoĢkun, in his column in Hürriyet, defined the meeting with a prideful celebration 
as “this was the first attempt to take back laic republic from the hands of counter 
revolutionaries”38.  
 Aftermath of the meeting did not reflect the agitating and provocating 
atmosphere that which the pro-government media supposed to happen previously. The 
                                                          
36 “Sezer‟inki çok yanlıĢ tespit, halk katılmıyor. Ne oluyor da rejim tehlikede... Siyasi noktada bir istikrarsızlığın 
olduğu ülkede, demokrasinin tehtid altında olduğu ülkede ekonominin geliĢme kaydetmesi mümkün olur mu? 
Rejimin tehtid altında olduğu bir ülkede gelir de yabancı yatırımda bulur mu? Ben bunu halkımızın kahır 
ekseriyetinin paylaĢtığına inanmıyorum.” (Hürriyet. April 14, 2007. p. 23) 
37  “Ne mutlu Türküm‟ diyemeyenler Çankaya‟ya çıkabilir mi? Türkiye‟nin onurunu koruyabilir mi? Türkiye‟yi 
Türkiye‟den yöneten bir cumhurbaĢkanı istiyoruz. Emperyalizme boyun eğmeyen, AB politikalarına ülkeyi kurban 
etmeyen bir cumhurbaĢkanı. Biz, tam bağımsızlıktan ödün vermeyen, ulus devlete sahip çıkan bir cumhurbaĢkanı 
istiyoruz.” (Hürriyet. April 15, 2007. p. 20-21) 
38 “Dün o meydanda, laik cumhuriyeti karĢı devrimcilerin elinden geri almanın ilk adımı atıldı.” (CoĢkun, B. (April 
15, 2007). Güzel günler göreceğiz çocuklar. Hürriyet. Retrieved May 14, 2015, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/6334939.asp) 
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gathering ended with a non-violent march and this situation temporarily falsified those 
attributions of the AKP circles. While oppositional media celebrated and supported 
demands appeared during the meeting, the pro-government media remained silent about 
the event during broadcastings and in the aftermath, as well. Erdoğan, on the other 
hand, addressed the crowd in the meeting while suggesting them to reflect their 
critiques at the ballot box: “Do we believe in democracy, laic Republic, social state, rule 
of law? If we do, the ballot box is the way to them”39. Erdoğan stated that he respected 
democratic rights of demonstrators in the meeting; however, he defined crowds at the 
meeting as „dispatched squadrons‟: “Too many rumors have been done [about the 
number of demonstrators], but the nation cannot be fooled. Because, dispatched 
squadrons are different. If they had pictured [the crowd in] our opening at the Blacksea 
coastal road, they would see the situation clearly”40. Reproducing the discursive tie 
between developmentalist investments and the image of a government servicing for its 
people, Erdoğan separated two crowds; the crowds in the AKP‟s opening ceremony as 
„the people‟ and the other crowd in the Rallies as „dispatched squadrons‟. This 
identification on the one hand discursively designated the AKP‟s popular supporters as 
the actual nation, on the other hand differentiated the protesters at the Rallies as 
manipulated crowds without having genuine claims.  
Contrary to Erdoğan‟s judgments, two important columnists of Yeni ġafak, 
KürĢat Bumin and Fehmi Koru, emphasized the democratic insight of the meeting. 
Ended up with gathering hundreds of thousands of people, Bumin complained about 
Erdoğan‟s attitude for he did not take the voice of these oppositions into enough 
consideration
41
. Similar to Bumin, Fehmi Koru, writing under his pseudonym Taha 
Kıvanç, stated that he also supported the meeting for it could contribute to democratic 
atmosphere: “It is a fundamental democratic right for the people to gather in order to 
declare their opinion on any topic they believe and express their reactions”42. In fact, the 
                                                          
39 “Demokrasiye inanıyor muyuz, laik Cumhuriyete inanıyor muyuz, sosyal devlete inanıyor muyuz, hukuk devletine 
inanıyor muyuz? O zaman, bunun yeri sandıktır” (AKP locasından Erdoğan‟a: Ordu burada. (April 17, 2007). 
Hürriyet. Retrieved May 10, 2015, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6347331.asp)  
40“Gazetelerde farklı farklı rakamlar. [...] Çok farklı Ģeyler söylendi, ancak millet bunu yutmuyor. Çünkü bindirilmiĢ 
kıtalar farklıdır. [...]Karadeniz Sahil Yolu açılıĢına gelip bunu fotoğraflayıp koymuĢ olsaydılar, neyin ne olduğunu 
gayet iyi görürlerdi.” (Tandoğan‟dakiler bindirilmiĢ kıta. (April 18, 2007). Hürriyet. Retrieved May 16, 2015, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6350588.asp) 
41 Bumin stated in his column article as follows: “Yüzbinlerce vatandaĢın yer aldığı bir gösterinin değerlendirilmesi 
„2 dakika‟ya sığar mı? [Is two minutes enough to evaluate a demonstration in which hundreds of thousands of 
citizens participated?]” (Bumin, K. (April 17, 2007). Tandoğan‟ın Analizi. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved May 16, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/KursatBumin/tandoganin-analizi-4749) 
42 “Ġnsanların inandıkları bir konuda görüĢ açıklamak üzere bir araya gelmeleri, tepkilerini ifade etmeleri en doğal 
demokratik haklarıdır” (Kıvanç, T. (April 18, 2007) Mitingden sonra. Yeni Şafak. p. 8) 
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tone of the meeting was highly nationalist, chauvinistic, majorly indifferent to rising 
deep state activities and exclusive against democratic demands of different sectors. 
However, unlike former attributions of certain pro-government columnists on agitation 
and terror, the extent of high participation in a peaceful march ended up with arguing 
the democratic possibilities of the meeting. Thus, semiotic shifts regarding the 
definition of inner qualities of both the crowds in the meeting and organizers remained 
without stability and changed according to political positions of narrators in the given 
conjuncture.  
Due to the indefiniteness of signifying elements across competing discursive 
fields, the AKP‟s discourse could not hegemonically fixed the meaning of the term 
„ulusalcı‟, although it was salient during the controversies of the era. According to 
Laclau, the concept of hegemony requires three essential modes of operation. First, 
heterogeneity of the social field has to prevent articulation of elements from being 
closed as a representable totality. Second, hegemonic suture has to force heterogeneity 
and indefiniteness towards an effect of totalization. Third, since universal totality is 
both incommensurable due to openness of the social and necessary as an effect, 
heterogeneity has to remain and hegemonic articulations have to be re-maintained 
(Laclau, 2001). Thus, for totality in conceptual terms is impossible, signification of 
totality maintains this unachievable fullness. Empty signifiers emerge out of this need to 
name an instable stability which is impossible but necessary. According to Laclau, this 
act of representing something irrepresentable is a catachrestical operation, and becomes 
the zero-point of any signifying process (Laclau, 2005, p. 72). Conceptualizing 
signification in the light of tropological operations leads Laclau to relate his theoretical 
discussion to a general debate on rhetoric. Within this framework rhetoric refers to “the 
contingent, discursive, and fundamentally tropological process that brings objective 
reality into existence by imposing on an array of heterogeneous elements the semblance 
of a structure within which they acquire identity/meaning” (Kaplan, 2010). 
 Regarding the concerns of this study, I argue that the AKP‟s attempt to capture 
„ulusalcı‟ debates fulfilled these criterions. Although there were shifts in terms of 
defining the constituents of the „ulusalcı‟ organization, i.e. those references to „Masons‟, 
„Öcalan‟, „secular elites‟, „gangs‟ etc., the discourse of the pro-government media 
attempted to hegemonically capture the „ulusalcı‟ phenomenon as a component of the 
enemy figure. In similar lines, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric on developmentalism and ballot box 
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constituted, on the one hand, „the people‟ as a political subject, on the other hand 
excluded hindering activities of enemy organizations. However, „ulusalcı‟ remained as 
an indefinite reference along these developments. Although this was the case, along 
these attempts to fix the content of „ulusalcılık‟ hegemonically, the reference to 
„ulusalcı‟ gained its totality effect in the aftermath of deep state assassinations which 
followed the first Republican meeting.  
A couple of days after the meeting, on April 18, three Christians were massacred 
in the Zirve publishing house in Malatya where they publish Bible and other pieces of 
Christian literature. Similar to the killing in Trabzon and murder of Hrant Dink, this 
deep state assassination also targeted religious minority groups. This event, within the 
period of April 2007, became determinant in indentifying the term „ulusalcı‟ with the 
„deep state‟ in the discourse of the pro-government media. On its cover page, Yeni 
ġafak daily repeated its previous definition „agitation‟ while addressing the 
assassination event as “Dark hands, dark day: The same agitators appeared on the stage 
while again using youngsters in Malatya”43.  Yalçın Akdoğan defined the massacre as a 
result of “ulusalcı fascism”. Through a retrospective articulation of previous killings 
discussed in pages above, Yalçın Akdoğan, under his pseudonym Yasin Doğan, stated 
that the actual aim behind these deep state activities was to force Turkey into further 
crises: 
Killing of Father Santoro. Murder of the writer Hrant Dink. Assassination of the 
personnel at the Zirve publish house. The Attack against the State Council.  This 
ferocity and violence always takes us to the same address: Ulusalcı fascism 
which utilizes occasionally religion or nationalism. Abusing notions like 
motherland, national flag, religiosity for their bloody projects, the ulusalcı mind 
aims to leave Turkey under great depressions.
44
 
While setting interrelations among previous assassinations through retroactive 
articulation of mentioned events, Akdoğan defined „ulusalcı fascism‟ as an ideology 
which manipulating nationalist and religious sentiments, and he discursively identified 
it with deep state killings. Akdoğan‟s formulation, in the end, positioned „ulusalcılık‟ as 
a larger threat before the country. At the same day, Yeni ġafak columnist Ibrahim 
                                                          
43 “Karanlık el kara gün: Aynı tahrikçi yine gençleri kıullanarak Malatya‟da sahneye çıktı.” (Yeni Şafak. April 19, 
2007. p. 1) 
44“Rahip Santoro'nun öldürülmesi. Yazar Hrant Dink''in katledilmesi. Zirve Yayınevi çalıĢanlarının öldürülmesi. 
DanıĢtay saldırısı. Bu gözü dönmüĢlüğün, bu vahĢetin dönüp dolaĢıp çıktığı adres hep aynı: Kimi zaman dini, kimi 
zaman milliyetçiliği yedeğine alan ulusalcı faĢizm. Vatan, bayrak, din kavramlarını kanlı hesapları için istismar eden 
ulusalcı anlayıĢın geldiği nokta Türkiye'yi büyük sıkıntılarla karĢı karĢıya bırakmaktır.” (Doğan, Yasin. (April 20, 
2007). Türkiye‟ye yazık ediyorlar. Yeni Şafak. p. 7) 
51 
 
Karagül also addressed the same rising “deep wave”. While he majorly described a 
moment of fear and anger against foreign forces, Karagül referred „ulusalcı‟ not as the 
cause but as one actor within the general atmosphere:  
Which fears feed such people? We witnessed similar incidents. The man who 
killed Hrant Dink was at the same age [with the murderers in the Zirve 
massacre]. There is a wave in Turkey growing rapidly at the deep. It is not 
enough to call it “Ulusalcı”. It is not enough to identify it with certain political 
groups. Currently, it belongs to nowhere. It does not take side with the inner 
polarizations of Turkey. It is an anger channeled against “foreign threats”.45  
 Unlike Akdoğan, Karagül stated that this deep wave of anger against foreign 
threats extended the boundaries of political groups like „ulusalcılar‟. In similar lines, 
Mehmet Altan, in Star newspaper, referred to current deep state activities. While 
describing in his article how and under which dynamics the missionary activities came 
to be recognized as a threat against the nation, Altan defined deep state activities as 
„agitation‟ that manipulated not just „ulusalcı‟ groups but a variety of political groups: 
“Missionary threat” spread to large masses after the National Security Council 
included it into its agenda under Bülent Ecevit‟s term in office in 2001. Almost 
everyone, from Ulusalcı circles to Islamists, started to argue that missioners 
converted Muslims to Christianity day by day and organized separatist acts. In 
the end, agitation showed its effects. Coming towards the presidency elections, 
messages of such murders are always the same. The one targeting inner actors 
addresses the AKP. The other which target outer actors addresses the EU. 
Summary of the message is as follows: We will stay as what we are or we will 
destroy this place.
46
 
The following day, Yeni ġafak newspaper separated a large portion to the 
analysis of political killings. The headline was written as “The Name of it, „Ulusalcı‟ 
terror”, and description was provided as follows:  
Traces of the murders, which violate the inner peace of Turkey and leave the 
country in a hard situation in front of the world, lead us to the paranoia of 
                                                          
45“Bu insanları hangi korkular besliyor? Trabzon'da aynı Ģeyler yaĢandı. Hrant Dink'i öldüren aynı yaĢlardaydı. 
Türkiye'de derinden bir dalga hızla büyüyor. “Ulusalcı” demek yetmiyor. Belli siyasi gruplarla tanımlamak yetmiyor. 
ġimdilik hiçbir yere ait değil. Türkiye içi kamplaĢmaların tarafı değil. “DıĢ tehdit”e yönelmiĢ bir öfke.” (Karagül, 
Ġbrahim. (April 20, 2007). Türkiye sürprize hazır olmalı. Yeni Şafak. p. 9) 
46“[2001] Nisanı‟nda Bülent Ecevit döneminde Milli Güvenlik Kurulu gündemine girince, „misyonerlik tehlikesi‟ bir 
anda geniĢ kitlelere yayıldı. „Ulusalcılar‟dan Ġslamcı çevrelere, herkes misyonerlerin ülkede gün be gün çok sayıda 
Müslüman‟ı Hıristiyan yapıp bölücü faaliyetler yürüttüğünü iddia etmeye baĢladı. ... Ve sounda tahrik, etkisini 
gösterdi. ... CumhurbaĢkanlığı öncesi bu cinayetlerin mesajı ise hep aynı. Ġçeriye olanın adresi AK Parti. DıĢarıya 
olanın adresi ise AB. Mesajın özeti ise Ģu: Eskisi gibi kalalım yoksa buraları dağıtırız.” (Altan, Mehmet. (April 20, 
2007). Azmettirenlerin listesi mi?. Star. p. 13) 
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„dismantling the nation‟. Those hands manufacturing such tensions terrorize the 
atmosphere through „young killers‟.47 
Again, there the signified „ulusalcı‟ shifted between deep state activities as „dark 
hands‟ and „paranoid crowds‟ as the nationalist atmosphere at the public level. On the 
one hand, discussions of the columnists addressed „ulusalcı‟ as a deep state organization 
triggering nationalist fears and anxieties of crowds; on the other hand, indefinite 
relationality between those „dark forces‟ and social groups supplemented the limit of the 
„ulusalcı‟ term in defining larger socio-political positions. Considering these indefinite 
and instable references, Laclau stated that “that vagueness and indeterminacy are not 
shortcomings of a discourse about social reality, but, in some circumstances, inscribed 
in social reality as such” (Laclau, 2005, p. 67). Illustrating this conceptualization of the 
formation of the social, below quotation from Yeni ġafak daily narrated the current 
situation from a larger spectrum. Extending the limits of „dark hands‟ or „agitators‟, 
narration of the newspaper stabilized previously referred features of the anti-people pole 
within a meaningful interpretation. Below, „ulusalcı‟ name hegemonically encapsulated 
different social branches wile integrating them through rhetorically constituted 
equivalential ties. 
The discourse of some politicians and non-governmental organizations claiming, 
“EU will divide Turkey,” and “The country will be lost,” enhanced the elbow 
room of the “ulusalcı terrorism.” The attack on Council of State that took place 
on 17 May 2006 agitated Turkey. It turned out that the hitman Alparslan Arslan 
had been in contact with the ulusalcı Association for the Union of Patriotic 
Forces (Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi Derneği - VKGB) and with 
some of the retired officers. It appeared that all the well-known ulusalcı people 
of Turkey, particularly some of the retired officers, scholars, politicians and 
journalists were the denizens of the meetings, programs and all kinds of events 
in the city. How the groups deploying the discourse on “saving the country,” 
which is particularly influential on milliyetçi students are organized became 
evident with the oath that the retired colonel Fikri Karadağ, the chairperson of 
the National Forces Society, swore on gun. … As all the other ulusalcı people 
do, Rahşan Ecevit, the vice chairperson of DSP, made statements such as 
“Missionary activities increased when foreigners started to bought lands. 
Another way of dividing Turkey is to encourage people to convert from their 
religion,” stating that the religion is lost with the EU process. … Ulusalcı 
websites, the number of which is increasing day by day, provoke the youth 
against both missionary activities and minorities. The ulusalcı newspapers where 
people who once occupied important positions wrote articles blamed those 
                                                          
47“Türkiye‟de huzuru bozan ve ülkeyi dünyaya karĢı güç durumda bırakan cinayetlerin izleri „vatan elden gidiyor, 
ülke bölünüyor‟ paranoyasına çıkıyor. Gerginliği üreten karanlık eller „genç katiller‟ eliyle terör estiriyor.” (Bunun 
adı „Ululsalcı‟ terör. (April 21, 2007). Yeni Şafak. p.1) 
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protested the victims and murders instead of investigating the murders. The 
Article 301 under which Dink was prosecuted became one of the important 
propaganda materials of the ulusalcı policy.48 (Emphasis added) 
While retroactively renegotiating former events and social groups, this 
overdetermined definition of the term „ulusalcı‟ hegemonically fixed varied signifying 
elements as components of a unified enemy organization. Therefore, while setting 
relations of equivalence between particulars, rhetorical appropriation of them 
discursively constituted „ulusalcı‟ as an anti-people community contextualized through 
the reference to „deep state‟. While the „deep state‟ emphasis gained a privilege as a 
result of political killings, along the articulation of elements „ulusalcı‟ signifier knotted 
civil society and paramilitary forces together in the light of those attributions of 
„agitation‟ and „disrupting the inner peace‟.  
This contingent fixation of the term „ulusalcı‟ enabled the pro-government 
media discourse to hegemonically connect previous events, groups and controversies 
over a contiguous setting. Based on this discursive constellation, Koray Düzgören, a 
columnist in Yeni ġafak, related the Malatya killings to the Republican Rallies in 
Ankara through. There, relating the meeting in Ankara to the February 28 military 
intervention, Düzgören stated that the tutelary state forces targeted the AKP through 
organizing the meeting in order to weaken the party: 
The meeting at Tandoğan is an organization similar to the February 28. It is an 
effort of those who want to maintain the February 28 through this or that way. 
[...] They voice similar issues. Scenario is the same. This time the target is the 
AKP. That is why, what seems reasonable is that in such a condition the Malatya 
massacre is an incident servicing to the aims of such an effort. [...] Those groups, 
who planned the murders of Father Santoro, Hrant Dink and protestant 
missioners in Malatya, are probably the same with the organizers hiding behind 
                                                          
48“Bazı siyasetçilerin ve sivil toplum örgütlerinin „AB Türkiye‟yi bölecek‟, „vatan elden gidiyor‟ söylemleri „ulusalcı 
terör‟ün hareket alanını geniĢletti. Türkiye, 17 Mayıs 2006'da DanıĢtay'a yönelik saldırıyla sarsıldı. Tetikçi Alparslan 
Arslan'ın [...] ulusalcı Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi Derneği (VKGB) ve bazı emekli askerlerle irtibatlı 
olduğu anlaĢıldı. BaĢta bazı emekli askerler, akademisyenler, siyasetçiler ve gazeteciler olmak üzere Türkiye'nin 
tanınmıĢ tüm ulusalcılarının Ģehirdeki toplantıların, programların ve her türlü etkinliğinin vazgeçilmez konukları 
olduğu ortaya çıktı. Özellikle milliyetçi gençler üzerinde etkili olan „vatanı kurtarma‟ söylemini kullanan grupların 
nasıl örgütlendiği ise Kuvayı Milliye Derneği'nin BaĢkanı emekli albay Fikri Karadağ'ın silah üzerine ettirdiği yemin 
ile ortaya çıktı. ... DSP Genel BaĢkan Yardımcısı RahĢan Ecevit diğer tüm ulusalcılar gibi AB'yle birlikte dinin elden 
gittiğini belirterek, „Yabancıların toprak alımıyla birlikte misyonerlik faaliyetleri arttı. Türkiye'yi bölmenin bir yolu 
da vatandaĢların dinlerini değiĢtirmelerini teĢvik etmekten geçer‟ Ģeklinde açıklamalar yaptı. ... Sayıları gün geçtikçe 
artan ulusalcı siteler de gençleri hem misyonerlik, hem de azınlıklar aleyhine kıĢkırtıyorlar. Bir dönem önemli 
makamları iĢgal eden kiĢilerin yazı yazdığı ulusalcı gazeteler cinayetleri sorgulamak yerine kurbanları ve cinayetleri 
protesto edenleri suçladı. Dink'in yargılandığı 301. madde de ulusalcı politikanın önemli propaganda 
malzemelerinden biri oldu.” (Bunun adı ulusalcı terör. (April 21, 2007). Yeni Şafak. p. 17) 
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the curtain of the Tandoğan meeting. Althugh they might not be the same, the 
purpose they service is not different.
49
(Emphasis added) 
Düzgören‟s formulation reproduced the hegemonic definition of „ulusalcı‟ as the 
deep state while integrating the tension between the political Islam and interventions of 
the secular military. On the one hand relating the Republican Rallies to the February 28 
coup attempt located the „ulusalcı‟ as a component of tutelary state forces, on the other 
hand this identification of the meeting with the current deep state assassinations 
reinvested the discursive antagonism between deep state activities and the well-being of 
the people.  
 Under these shifts and re-localizations along the contextualization of „ulusalcı‟ 
phenomenon, in April 24 the AKP declared Abdullah Gül as the candidate for the 
presidency elections. The pro-government media and liberal circles supported the 
AKP‟s decision. However, reactionary groups with secular concerns continued to 
perceive Gül as a threat against Kemalist republic and secular laic Turkey. Those 
groups opposed the candidacy of Gül for he criticized the headscarf ban at universities 
and supported his wife‟s becoming the first first lady with a headscarf. In the face of 
rising oppositions, the CHP insisted on its plan for boycotting the parliamentarian 
voting, so that the constitutional law on the required 367 seats would annul voting 
process. Against such controversies, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and Gül tried to 
obtain required number of seats for parliamentarian voting through negotiating with 
members of the parliament in order to convince a few of them. However, the first voting 
session at the parliament was unsuccessful in gathering 367 seats due to boycott 
decision of the CHP. Although Gül gained 357 votes out of 361, in the aftermath, the 
CHP took the voting to Constitutional Court and the first session of voting annulled.  
At the evening of the first voting tours, in April 27, the Head of the General 
Stuff YaĢar Büyükanıt declared worries of the Turkish military and reminded the 
responsibilities of the army on protecting the nation and laicism against any threats. 
Often titled as „e-memorandum‟, this declaration in the late evening was perceived as a 
possible military intervention to decisions of civil parliament. Two days later, Erdoğan 
                                                          
49“Tandoğan mitingi aslında bir 28 ġubat'vari örgütlenme. 28 ġubat'ı baĢka bir biçimde devam ettirmek isteyenlerin 
iĢi. [...] ġimdi de aynı Ģeyler söyleniyor. Senaryo aynı. Bu sefer hedef AKP. ĠĢte böyle bir ortamda ortaya çıkan 
Malatya katliamı da görünen o ki aynı gidiĢe hizmet eden bir olay. [...] Rahip Santoro''nun, Hrant Dink''in ve 
Malatya''da Perotestan misyonerlerin katledilmesini planlayan odaklarla Tandoğan mitinginin perde arkasındaki 
planlayıcıları muhtemelen aynı. Aynı olmasa bile hizmet ettikleri amaç farklı değil” (Düzgören, Koray. (April 23, 
2007). Tandoğan‟dan Malatya‟ya. Yeni Şafak. p. 10) 
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Teziç, head of the YÖK, was targeted in an assassination attempt and according to the 
assailant the act was due to Teziç‟s declarations on the banning of headscarf at 
universities. The assailant was arrested; a membership card for Kuvayı Milliye Derneği, 
being one of the paramilitary associations mentioned, and a note on which Orhan 
Pamuk‟s name was written was found on him.  
Along these tensions the second Republican meeting was held in Istanbul on 29
th
 
of April. Gathering hundreds of thousands citizens, the meeting in Istanbul highlighted 
similar concerns with akin slogans. However, one was rather distinct from others: 
“Neither Sharia Nor Coup”. Although the crowd voiced out their concerns on 
secularism, foreign interventions of the EU and the IMF and national independence, the 
meeting in Istanbul integrated this anti-coup aspect, as well. Türkan Saylan, one of the 
founders and the then head of the ÇYDD, emphasized anti-coup stance of the meeting. 
In her speech, Saylan criticized the AKP for favoring Islamic cadres at the bureaucratic 
levels, having alliances with foreign actors and anti-secular policies. Although Saylan 
defined the military as an actor in the service and protection of laic republic, she 
additionally stated that coups will not be a solution for political conflicts.  
This distinguished tone, together with political crises occurred between Ankara 
and Istanbul meetings, effected interpretations of the pro-government media about the 
Republican Rallies. Unlike previous references to agitation and terror organizations, this 
time Yeni ġafak daily highlighted the democratic aspect of crowds and the meeting. 
Yeni ġafak reported the meeting with a heading which stated: “Democracy is a beautiful 
thing”. While emphasizing the large number of public participation, the newspaper 
stated: “The meeting in which certain political party leaders involved, concluded along 
with democratic maturity”50. From a similar perspective, Star newspaper defined the 
meeting as a “wave of flags”, which was the same heading of the oppositional Hürriyet 
daily. Fehmi Koru also paid attention to this democratic aspect of the meeting in his 
column article in Yeni ġafak. He defined the meeting as a step in the democratic 
progress of the country: “No matter what the claim of demonstrators was, no matter 
                                                          
50“Bazı siyasi parti liderlerinin de yer aldığı miting demokratik olgunluk içerisinde tamamlandı.” (Demokrasi güzel 
Ģey. (April 29, 2007). Yeni Şafak. p. 1) 
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how the addressees of those claims perceive the meeting, with the last street 
demonstrations Turkey took a new step forward in its path towards democracy”51. 
 During these debates on „ulusalcılık‟, Republican Rallies, presidency elections 
and annulment of the parliamentarian votes due to the 367 decision, three more 
meetings were organized during May 2007. In these meetings, participants highlighted 
similar complaints and oppositions against policies of the AKP. Mobilizing large 
crowds within one month period, Republican Rallies led hundreds of thousands of 
people to gather on streets in five different cities under the concerns for secularism, 
foreign threats, national freedom and laic republic. Within this period the Constitutional 
Court defined the first voting tour as invalid due to the law necessitating participation of 
367 members of the parliament. Criticizing the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
Erdoğan stated: “Election of the president in the parliament is now being blocked; this 
is a bullet shot against the democracy”52. Then, the AKP decided on having an early 
general election. In the aftermath of the 2007 general elections, the AKP gained more 
than 46 percent of votes. The crowd gathered during the Republican Rallies could not 
reflect the same dynamic at the ballot box, and the atmosphere of „threat and agitation‟ 
turned into democratic achievement and maturity of the AKP government. As a result of 
gaining enough seats at the parliament for reforming the constitution, the AKP prepared 
an amendment package which changed presidency elections in order to prevent another 
367 crisis. Therefore, through the constitutional amendment voted and accepted at the 
parliament number of required seats was decreased. Beside, the law on presidency 
elections was changed from parliamentarian voting to popular voting. As a result of 
these changes, the AKP managed to elect Abdullah Gül in the parliament as the new 
president of Turkey. Thus, the period covering Republican Rallies gradually closed 
along debates, tensions and transformations analyzed above. 
In this chapter I first illustrated the dynamics that led the AKP to gain a public 
trust and high vote rates at the 2002 general elections in the aftermath of major 
economic and legislative crises. Through the pragmatic conceptualization of the party 
doctrine “conservative democracy”, the AKP introduced the party as reformist, liberal 
                                                          
51 “Katılanların muradı ne olursa olsun, mesaja muhatap olanlar eylemi nasıl algılarsa algılasın, son sokak 
gösterileriyle, Türkiye, demokrasi yolunda yeni bir adım daha atmıĢ oldu” (Koru, Fehmi. (April 30, 2007). 
Sokaklardan korkmak mı, o niye? Yeni Şafak. p. 12) 
52 “CumhurbaĢkanının Meclis'te seçilmesinin önü bloke edilmiĢtir; bu, demokrasiye sıkılmıĢ bir kurĢundur." 
(Erdoğan: Demokrasiye kurĢun sıkıldı. (May 5, 2007). Radikal. Retrieved May 17, 2015, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=220196) 
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minded and inclusive. On the other hand, I stated that the AKP‟s reformist foreign 
relations and neoliberal administration led a defensive nationalism emerge which 
merged left wing anti-imperialist ideologies and right wing ultranationalists. Coming 
towards the Republican Rallies and the presidency elections, political assassinations 
organized by deep state actors became more explicit. In this period of the Rallies, I 
argued that the AKP generated a populist discourse which configured the social space in 
light of a dichotomizing logic. Discourse of the pro-government media and PM 
Erdoğan‟s statements constituted an antagonistic frontier through such referents as 
„agitators‟, „Masons‟, „terror groups‟, „gangs‟, „secular elite‟ and „ulusalcı‟. In his 
statements, Erdoğan‟s excluded the organizing committee through a developmentalist 
discourse and rhetorical reference to the ballot box. Although there were shifts in the 
contextualization of the term, I argued that what overdetermined the meaning of the 
„ulusalcı‟ reference was the political assassinations by deep state organizations. Thus, 
the AKP‟s populist discourse hegemonically captured the contingent meaning of 
„ulusalcılık‟ in 2007 period with the privileged signifier „deep state‟. According to this 
discursive formation, „ulusalcılık‟ indicated the paramilitary state cadres manipulating 
crowds and agitating political climate against the well-being of the people. In the next 
chapter, I will analyze how the AKP‟s rhetorical articulation of the political space 
contextualized the 2010 constitutional referendum period and „ulusalcılık‟ as a 
constitutive element of the enemy figure. 
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3. „ULUSALCILIK‟ AS „TUTELARY ELITES‟ 
3.1. From „Deep State‟ To „Status Quo‟: The AKP‟s Changing Discursive Field 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the period covering the Republican Rallies 
while problematizing the AKP‟s populist discourse and formation of “ulusalcılık” as a 
constitutive element in it. Although during the period the meaning of „ulusalcılık‟ 
shifted across different signifying elements, „deep state‟ aspect hegemonically fixed the 
term „ulusalcı‟ as a privileged constituent of the anti-people camp in the AKP‟s 
discursive field. In this chapter I analyze rearticulation of „ulusalcılık‟ as „status quo‟ in 
the 2010 constitutional referendum period. In below pages I will first trace the effects of 
the attempted party closure case against the AKP, and Ergenekon and Balyoz 
investigations on the configuration of the AKP‟s political discourse. Secondly, I will 
argue that in the 2010 constitutional referendum period the AKP‟s populist discourse 
constituted the antagonism between „democracy‟ and „status quo‟ which eventually took 
the place of the privileged signifier, i.e. „deep state‟, in configuration of the enemy 
figure. In light of this inquiry, through analyzing pro-government media discussions and 
Erdoğan‟s statements I will illustrate how hegemonic definition of „ulusalcılık‟ shifted 
its discursive terrain from „deep state‟ and contingently fixed „ulusalcılık‟ as „tutelary 
white elite‟ supporting the „Kemalist status quo‟. 
After the 2007 general elections, the AKP gained 46,5 percent of overall votes. 
Despite the oppositions of the CHP, mass gatherings during the Republican Rallies, and 
interventions of the military and judiciary branches of state bureaucracy, the AKP 
increased its power in the parliament as well as its public legitimacy. The election 
showed that neither the oppositional efforts nor these wide-ranging interventions could 
keep Abdullah Gül from becoming president. After the electoral success of the AKP, 
increasing pessimism and frustration grew on the side of oppositional voters (Keyman 
F. , 2010). On the one hand increased interventions of the bureaucratic cadres to 
parliamentarian legislation considering the threats against secularism, on the other hand 
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resentments of secular critiques against voters of the ruling party enabled the AKP to 
use a discourse of victimhood during its second term in office.  
In the aftermath of the Republican Rallies, two columnist of Hürriyet newspaper, 
Bekir CoĢkun and Yılmaz Özdil, wrote two articles which reflected this displeasure and 
indignation. Notably, the AKP rhetorically turned content of both columns into 
evidence of their being victimized by the laicist and bureaucratic circles. Bekir CoĢkun 
portrayed a potential AKP voter which he called “a man scratching his belly” (göbeğini 
kaşıyan adam), who was lazy, pragmatic, indifferent and ignorant to politics. CoĢkun 
contrasted this insulting figure with sons and daughters of Atatürk who were struggling 
for the future of this country
53. Using similar stereotypes, Yılmaz Özdil presented AKP 
voters through the figure of a man, that he named “barrel head” (bidon kafa), who was 
deceived by the governing AKP because of his being weak in reasoning and 
indifferent
54. Onur Öymen, spokesman of the CHP, while trying to make sense of the 
elections results noted that although people suffered because of the AKP and criticize 
the party, they still voted for the party in an irrational manner. According to Öymen, 
this was partly due to religious affiliations that the governing party abused and mostly 
because of assistance campaigns provided by the AKP in kind of wheat and coal
55
. 
These interpretations of certain oppositional circles about voting results provided the 
AKP key references in constituting a populist appeal that rejected „elitist‟ reactions of 
privileged exclusionists.   
 After winning their second term in office, the AKP proposed a constitutional 
amendment and took it to a referendum. Amendments included certain codes which 
decreased required number of seats at the parliament for decision taking, and changed 
presidential elections from parliament to popular voting. Oppositional circles 
interpreted this reform package as the AKP‟s legal counter attack against the 
Constitutional Court due to its decision on the two-third rule for parliamentarian voting, 
so-called “367-decision”. In October 2007, the AKP took the amendment to a 
referendum and people voted for constitutional reforms with 70 percent of support. In 
sum, despite the pessimism and frustrated views of oppositional groups, the AKP 
                                                          
53  See: CoĢkun, B. (May 3, 2007). Göbeğini kaĢıyan adam. Hürriyet. Retrieved May 28, 2015,  from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/6449176.asp  
54 See: Özdil, Y. (August 13, 2007). Bidon kafa. Hürriyet. Retrieved May 28, 2015,  from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/7074842.asp  
55 See: Öymen: CHP gücünü korumuĢtur. (July 23, 2007). Zaman. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from 
http://mobil.zaman.com.tr/politika_oymen-chp-gucunu-korumustur_567542.html 
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gained self-confidence as a result of fortifying its ballot base. Free from previous 
pressures of the military and the judiciary, the governing AKP (re)instated certain legal 
reforms that the party had to withdraw during its first term in office.  
Among these was an amendment to lift the headscarf ban at universities which 
the party had tried to implement previously together with reforms on university 
admission process of religious high schools (İmam-hatip okulları). In the face of strong 
oppositions from the military, the AKP had to drop these reform plans. However, after 
the 2007 general election the AKP prepared a constitutional reform and with the help of 
the MHP the law lifting headscarf ban was approved with 411 votes in the parliament. 
In response, the CHP took the article to the Constitutional Court for the amendments to 
be annulled (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012; Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012). Hurriyet, one of the most 
sold dailies in Turkey and owned by the oppositional Doğan Media Group, highlighted 
the collaboration of the AKP and the MHP on the headscarf issue in their cover page as 
“411 hands raised for chaos”56. While the newspaper interpreted this decision of the 
parliament as an attempt toward disunion and polarization of the country, this headline 
became another important reference point through which the AKP restored their claim 
of being oppressed by secularist state reactions, that did not only aim against the party 
but also „the people‟. As I stated in the previous chapter populist politics configure the 
political space by purportedly siding with the people as opposed to elites and their state 
establishments. In the AKP‟s rhetoric, this chain of crises became evidences for the 
obstruction of the national will by the secular elite and exclusionary bureaucratic cadres 
(DinçĢahin, 2012). 
In March 2008, a chief public prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court 
demanding to close down the AKP arguing that the party violated the constitutional law 
on secularism. In addition, the prosecutor requested to bar leading party cadres, 
including Erdoğan and Gül, from public office for a period of five years (Öktem, 2011). 
Intervention of the judiciary as a tutelary establishment was a recurrent phenomenon in 
the Turkish parliamentarian history. Through party closure cases banned political 
parties of the left-wing, Kurdish and Islamist movements, the judiciary as a status quo 
establishment tended to protect official ideology of the Kemalist state form (Saygılı, 
2010). Pro-government media circles and liberals defined the involvement of the 
Constitutional Court and the military in parliamentarian decisions as attempts of the 
                                                          
56 “411 el kaosa kalktı” (Hürriyet. February 10, 2008. p. 1) 
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tutelary forces in order to guard the secular state form. From this perspective, pro-AKP 
circles expressed their concerns on the closure request in 2008. Although, the chairman 
of the Court HaĢim Kılıç accused the AKP of being the center for anti-secular activities, 
the Court decided not to ban the party but decreased the portion of financial aids paid to 
the AKP by the state. According to Kılıç, this would be a “serious warning” for the 
AKP (Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012). 
 In this one year period, the Ergenekon trial being one of the most important 
political trials of Turkey was about to. According to many, Ergenekon investigations 
were hard to follow due to allegedly varied, detailed and intertwined connections among 
defendants (Ünver, 2009). Prosecutors of the case alleged that the so-called Ergenekon 
networks within the military and judiciary branches of the state have organized as a 
clandestine organization. Throughout the investigation suspects, including retired and 
active military officers and civilians from different backgrounds, have been charged 
with aiming to overthrow the AKP government through political assassinations, terror 
acts and ultimately a coup plot. 
The Ergenekon investigations began when more than twenty hand grenades were 
found in a shanty house in Istanbul, in June 2007. After a while, the police determined 
that serial numbers of grenades were identical with the bombs used in the attack against 
the offices of the Cumhuriyet newspaper in May 2006. Through the assailant, Alparslan 
Arslan who was a member of the paramilitary organization Association for the Union of 
Patriotic Forces (Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği) and also the killer of a State 
Council judge, investigations reached to retired army major Muzaffer Tekin. The 
investigation proposed that Tekin had incited Arslan to carry out these violent acts. 
Meanwhile, the investigation spread to other provinces and towns with the police 
finding secretly buried military equipments, bombs and arms. As the investigation 
expanded, in January 2008 retired four-star general and founder of intelligence service 
of Gendarmerie (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele-JĠTEM) Veli Küçük, the 
lawyer behind the article 301 indictments Kemal Kerinçsiz, ultranationalist (ülkücü) 
mafia leader Sedat Peker were arrested. In March 2008, investigations started to include 
people from a wide variety of backgrounds. Head of the Labor Party Doğu Perinçek, 
Cumhuriyet columnist Ġlhan Selçuk, and the rector of Istanbul University Kemal 
Alemdaroğlu were also taken into custody.  
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The pro-government media and liberal circles perceived this chain of 
arrestments as the gradual uncovering of the perennial deep state networks. On the 
contrary, critical groups and secular media were doubtful on the investigation and 
alleged connections between paramilitary mafia circles, journalists and academicians 
under the accusation of terror. In this speculative climate, police and prosecutors 
constantly serviced evidences and accusations to media groups which have close 
connections with the government. In doing so, pro-government media narrated the story 
behind Ergenekon networks before official indictments were prepared. As a result, 
actors and events were connected to each other not by the court but by media debates. 
Without further skeptical exploration, pro-government media groups interpreted those 
serviced connections with a speculative and criminalizing reasoning. This narration of 
the case, on the one hand, situated the AKP as the sole democratic force trying to 
eliminate tutelary cadres; on the other hand, pro-government media actors gradually 
started to stigmatize critical voices in an offensive manner while conjecturally labeling 
them as supporters of Ergenekon and coups d‟états. Oppositional media, on the other 
hand, relatively remained silent about ongoing accusations and majorly emphasized the 
instrumentalization of the case against oppositional voices in the hands of the governing 
AKP (Danzikyan, 2008).  
In July 2008, another set of investigations expanded towards an even larger and 
varied segment of public figures; and hence, gradually, the case became more 
controversial. In the sixth wave of indictments retired general and head of the Ataturkist 
Thought Association (ADD) ġener Eruygur, another retired high ranked general HurĢit 
Tolon, Ankara Chamber of Commerce Chairman Sinan Aygün, Cumhuriyet columnist 
Mustafa Balbay and former deputy of the AKP Turhan Çömez were questioned; except 
Çömez, all were taken into custody due to their alleged relations with the Ergenekon 
networks. These extraordinary chains of custodies eventually resulted with the rise of 
skepticism and disputes about the nature of investigations. After several waves of 
arrestments, the inquiry apparently aimed to combine a group of sectors having different 
origins and heterogeneous aims. According to the main argument of the trial, the 
Ergenekon network was an extra-legal terror organization that aimed to create a suitable 
environment for a military takeover to topple the AKP government. The Ergenekon 
indictment further proposed that the organization consisted of four sub-branches; which 
were military personnel, ideologues and journalists crafting a nationalist and isolationist 
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public opinion, mafia-like figures circulating a climate of terror and fear, and juridical 
cadres that enabled the Ergenekon network to operate clandestinely (Aydınlı, 2011). 
According to the pro-government media, the ultimate goal of Ergenekon and deep state 
terror organization was to overthrow the AKP from governing power through a military 
coup plot. 
Since the Ergenekon investigations and the attempt to close down the AKP 
occurred in the same time periods, the two cases appeared as a political battle between 
state bureaucracy and the AKP government. It was along these lines that Erdoğan 
accused the Supreme Court and the State Council of being agents of the anti-AKP, anti-
democratic, pro-military forces (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012). As a response, head of the CHP 
Deniz Baykal argued that Erdoğan was acting like the prosecutor of ongoing 
investigations. Erdoğan replied that he indeed could be seen as the prosecutor of the 
case, since a prosecutor is concerned with the public interests; i.e. the people, just like 
the AKP. 
Prosecutor works in the name of the people. Allegation operates in the name of 
the people and we are struggling for demanding and defending the justice in the 
name of the people. If it is conceived in this manner, yes I am the prosecutor of 
the case.
57
  
Along the controversies, increasing number of arrestments targeting oppositional 
groups led larger public segments to perceive the Ergenekon trial as the AKP‟s legal 
counter-attack against secular cadres at the state bureaucracy (Ünver, 2009). As a result 
of these political allegations, together with constant enlarging scope of the case towards 
rectors, academicians, journalist, several civil society segments including unionists, 
skeptical tendencies culminated towards a deeper polarization that questioned 
trustworthiness and impartiality of the trial. 
 Members of the opposition were highlighting different injustices. First of all, 
forced connections between arrestments and leakages of sensitive evidence directly to 
the pro-government media channels attracted a shared feeling of distrust about both the 
AKP‟s the court‟s neutrality on the trial. Besides, larger public sectors gradually 
perceived the case as initially inflated due to immensely detailed and more than three 
                                                          
57“Savcı millet adına vardır. Ġddia makamı millet adına oradadır ve biz de millet adına hakkı aramanın, hakkı 
savunmanın gayreti içerisindeyiz. Eğer bu anlamda savcılıksa, evet savcıyım” (Evet milletin savcısıyım. (July 16, 
2008). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 1, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/politika/evet-milletin-savcisiyim-
129065) 
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thousand page long indictment (Ünver, 2009). Despite the seriousness of charges, the 
indictment did not include convincing evidence that the accused were members of a 
single terror organization (Jenkins, 2009). Moreover, the way in which evidence was 
collected, such as use of wiretaps and electronic surveillance without legal warrant, 
became controversial due it was illegal. In addition to these legal allegations, the 
individuals in question were detained and kept in custody for years without formal 
charges (Gürsoy, 2012). Thus, rising number of journalists and oppositions from varied 
backgrounds started to highlight the politicized nature of the investigations and 
accusations. In the end of ongoing doubts and speculations over the case, insight of the 
trial turned into unjustifiable conspiracies that further polarized the public discussions 
(Polat, 2011).  
 In analytical terms, this polarization and split of judgments about the trial was 
about the conception of the deep state which was perceived differently along media 
oppositions. The name Ergenekon was firstly heard in the context of Susurluk incident. 
In 1997, a car accident in the town Susurluk eventually revealed extra-legal connections 
between political assassinations, state bureaucracy and parliamentarian circles. In the 
accident head of the Istanbul police department Hüseyin Kocadağ and an 
ultranationalist contract killer Abdullah Çatlı were dead, while Sedat Bucak who was a 
Kurdish tribe leader and a deputy in the parliament survived. Although police 
investigation and the parliamentarian commissions of inquiry tried to clarify networks 
between these figures, investigations could not uncover deep state alliances of the 90‟s. 
Comparing the oppositional and pro-government media with regard to their 
conceptualization of the Ergenekon trial and „deep state‟, the Susurluk incident became 
a distinguishing reference point. While secular oppositional media discussed Ergenekon 
and deep state as a part of the alliances appeared in the Susurluk incident, pro-
government media discursively isolated Ergenekon from Susurluk and argued that the 
deep state reorganized itself after the 90‟s and ranged to civil society associations 
(Balcı, 2010). Pro-government media situated „deep state‟ mainly as a product of 90‟s 
coup-supporting tutelary state cadres while identifying Ergenekon with the secular 
bureaucracy. This definition was disconnecting the history of counter guerilla 
organizations which have been active till 70‟s and onwards, and hence enabling the 
AKP‟s discourse to limit „deep state‟ as coup plots against the current government. In 
contrast, oppositional media conceived deep state as a continuation of the political 
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assassinations and terror plots by the counter-guerilla forces till the 70‟s; however, it 
mainly remained silent on the actual Ergenekon investigations.  
Thus, two different accounts emerged on Ergenekon, deep state and tutelary 
forces of state cadres (Balcı, 2010). On the one hand, the pro-government media 
addressed „ulusalcı‟ deep state actors in the tutelary establishments of the secular state. 
Based on this line of reasoning, pro-government media actors stated that „Ergenekoncu‟ 
status quo was targeting the AKP in order to violate the party‟s success in consolidating 
democracy and granting the will of the people. On the other hand, oppositional media 
was insisting that the AKP was not aiming to expose actual deep state networks, but 
instead trying to reinstitute and utilize state establishments for their own benefit. On the 
eve of the actual trial, Zaman newspaper defined the case as “the case of the century”: 
“Bloody chaos plans of the „ulusalcı gangs‟, who involved in many provocative acts in 
the recent history of the country, have been deciphered”58.  
Chain of detainments during the Ergenekon investigations included civilians as 
well as jurisdictional and military cadres in the name of elimination of the tutelary 
cadres. Therefore it helped the AKP to portray the party as an actor in reforming anti-
democratic status quo establishments of the Kemalist state form and normalize state-
civil society relations (Cizre & Walker, 2010). In this era of demilitarization, the ruling 
party started democratic openings that aimed to negotiate and improve cultural rights of 
discriminated communities; namely Kurds, Alevis and Roma people. However, the so-
called Khabur incident in October 2009 became a cut off point for oppositional public 
opinion and for the AKP, as well. As a step for the Kurdish opening negotiations, a 
representative group of unarmed Kurdish guerilla members entered into borders of 
Turkey from Khabur border gate with a massive demonstration over a bus while 
saluting townspeople with Kurdish national flags, marches and slogans. In the uproar of 
critical explosions from state officers and civil realms, the AKP had to step back and 
condemned the incident. According to Kalaycıoğlu, in the turmoil of rising reactions, 
the governing party decided to prepare a constitutional amendment in order to fight off 
another closure case that might be imposed by tutelary cadres at the military and 
judiciary (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012).  
                                                          
58“Ülkenin yakın tarihindeki birçok provokatif eylemde imzası olan 'ulusalcı çete'nin, kanlı kaos planları deĢifre 
edildi” (Yüzyılın davası baĢlıyor. (October 20, 2008). Zaman. Retrieved June 2, 2015, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_yuzyilin-davasi-basliyor_751306.html)  
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During preparations for the amendment package, the newspaper Taraf published 
military documents in January 2010 which allegedly uncovered plans for a military 
intervention in 2003, the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plan. Under the Balyoz 
investigations, detained military personnel accused of planning to shoot down a Turkish 
fighter jet and blow up two mosques during a Friday prayer. Although the military 
officers stated that these were parts of a military workshop, the Taraf daily and the 
indictment alleged that documents were part of a designed coup attempt. Critiques 
claimed that those documents have been manufactured in order to degrade and weaken 
the military. On the contrary, pro-government media took side with the alleged 
accusations. In sum, on the one hand, rising sceptical atmosphere due to political and 
legal allegations made the accusations in Balyoz and Ergenekon trials more 
controversial, on the other hand pro-government media circles intimidated critical 
voices for “supporting” military coups and accused with a criminalizing tone (Doğan & 
Rodrik, 2010). As a result, Balyoz investigations accused more than a hundred active 
military members for organizing terror acts in order to weaken the AKP government 
and enabling a coup plot. Being the second largest trial which included majorly active 
military personnel from high ranked offices, Balyoz investigations let oppositional 
voices to increase their critiques against their being silenced under the AKP‟s “empire 
of fear”.  
The Balyoz indictment proposed that retired General Çetin Doğan was heading 
the plot. Some other active generals, who were allegedly involved, were about to have 
their annual promotions in August 2010 from the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek 
Askeri Şûra/YAġ) depending on the confirmation by the Prime Minister Erdoğan. Chief 
of the General Stuff Ġlker BaĢbuğ, who was identified Ergenekon investigation as 
intentionally targeting Turkish Armed Forces, insisted on the appointment of the 
military members in question. In contrast, Erdoğan‟s decision was to prevent the 
promotions, and instead direct them into forced retirements. After a number of YAġ 
sessions, negotiations between Erdoğan and BaĢbuğ turned into a major crisis between 
the military and the elected government in rule. Erdoğan and BaĢbuğ could not agree on 
promotions of certain generals. In the end, Erdoğan solved this dispute by forcing 
BaĢbuğ to retirement, and hence finalizing YAġ sessions with a new Chief of Staff and 
his own list of appointments. Similar to the Ergenekon and party closure cases, pro-
government media portrayed Erdoğan‟s decisions on the so-called “YAġ crisis” as a 
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move to delegitimize and weaken the long endured tutelary cadres within the 
bureaucratic structures.  
Just in the aftermath of the YAġ crisis, Turkey went through the constitutional 
referendum on 12
th
 of September 2010. The amendment package contained varied and 
seemingly unrelated constitutional reforms; ranging from law codes regarding personal 
privacy, children‟s right, right to travel, introduction of the Ombudsman, right to file a 
petition for the Constitutional Court individually etc. However, contrary to these 
administrative changes, four amendments made the referendum a realm of hegemonic 
struggle for both oppositional and pro-AKP sectors. Under the political tensions 
illustrated above, the amendment package gained the 58 percent of overall votes and 
formally accepted. The fact that the date for the referendum intentionally overlapped 
with the thirtieth anniversary of 12 September 1980 coup let the AKP to strengthen its 
hegemonic investment in crafting the referendum discursively as a break point towards 
democratization of Turkey. According to the AKP‟s discourse, the referendum would be 
a threshold in order to leave tutelary and coup-prone establishments of the “old Turkey” 
behind, and move towards what the government called “advanced democracy”. Two 
requested amendments in the package were considering the legal status of the military 
personnel. One was demanding to limit the jurisdictional bureaucracy and reach of 
military courts while empowering civil courts. The other was requesting to repeal the 
article 15 that had barred the prosecution of coup generals, including Kenan Evren, 
since the 1982 constitution drafted under the military junta. Two further amendments 
pertained to bureaucratic organization of the judiciary. These articles aimed to change 
the composition of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (Hakimler Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu/HSKY) by increasing the total number 
of judges and changing their election procedure. Although the 1982 constitution have 
been amended 17 times before 2010, the AKP rhetorically framed referendum as an 
initial stage for confronting the coup interventions in the political history of the country.  
Pro-government media columnists defended these reforms for they regard 
amendments as a step to challenge tutelary cadres of the Kemalist state and downgrade 
status quo establishments. According to pro-AKP circles, amendments would transform 
unaccountable and nonresponsive jurisdictional bureaucracy, which they called as the 
„tutelary elites‟, into a more democratic and heterogeneous composition. The AKP 
spokesmen and the pro-government media argued that amendments would weaken the 
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strength of status quo supporters in the judiciary and would prevent and eliminate future 
interventions of the tutelary cadres to the elected government. Therefore, to the AKP‟s 
discourse, the referendum was more than voting for amendments but it would be a 
breaking point from a repressive state form and impacts of former coup regimes towards 
consolidation of democracy and normalization of state-society relations in Turkey. 
Based on this line of reasoning, the AKP discursively positioned “Yes” votes as the 
“decision of the people” for democratic changes, while defining “No” votes as 
manifestation of defenders of the tutelage resisting for status quo. Based on the AKP‟s 
discursive field, below caricature from Taraf newspaper perfectly portrayed this 
configuration of the antagonism between change and resistance. 
 
(Evet-Hayır [Yes-No]. (September 7, 2010) Taraf, p. 19)  
3.2. Articulation of „ulusalcılık‟ Within The Context of „Status Quo‟ And „White 
Elites‟ 
Up until now elements I have portrayed the social dynamics and tensions- 
namely the attempted closure of the AKP, the democratic openings, the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz trials and the YAġ crisis- which shaped the political atmosphere coming 
towards the constitutional referendum on September 12, 2010. In the following pages, I 
will illustrate the configuration of the AKP‟s discursive articulation of the referendum 
while analyzing rhetorical formulations of Erdoğan and certain AKP‟s spokesmen, as 
well as excerpts from pro-government media columnists. In doing so, I will analyze 
how the AKP‟s discursive field hegemonically fixed constitutive elements of the enemy 
figure and „ulusalcı‟ being a component in it through the antagonism between 
„democratic change‟ and „status quo‟. 
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3.2.1. CHP Zihniyeti (Mentality of The CHP) And The „Coup Supporters‟ 
From late 2007 onwards, the AKP discursively positioned itself on the political 
space as an anti-institutionalist and anti-status quo party. Pro-government media and 
public intellectuals from different backgrounds applauded attempts of the government 
as courageous steps to challenge political manifestations of Kemalist status quo and 
their exclusionist tutelary cadres. Since public figures from different backgrounds 
conceived the Kemalist ideology as the perennial problem before the anti-democratic 
nature of state-civil society relations in Turkey, a large scope of political groups, 
ranging from leftists, conservatives to liberals, supported the AKP‟s reformist attempts 
for weakening the common enemy, „tutelary mentality‟. In the previous chapter, I 
stressed that populist logic necessitates the division of the social space into two 
antagonistic camps; e.g. elites as the oligarchs vs. the people as the underdog. 
Articulation of claims of heterogeneous sectors towards a broader anti-institutionalist 
demand of a popular identity, to Laclau, is a characteristic feature of the politics logic of 
populism (Laclau, 2005). The AKP‟s discourse operationalized this political logic in the 
referendum period through its appeal to „the people‟ while this rhetorical addressing 
simultaneously demarcated the anti-people block.  
Along this dichotomic „us and other‟ relation, Erdoğan mainly referred to two 
constituents of the anti-democratic pole. The first was related to the continuing debates 
on „coup plots‟ and the AKP discursively knotted current trials together with the May 
27 1960 coup d‟état and hanging of then PM Adnan Menderes. The other was the 
„mentality of the CHP‟ that which the AKP rhetorically articulated as a metaphoric 
figure referring to the CHP as the political manifestation of the „status quo‟. Based on 
this discursive field, in the quotation below Erdoğan referred to the 1960 coup and 
identified the forces behind it as those that would vote for “No” in the referendum. 
While Erdoğan implied the continuity of tutelary interventions, he situated the “No” 
votes as votes against „democracy‟ and „decisions of the people‟. 
The mentality, which applauded May 27, offered May 27 some possibilities, 
which said “I am at your disposal”; it is the same mentality supporting “No” 
votes today. Are we saying “Yes” to the advanced democracy? “Yes” to 
liberties? “Yes” to the empowerment of the national will [milli irade]? “Yes” to 
70 
 
confront May 27? “Yes” for the power to the nation [millet], the decision to the 
nation [millet]?
59
 
This quote from Erdoğan‟s speech designated that the „mentality‟ behind “No” 
votes reached back to the 1960 coup. In another speech, Erdoğan stated that “We are 
yelling like Adnan Menderes, saying „enough‟, enough; we are stating that both the 
word and decision belongs to the people [millet]” 60 . Erdoğan recurrently 
commemorated Adnan Menderes, who was hanged by military junta of the 1960 coup, 
along different public meetings during the referendum period. Right-wing political 
movements in Turkey as well as the AKP government discursively articulated Adnan 
Menderes and the Democratic Party period in the 1950‟s as a progressive administration 
which challenged the single-party domination of the CHP and discontinued the 
alienation of relations between the state and the people. After he has been expelled from 
the CHP in 1945, Menderes won the general elections in 1950 with the Democrat Party 
and put an end to single party period. Menderes became the prime minister while 
gaining one of the highest vote rates in the parliamentarian history of Turkey. 
Considering his economic and political programs, Menders, similar to Erdoğan, utilized 
a populist rhetoric which based on the antagonism between the despotic single-party 
state under the CHP rule and the oppressed people. Based on this dichotomy, Menderes 
accused the CHP for suppressing the interest of the people and establishing a rule of 
elites. He criticized former CHP rule, which he defined as a small privileged minority 
enjoying the resources of the central state, and rhetorically positioned the Democrat 
Party as the true representative of the people (Türk, 2014).  
Mobilizing the memory of the Democrat Party, Erdoğan time to time 
appropriated the symbolic image of Menderes in order to legitimize their political 
discourse. In his speeches, Erdoğan frequently referred to the hanging of Menderes and 
the overthrow of the Democrat Party by the 1960 coup d‟état while rhetorically 
addressing the CHP cadres as coup supporters. In doing so, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric merged 
tutelary state and coups d‟états with the CHP as a single domineering force which 
suppressed the will of the people. In line with this reasoning, during the 2007 general 
                                                          
59 “O gün 27 Mayıs'a alkıĢ tutan, o gün 27 Mayıs'a çanak tutan, o gün 27 Mayısçılara 'emrinizdeyim' diyen zihniyet, 
iĢte bugünkü hayırcı zihniyettir. Ġleri demokrasiye evet mi? Özgürlüklere evet mi? Milli iradenin güçlenmesine evet 
mi? 27 Mayıs'la yüzleĢmeye evet mi? Gücümüz millet, kararımız millet evet mi?” (CHP‟nin diktiği tek bir ağaç yok. 
(August 7, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 6, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/chpnin-diktigi-tek-bir-
agac-yok-272294)  
60  “Tıpkı Adnan Menderes gibi haykırıyoruz, „yeter‟ diyoruz, yeter, „söz de karar da milletindir‟ diyoruz” (12 
Eylül‟den sonra kimse fiĢlenmeyecek). (August 6, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 6, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/12-eylulden-sonra-kimse-fislenmeyecek-272102 
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election in July, one of the support campaigns for the AKP utilized the memory of 
Menderes. Entitled “Men of the Nation” (Milletin Adamları), this campaign poster set 
pictures of Adnan Menderes, Turgut Özal and Tayyip Erdoğan together. At the bottom 
the poster read:  
They are the iconic figures of the love for the nation clinched with Atatürk. They 
are the voice of this land, its conscience, its spirit for springing. There is the 
nation in their hearts, and they in the heart of the nation. They are the Men of the 
Nation
61
. 
Similar to this political campaign, during the referendum period Erdoğan 
rhetorically addressed Menderes while discursively merging the 1960 coup, Ergenekon 
and Balyoz trials and the CHP as continuous threats against democracy and the popular 
will. Through this rhetorical inscription of equivalence and continuity, the AKP‟s 
discourse configured the political space as a battle between two camps; one represented 
the popular will and the well-being of the nation, while the other manifested coup 
supporters and exclusionary circles suppressing the national will (Koyuncu, 2014). In 
this way, Erdoğan strengthened the depiction of referendum as a threshold for 
eliminating „status quo‟ and establishing the „advanced democracy‟.  
Beside the reference to „coup d‟états‟ as an anti-democratic aspect, Erdoğan 
integrated different signifying elements that he opposed to the popular will of the 
nation; such as the „dark provocations‟, „agitating political parties‟ and „legislative 
organs‟. 
They wanted to prevent us through mafia and dark provocations. Through 
manipulating laws they deterred us. Do you know what do they say us, now? 
You know what happened to Adnan Menderes in the end, don‟t you? They say 
“You‟re going to have the same end”. […] Henceforth, the people [millet] shape 
the destiny of this country, which is what they could not bear. We know how 
they cooperate with dirty forces, dirty gangs within the terror organization. And, 
you know what is written in those indictments about frightening dirty 
partnerships. Unfortunately, some of the political parties became figurants in this 
game of gang and terror organizations intentionally or unintentionally. With the 
will of God and common sense of our people Turkey will not be deceived by 
such games.
62
 (Emphasis added) 
                                                          
61 “Onlar Atatürk ile perçinleĢen millet sevgisinin simge isimleri. Onlar bu toprağın sesi, vicdanı, atılım ruhu. Onların 
yüreğinde millet, milletin yüreğinde onlar. Onlar Milletin Adamları” (as cited in Koyuncu, 2014, p. 148)  
62 “Bizi mafyayla, karanlık provokasyonlarla durdurmak istediler. Hukuku zorlayarak üzerimize geldiler. ġimdi bize 
ne diyorlar biliyor musunuz? Merhum Adnan Menderes'in akıbetini biliyorsun değil mi? „Senin de akıbetin öyle olur 
ha‟ [...] Bu ülkenin kaderini artık millet kendisi çiziyor, bunu hazmedemediler. Terör örgütünün içerideki kirli 
odaklarla, kirli çetelerle, nasıl iĢbirliği içinde olduğunu biliyorsunuz. O yazılan iddianamelerdeki tüyler ürpertici kirli 
ortaklıkları biliyorsunuz. Bu terör, bu çeteler, iĢte bunlarla beraber maalesef birtakım siyasi partiler de bilerek ya da 
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Erdoğan‟s statement above knotted different elements together contiguously; 
such as „gangs‟, „mafia‟, „legislative bodies‟, „terror organizations‟ and „political 
parties‟. Addressing the people as the democratic subject in decision, Erdoğan 
rhetorically configured these elements as a unified force which worked against Turkey‟s 
well-being. Erdoğan referred to the 1960 coup and Menderes in order to justify his 
statements on „dark provocations‟ and „dirty collaborations‟, although his formulation 
of an enemy organization extended the limits of military aspect towards political parties 
and the jurisdiction. Therefore, contrary to this equivocality of varied elements, a 
certain discursive structure arrested these aspects within a meaningful totality as an anti-
people pole.  
This structure, constituting and organizing social relations, is configured through 
articulatory practices which discursively determine the meaningful positions of 
signifying elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 115-21). Theory of discursive 
articulation rejects foundationalist and deterministic explanations on objective identity 
of particulars; to the contrary, it prioritizes the contingency and openness of the social. 
This theoretical framework does not conceive social elements as having particular 
identities and meanings by themselves, but argues that identity and meaning is a result 
of hegemonic articulation which dislocates and fix signifying elements under a 
temporary force of discursive fields (DeLuca, 1999). Regarding the analyses on above 
quotes, Erdoğan‟s formulations developed such an articulation while addressing the 
anti-people camp. Configuring the heterogeneity of social elements as a unified actor, 
an enemy, Erdoğan rhetorically integrated different actors in a relational setting. In 
below quote from his speech, we can trace the dislocation and metonymic fixation of 
elements in contiguity to each other.  
CHP, MHP, BDP, YARSAV [the Union of Judges and Prosecutors] and the 
terrorist organization all came together against who, against those who say 
“Yes” to the constitution of the people [millet]. I am asking you, can Turkey 
benefit from such an alliance? They cannot work together on any issue mattering 
to the country. They run away from democracy, from liberty, from anything that 
may benefit the well-being of the people. But today, together they oppose the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
bilmeyerek bu oyunun figüranı oluyorlar. Allah'ın izniyle milletimizin sağduyusuyla Türkiye'ye bu oyunlara 
gelmeyecek” (Abdest Ģüphesi olanın namazından Ģüphesi olur. (August 10, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 9, 
2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/abdest-suphesi-olanin-namazindan-suphesi-olur-272809) 
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amendments which will expand the people‟s horizon and strengthen the vision of 
the country; they make evil alignments.
63
 (Emphasis added) 
In this quote, articulation of the political field simultaneously subverted different 
elements while equalizing them as constitutive elements of an enemy organization that 
which Erdoğan defined as opposed to the democratic and developmentalist interests of 
the people/millet. While rhetorically merging political parties, terror groups and 
legislative bodies together, Erdoğan‟s discursive formulation dislocated the position of 
those elements in the political field and hegemonically captured them as „evil 
alignments‟ who were against the „constitution of the people‟. Constituting equivalential 
chains and configuring a hegemonic contiguity, Erdoğan rhetorically addressed the 
constitutional referendum as an antagonistic frontier demarcating the political field. 
Based on this differential logic and configuration of the relations of oppositions, we can 
argue that elements like the CHP or legislative bodies do not preexist as threats against 
the social well-being, but configuration of the discursive realm and articulation of the 
political antagonisms determines the quality of particulars. Laclau and Mouffe define 
articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 
105). In consequence, articulatory practice dislocates and temporarily fixes those 
elements onto a meaningful discursive field. Above references on “decision of the 
nation” and “constitution of the people” configured the center of this field through 
which “us and others” were determined discursively. While recurrent reference to 
“democracy” enabled Erdoğan to rhetorically interpellate „the people‟ as a popular 
subject in decision making, appealing to the people at the same time constituted 
„restrainers‟ of democracy and popular will. Through this discursive field in which the 
referendum gained its discursive meaning, the “Yes” pole designated 
„us/democracy/freedom‟, while the “No” pole implied the „evil alignments‟ as an enemy 
organization having ties to terror groups, judiciary and the parties at the parliament.   
 
 
                                                          
63 “CHP, MHP, BDP, YARSAV, terör örgütü hepsi bir araya toplanmıĢlar, kime karĢı, milletin anayasasına evet 
diyenlere karĢı. Soruyorum size, bu ittifaktan Türkiye menfaat sağlayabilir mi? Bunlar, memleketin hiçbir 
meselesinde bir araya gelmezler. Bunlar demokrasiden kaçar, özgürlükten kaçar, milletin yararına olacak ne varsa 
ondan kaçarlar. Ama bugün, milletin ufkunu açacak, ülkenin vizyonunu güçlendirecek bu değiĢikliğe karĢı çıkıyor, 
Ģerde ittifak ediyorlar.” (Dörtyol mesajları. (August 1, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 10, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/dortyol-mesajlari-271279) 
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3.2.2. CHP Zihniyeti And The „White Turks‟ 
Articulatory practice governs and contextualizes a discursive narration of events 
and actors. In light of historical and political dynamics, articulation hegemonically fixes 
and saturates varied references as meaningful constituents of a whole (DeLuca, 1999). 
This is valid for the AKP‟s discourse, as well. The discourse of the party in 2007 mostly 
addressed „agitating gangs‟ implying ongoing deep state activities which eventually 
became the privileged signifier overdetermined the context of „ulusalcı‟ reference. 
However, tensions of the period from 2007 to 2010 led the AKP to constitute an anti-
tutelary and anti-status quo discourse. Therefore, during 2010 constitutional referendum 
period rhetoric of the party knotted the deep state aspect and oppositional groups 
together as two related branches of the „status quo‟ as the anti-democratic enemy pole. 
In another speech, while stating achievements and progressive successes of his party, 
Erdoğan defined those anti-democratic forces hindering the services of the AKP: 
While carrying out such activities, we saw that some dark forces that do not like 
milli irade (national will) and that despise civil politics took action. We saw that 
there are some dirty organizations in this country. … There is no government 
asking for anti-democratic forces anymore. There is no government yielding its 
power and leaves the administration; there is a government that considers the 
nation‟s trust more sacred than its own existence on nation‟s behalf. This CHP 
mentality (CHP zihniyeti) calls my citizens “belly scratchers” and “barrel 
headed.” You will see who is belly scratcher and who is barrel headed on 
September 12.
64
 
Again, Erdoğan grounded his formulation onto the opposition between “will of 
the people” and “extra-democratic forces”. This dichotomization prioritized notions 
such as “democracy”, “civil politics” and “decisions of the nation” over “locus of dark 
organizations” and „mentality of the CHP‟. In his formulation, firstly, Erdoğan talked 
about “locus of dark organizations” while implying ongoing coup trials. In the previous 
chapter, I have argued that Erdoğan constantly referred to “gangs” as „deep state‟ in the 
context of a developmentalist discourse. In the 2010 period, however, the AKP‟s 
discourse prioritized their struggle against coup attempts, which Erdoğan referred as 
„anti-democratic dirty organizations‟, and degradation of the people by the state elite. In 
                                                          
64“Tüm bunları yaparken, demokrasiden, millet iradesinden hoĢlanmayan, sivil siyasetten hazzetmeyen bir kısım 
karanlık odakların harekete geçtiklerini gördük Gördük ki bu ülkede kirli bir takım örgütlenmeler var. ... ġimdi artık 
demokrasi dıĢı güçlere çanak tutan bir yönetim yok. ġimdi artık Ģapkasını alıp giden bir iktidar yok, milletin adına 
milletin emanetini canından kutsal bilen bir iktidar var. Bu CHP zihniyeti benim vatandaĢıma „göbeğini kaĢıyanlar‟ 
diyor, „bidon kafalı‟ diyor. 12 Eylül‟de kim bidon kafalı, kim göbeğini kaĢıyan göreceksin” (Bu anayasa değiĢikliği 
bir millet projesidir. (August 17, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 12, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/bu-anayasa-degisikligi-bir-millet-projesidir-273896) 
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accordance, metaphoric formulation of „mentality of the CHP‟ discursively combined 
both the coup aspect and denigration of the people. In previous quotes, Erdoğan‟s 
reference to the „mentality of the CHP‟ situated an ill-defined relationality between the 
military interventions and the CHP while mobilizing the memory of Menderes. 
However, in this formulation, Erdoğan excluded the CHP rhetorically as an anti-
democratic and anti-people through indicating the hierarchy between secular elites and 
the people. While addressing those pejorative labels, i.e. “the man scratching his belly 
and “the barrel headed”, Erdoğan merged „coup‟ aspect with „secular elites‟ under the 
shorthand formulation of the „mentality of the CHP‟. Through subversion of the „secular 
elites‟ and „coup plots‟ and rhetoric combination of both, Erdoğan‟s articulation 
arrested both aspects within a single narration based on an antagonistic relationality 
against the people. Privileged reference to “anti-democratic forces” tied on the one hand 
coup trials and „locus of dark organizations‟, on the other hand denigrating reactions of 
„the CHP elites‟ against the people. Thus, through the constituting antagonism between 
„democracy‟ and „status quo‟, „mentality of the CHP‟ and „dirty/terror/coup 
organizations‟ became substitutable as „tutelary forces‟. Through this discursive 
substitution, Erdoğan designated „the CHP‟ both as an actor supporting coup d‟états 
and, through mobilizing the memory of such pejorative labels, as the suppressive elite 
alienated from the people. According to this line of formulation, „mentality of the CHP‟ 
hegemonically meant exclusionary secular elite reactions that patronized, ignored and 
oppressed the „real people‟ of Turkey. Based on this discursive field, in a speech 
Erdoğan referred to the lifting of headscarf ban and rising secular concerns. While 
reminding and criticizing the headline “411 hands raised for chaos” by oppositional 
Hürriyet newspaper, Erdoğan retroactively related this event into the „mentality‟ behind 
“No” votes: 
What happened to your liberal thoughts; what happened to your support for 
freedom of religions; what happened to your support for freedom of education? 
Yet, these were the people subjecting the country to such discrimination as white 
Turks-black Turks, unfortunately. These people are wretched enough to call my 
nation “belly scratchers.” Those who give them columns in their newspapers 
have the mentality to go too far to call my citizens “barrel heads.” Now they all 
gather on the “No” front. Now they are defending a coup d’état constitution. 
However, we will walk towards an enlightened future with the constitution of the 
people [millet].
65
 (Emphasis added) 
                                                          
65 “Hani ya, siz özgürlükçüydünüz, hani siz inanç özgürlüğünden yanaydınız, hani siz eğitim özgürlüğünden 
yanaydınız? Ama bunlar bu ülkeyi maalesef ayrıma tabi tutanlardı, beyaz Türkler-zenci Türkler diye. Bunlar var ya, 
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In this quotation, the same two-layered logic was at work. On the one hand, 
Erdoğan referred to „mentality of the CHP‟ and discursive indications of it while 
commemorating those same labels. In his formulation, Erdoğan designated the antagony 
between „secular elites‟ and the „people‟ through “white Turk-black Turk” dichotomy. 
Through this analogy, Erdoğan remarked the underestimation of religious identity of the 
people by exclusionist „white Turks‟. On the other hand, Erdoğan rhetorically 
configured a dichotomy between the „constitution of the people‟ and „constitution of 
coup‟.  While he identified actors at the “No front” as supporters of the constitution of 
coup d‟états, Erdoğan rhetorically merged „white Turks‟ reference with the „coup‟ 
aspect.  
As stated above, in the AKP‟s discourse „mentality of the CHP‟ was one of the 
two pillar constituents of the anti-people camp together with „coup plots‟ as „anti-
democratic forces‟ in the period of the constitutional referendum. In previous 
quotations, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric metonymically combined different political parties, 
terrorist organizations and legal cadres to each other on a contiguous setting (i.e. “CHP, 
MHP, BDP, YARSAV, terror organizations”).  Under the hegemonic force of an 
equivalential chain, this contiguous setting constituted the anti-democratic syntagm in 
the AKP‟s discursive field. Along speeches, Erdoğan reduced the unidentified 
relationality between those elements into the „mentality of the CHP‟. This short hand 
formulation, as argued above, represented the metaphoric substitute of „anti-democratic 
forces‟. Thus, in the discourse of the AKP the „mentality of the CHP‟ functioned in 
condensing two phases of „anti-democratic forces‟ which were „secular elite reactions‟ 
and supporting „coup d‟états‟. Thus, the AKP‟s discursive field condensed these two 
axes in the metaphoric formulation of „mentality of the CHP‟ which was located in 
opposition to „those who say „Yes‟ to the constitution of the people‟. 
This rhetorical reduction of the heterogeneity of the social necessitated the 
simplification and homogenization of the political field under a dichotomizing logic. 
According to Laclau‟s political theory, as a result of the tension between the 
equivalential and differential logics an antagonistic front line demarcates the social into 
                                                                                                                                                                          
benim milletime göbeğini kaĢıyanlar diyecek kadar sefil. Bunları köĢelerinde yazdıranlar, benim vatandaĢıma bidon 
kafalı diyecek kadar ileri giden zihniyettir bunlar. ġimdi hepsi hayır cephesinde toplandılar. ġimdi darbe anayasasını 
savunuyorlar. Ama biz milletin anayasasıyla aydınlık yarınlara yürüyeceğiz.” (Biz her yerde aynı dili konuĢuruz. 
(August 29, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 13, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/biz-her-yerde-ayni-
dili-konusuruz-275920) 
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two incommensurable camps while subverting the heterogeneity of particulars. Laclau 
states that since objects are not pre-determined by necessary laws but discursively 
configured through articulatory practices, constitution of the society as a closed totality 
is only possible through contingent dislocation and hegemonic fixation of elements. 
Therefore, what constitutes and maintains the effect of society is the result of discursive 
performances and rhetorical operations such as metonymic combinations and 
metaphoric substitutions (Laclau, 2005, p. 12). Thus, regarding the configuration of 
equivalentiality among different signifying elements Laclau states: “[T]his equivalence 
supposes the operation of the principle of analogy among literally diverse contents- and 
what is this but a metaphorical transposition” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 110). 
Through metonymic articulations and analogical identifications, heterogeneity is 
subverted into homogeneity through equivalential relations. Below quote from Egemen 
BağıĢ, then deputy of the AKP and minister of EU affairs, illustrates operation of this 
political logic and how rhetorical articulations configure the signification within the 
discursive systems. Egemen BağıĢ, during an interview with the Yeni ġafak daily, 
identified the actors behind “No” votes and their „mentality‟ as below: 
Look at who is saying “no” to the change. The separatist terrorist organization 
says “no.” Those who call their own base “piteous” say “no.” Those who feed 
upon coup d’état say “no.” Those who call the nation barrel-heads say “no.” 
Those who desire a democracy without the people say “no.” The social 
engineers say “no.” The well-to-do say “no.” Those who see the nation as a 
threat say “no.” Those who grudge the nation the democracy say “no.” EU 
opponents say “no.” Dark forces say “no.” […] Voting for no brings wide range 
of problems, poverty, oppressive regimes, long queues and weariness, as every 
CHP government would bring. CHP mentality was put on trial by the nation‟s 
conscience and sentenced to lifelong opposition. The fact that status quo 
supporters and those stymieing this country’s will for change and 
transformation are revealed and they are going be defeated by our nation‟s will 
for change once more will be the greatest beneficence of voting for no.
66
 
(Emphasis added) 
BağıĢ‟s formulation exemplifies rhetorical constitution of equivalential bonds 
across different elements in a discursive field. The AKP‟s dominant discourse on 
                                                          
66“Bakın değiĢikliğe kimler “hayır” diyor bakalım. Bölücü terör örgütü “hayır” diyor. Kendi tabanına “zavallı” 
diyenler “hayır” diyor. Darbelerden beslenenler “hayır” diyor. Millete bidon kafalı diyenler “hayır” diyor. Halksız bir 
demokrasi isteyenler “hayır” diyor. Toplum mühendisleri “hayır” diyor. Tuzukurular “hayır” diyor. Milleti tehdit 
olarak görenler “hayır” diyor. Millete demokrasiyi çok görenler “hayır” diyor. AB karĢıtları “hayır” diyor. Karanlık 
odaklar “hayır” diyor. [...] Hayır oyu bu ulkeye sadece ve sadece her CHP yönetimi gibi envai cesit sorun, fakirlik, 
baskıcı rejim, kuyruk ve bezginlik verir. CHP zihniyeti millet vicdanında yargılanmis ve muebbet muhalefete 
mahkum olmustur. Statükocuların ve bu ülkenin değiĢim ve dönüĢüm iradesine taĢ koyanların artık iyice ayyuka 
çıkmaları ve bir kez daha milletimizin değiĢim iradesi karĢısında yine yenilecek olmaları “hayır”ın en büyük hayrı 
olacak.” (Yüksek Mahkeme bile referanduma „evet‟ dedi. (August 26, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 17, 2015, 
from http://www.yenisafak.com/roportaj/yuksek-mahkeme-bile-referanduma-evet-dedi-275323?mobil=true) 
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„democracy‟ configured the political space in the light of the antagonism between 
demand of the „people‟ for „democratic change‟ and „tutelary state elite‟ resisting for the 
maintenance of „status quo‟. Discursive articulation configured the differential setting of 
heterogeneous social elements while contiguously fixing them onto two incompatible 
poles. Through analogically articulating varied elements under the „status quo‟ 
reference, BağıĢ‟s formulation metonymically combined different signifying elements 
as „No voters‟; such as „separatist terrorists‟, „coup supporters‟, „dark units‟, „EU-
skeptics‟, „elites‟ and „mentality of the CHP‟. Therefore, in the AKP‟s discourse, 
hegemonic definition of „status quo‟ metaphorically substituted varied elements and 
articulated them as equivalent to each other as constituents of the anti-people camp. 
Quote from Erdoğan‟s speech below crystallized configuration of „No voters‟ as 
supporters of „tutelage‟ while hegemonically fixed different sectors as the features of 
the same enemy group in contrast to the values and constitution of „the people‟: 
Do you know who will win if you vote for “No”? The tutelary mentality will 
win. Gangs will win if you say “No”. If you say “No” those who want to conceal 
the actor unknown murders will win. Those who ignore national values, those 
who mock the religion of the people will win.
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3.3. The Pro-government Media Addresses „ulusalcılık‟: Rhetorical Identification 
of „Elite‟, „Laic‟ and „Tutelage‟ Under The Label “No Voters” 
Until now, I have analyzed how discourse of the AKP articulated the political 
space in light of the antagonism between „democratic change‟ and „status quo‟. Along 
this dichotomization, one camp defined proponents of amendments as supporters of 
democratization through confronting tutelary regimes. The other camp referred to coup 
supporters and secular exclusionists as the tutelary elite. Similarly, Erdoğan‟s 
formulations above addressed „tutelary mentality‟ while implying on the one hand „dirty 
organizations‟ and „coups d‟états‟ as extra-legal attempts of anti-democratic forces; on 
the other hand, he addressed alienated „elites‟ degrading the people. On this discursive 
field, while „democracy‟ reference indicated „constitution of the people‟ and “Yes” 
votes, „status quo/tutelage‟ determined the hegemonic meaning of “No” votes indicating 
the „mentality of the CHP‟ and support for „coup constitutions‟. In the coming pages, I 
will analyze how the pro-government media reproduced the AKP‟s hegemonic 
                                                          
67“Hayır derseniz kim kazanacak biliyor musunuz? Vesayetçi anlayıĢ kazanacak. „Hayır‟ derseniz çeteler kazanacak. 
„Hayır‟ derseniz faili meçhullerin uzerini örtmek isteyenler kazanacak. Milletin değerlerini hiçe sayanlar, milletin 
inancıyla dalga geçenler kazanacak.” (Hayır çıkarsa çeteler kazanır. (September 7, 2010). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 
18, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/hayir-cikarsa-ceteler-kazanir-277330) 
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antagonism and how it effected the discursive articulation of „ulusalcı‟ reference in the 
context of „status quo‟ and „tutelage‟. 
Based on this dichotomized political space, pro-government media appropriated 
the same hegemonic articulation of “No” voters as „coup supporters‟. Nizamettin BarıĢ, 
a columnist in Taraf newspaper, stated:  
Even in paradigmatic terms, saying “No” to the amendments, which are in favor 
of all citizens except the bureaucratic elite, is equal to asking the continuation of 
the tutelary regime, taking side with coups, and at the same time opposing EU 
criterions.
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 In this quote, rhetorically voicing the „interests of the people‟ hegemonically 
positioned elements like “bureaucratic elite”, “coup supporters” and “eurosceptics” as 
the actors behind “No” votes.  Therefore, regarding the discursive dichotomy between 
the status quo and democratic change, we can argue that there was a similarity between 
the AKP‟s hegemonic articulation and that of the pro-government media. Based on this 
constitutive dichotomy, pro-government media discursively defined “Yes” votes in the 
referendum as a decision for the common good of the people. Therefore, this 
formulation stated that the referendum would be a threshold for the people to voice their 
claims against the long endured oppression by the status quo establishments. In line 
with this reasoning, Ahmet Altan, then editor of Taraf newspaper and a liberal 
columnist, stated that reformist achievements of the AKP on eliminating the tutelary 
cadres of the status quo establishments would be accomplished with the constitutional 
amendments. Therefore, Altan perceived the September 12 referendum as a chance to 
challenge the status quo with the popular will of the people which would accordingly 
strengthen democratic power of the people over the suppressing state form: “In a 
country in which the state decided on „what shape‟ the people should be, now we are 
going into an era in which the people will decide on what shape „the state‟ should be”69.   
Along similar lines, Ali Bayramoğlu, a liberal democrat columnist at Yeni 
ġafak, stated that Turkey was passing through an important period of transformation. 
Bayramoğlu, defined the promise of amendments as “a vital turning point for the 
                                                          
68“Paradigmatik açıdan bakıldığında bile, bürokrat elitlerin dıĢında her vatandaĢın lehine olan bu kısmî değiĢikliklere 
karĢı „Hayır‟ demek, vesayetçi rejimin sürmesini istemek, darbeden yana olmak ve aynı zamanda değiĢime ve AB 
kriterlerine de karĢı olmak demektir.” (BarıĢ, N. (August 1, 2010). Evet! Cellatlarımızı desteklemiyoruz. Taraf. 
Retrieved June 18, 2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-yazdir-54845.html) 
69“Halkın „nasıl‟ olması gerektiğine devletin karar verdiği bir ülkede, Ģimdi „devletin‟ nasıl olması gerektiğine halkın 
karar vereceği bir döneme giriyoruz.” (Altan, A. (August 10, 2010) Ayaklarının üstüne koyarken. Taraf. Retrieved 
June 19, 2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ahmet-altan/ayaklarinin-ustune-koyarken/12414/) 
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maturation of Turkish democracy and its institutionalization with civil qualities” 70 . 
Differentiating supporters and skeptics of this wave of transformation, Bayramoğlu 
addressed two conflicting camps with cross interests. To Bayramoğlu, on the one side 
there were supporters of democratic reforms, on the other side there were defeated 
skeptics including „ulusalcılar‟ who were resisting against those reforms in order to 
maintain their position in the state and society segments. 
Yes, one section of the society thinks that Turkey is passing through a process of 
deep rooted transformation; they support related reformist steps, take side with 
civil institutions and values. […] The other section at the opposite pole is 
composed of ulusalcılar, losers, militarists, Kemalists and some nationalists who 
perceive the transformation as separation.  To them, what is at stake is a 
“struggle for fields”, to them, “The AKP and Gülen community are seizing the 
state step by step”.71 
Here, the emphasis on „democratic demands for change‟ remains as the basic 
determinant in demarcating and configuring political identities. In his article, 
Bayramoğlu depicted different sectors implying anti-reformist groups, which he defined 
as „ulusalcılar‟, „Kemalists‟ and „nationalists‟. To Bayramoğlu, what bonded these 
social sectors was their common fear in losing their privileged status in state branches. 
In another column article titled “Whites of the exclusionist regime and „No‟ voters”, 
Bayramoğlu argued that what the referendum would transform was the “mentality of 
laicists whites” which, to the author, resembled the struggle of tutelary elite to maintain 
their exclusionary state cadres. 
Especially No voters agitate laic fears and laicist diseases through campaigns 
including aspects like “the empire of fear” and “the seizure of the state”, and 
they form a psychology of civil war. The “No” vote manifests the will to 
maintain political and cultural criterions regulating the exclusive relations over 
the fields which are monopolized by whites and laicists. In fact, Turkey is trying 
to break this mentality.
72
 
                                                          
70“Anayasa değiĢikliklerine iliĢkin referandum, Türk demokrasisinin olgunlaĢması, sivilleĢerek kurumsallaĢması 
yolunda hayati bir rol oynayacak.” (Bayramoğlu, A. (August 28, 2010). Hayır‟daki vasatlık. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved 
June 19, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/alibayramoglu/hayirdaki-vasatlik8230-23742) 
71“Evet, bir kesim Türkiye'nin köklü değiĢim sürecinden geçtiğini düĢünüyor, bu çerçevede atılan reform adımlarını 
destekliyor, sivil kurum ve değerlerden yana tavır alıyor. [...] Bunun karĢısında yer alan diğer kesim, ulusalcılar, 
kaybedenler, militaristler, Kemalistler, değiĢimi bölünme olarak algılayan kimi milliyetçilerden meydana geliyor. 
Onlar için yaĢanan bir „alan kavgası‟dır; „AK Parti, Gülen cemaati birlikte adım adım sistemi ve devleti ele 
geçirmektedir”. (Bayramoğlu, A. (August 25, 2010). Süngü savaĢları ve anlamı. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved June 21, 2015, 
from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/alibayramoglu/sungu-savaslari-ve-anlami-23693?mobil=true) 
72“Özellikle „hayırcı‟lar „korku imparatorpluğu‟, „devletin ele geçirilmesi‟ gibi unsurlardan oluĢan kampanyalarla laik 
korkuları, laikçi hastalıkları tahrik ediyor ve bir iç savaĢ psikolojisi oluĢturuyorlar. „Hayır oyu‟ beyazların, laiklerin 
tekelindeki alanlara giriĢ çıkıĢları düzenleyen siyasal ve kültürel kriterlerin korunmasını, korunması isteğini ifade 
ediyor. Türkiye aslında bu zihniyeti kırmaya uğraĢıyor.” (Bayramoğlu, A. (September 10, 2010). Ayrılıkçı rejimin 
beyazları ve hayırcılar. Yeni Şafak. p. 3)  
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This quotation shown that the antagonism between „democratic demands of the 
people‟ and guardian „status quo‟ forces continued to determine the configuration of 
positions within the political field in the AKP‟s hegemonic discourse. Although the 
1982 coup constitution have been reformed for 17 times prior to 2010 referendum and 
68 out of 177 articles have been amended (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012), the social and political 
tensions occurred  during the AKP‟s second term in office portrayed the constitutional 
referendum as a threshold for democratization of Turkey politics. The AKP‟s discourse 
formulated this threshold as a step for leaving tutelary regimes and the „exclusionary 
mentality‟ supporting it behind, and proliferate civil demands of the people.  
In similar lines, Etyen Mahçupyan, long considered a liberal intellectual and 
advisor of the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu since October 2014, perceived the 
referendum as a reflection of the battle between „educated laic classes‟ in the center and 
„the people‟ in peripheries. In his article titled “Masters and countrymen” (“Efendiler ve 
taşralılar”), Mahçupyan stated: 
Last fifteen years of Turkey mean an existential defeat and trauma for the 
educated, urbanite, well-off laic sections of the society. [T]his defeat is achieved 
through democracy. Besides, „the countrymen’ defeating them are about to 
checkmate their „masters’ in terms of the economic and intellectual aspects. […] 
The referendum will decide on either democracy or tutelage, and both of the 
poles of the society perceive it in this regard. [E]ach step taken towards the 
release from the „master‟s domination will lead this country to recover its health 
thanks to its „countrymen‟.73 (Emphasis added) 
Two important issues stand out in this quote. First, like the statements discussed 
throughout this chapter, it illustrates the contrast between 2007 and 2010 periods 
considering the constituents of the AKP‟s populist discourse. In the 2007 period of deep 
state killings and the Republican Rallies, the AKP‟s political discourse mostly referred 
to „deep state‟ killings which temporarily overdetermined the meaning of „ulusalcı‟. 
However, in the lead-up to the 2010 constitutional referendum, the enemy figure tended 
to shift towards the notions of „tutelage‟ and „laicists elites‟ as the supporters of the 
„status quo‟ establishments. As a result of this discursive articulation, the AKP 
rhetorically prioritized the oppression of democratic demands of the people by the 
                                                          
73“Türkiye‟nin son on beĢ yılı eğitimli, kentli, hali vakti yerinde laik kesim için varoluĢsal bir yenilgi, bir travmadır. 
[S]öz konusu yenilgi demokrasi üzerinden geliyor. Üstelik onları yenen „taĢralılar‟ iktisadi ve entelektüel açıdan da 
bu „efendileri‟ mat etmek üzereler. ... Referandum demokrasi ile vesayet arasında yapılıyor ve toplumun her iki 
kanadı da bunu böyle anlıyor. „[E]fendilerin‟ tahakkümünden kurtulmaya yönelik her adım, bu ülkenin „taĢralılar‟ 
sayesinde sağlığına kavuĢmasına vesile olacak.” (Mahçupyan, E. (August 15, 2010). „Efendiler‟ ve „taĢralılar‟. Taraf. 
Retrieved June 24, 2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/etyen-mahcupyan/efendiler-ve-tasralilar/12502/)  
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tutelary cadres of the exclusionary establishments. This oppositional logic discursively 
defined „the people‟ as an uncorrupted Islamic community while designating the anti-
people camp in light with such tropes as „secular whites‟ and „tutelary elites‟. Therefore, 
I argue that in the 2010 constitutional referendum period, the AKP‟s discursive 
articulation of the enemy figure shifted its terrain from „deep state‟ to „status 
quo/tutelage‟ as the privileged signifier.  
Mahçupyan‟s differentiation of „masters‟ and „countrymen‟ also reflected this 
antagonistic demarcation. Mahçupyan‟s formulation, in the first hand divided political 
space in the light of the conflict between democracy and tutelage. Discursive effect of 
this hegemonic split simplified and fixed varied elements through rhetorical operations 
as two antagonistic poles; the people as the underdog “countrymen” and the anti-people 
pole as “educated, urbanite, well-off laicist communities”. Combination of tropes along 
the chain of equivalence rhetorically constituted the anti-people camp through fixing 
different social elements over a contiguous setting. Subversion of heterogeneity into 
particularity (i.e. „tutelage‟ vs. „the people‟) is fundamentally a discursive articulation 
which is configured by rhetorical operations. Therefore, we can state that “the 
tropological characterization of the articulatory practices progressively yields to an 
analysis of their performative emergence by way of „naming‟” (Gaonkar, 2012). This 
discursive force of the name, according to Laclau, is identical with the hegemonic 
capacity of privileged signifiers. Privileged signifiers condense metonymic slippages 
and determine the signification of the whole antagonistic camp as a metaphorical 
closure (Laclau, 2005, p. 87). Turning back to Mahçupuan‟s formulation, this 
organizing logic defined the anti-people camp as “tutelage” while metonymically 
articulating well-known motifs in the Turkish political context; “masters”, “periphery”, 
“elites”, “educated middle classes”, “laicists” etc. The second important point in 
Mahçupyan‟s formulation was that the name “tutelage” functioned as the metaphor for 
the anti-people pole which as a privileged signifier signified those constitutive elements. 
According to Laclau, performative force of a privilege signifier in assuming the 
representation of a totality is a hegemonic representation. 
[T]here is the possibility that one difference, without ceasing to be a particular 
difference, assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality. In that 
way, its body is split between the particularity which it still is and the more 
universal signification of which it is the bearer. This operation of taking up, by a 
particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification is what I have called 
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hegemony. And, given that this  embodied totality or universality is, as we have 
seen, an impossible object, the hegemonic identity becomes something of the 
order of an empty signifier, its own particularity embodying an unachievable 
fullness. (Laclau, 2005, p. 70). 
In sum, according to this theoretical framework, populist discourse of the AKP 
constituted its hegemony over the political field through dividing the social space into 
two camps in the light of two privileged signifiers; „democracy‟ and „tutelage/status 
quo‟. On this discursive realm, the AKP and pro-government media hegemonically 
configured this antagonistic opposition as the essential contradiction in the history of 
socio-political crises in Turkey. Based on this line of conceiving, the AKP circles and 
the pro-government media discursively portrayed the constitutional referendum as the 
confrontation of military regimes, coup d‟états, tutelary reactions of secular elite and 
exclusion of „the people‟ from parliamentarian politics. In another article, titled “Yes 
and No voters”, Mahçupyan underlined this contradiction while stating that the 
referendum had a “key” role in breaking the tutelary character of the Turkish Republic 
towards further democratization.   
The change that will emerge with the opening of this lock will inevitably lead 
the only essential quality of the republic, namely the tutelary approach to 
government, to transform. Such a transform will put an end to the ideological 
domination generated over the phenomenon of “nation” while making the 
balance between the state and society more egalitarian. Thus, we can argue that 
a parenthesis of one hundred years will close and the people of these lands will 
build their own road to emancipation again even though they have been black 
and blue. Considering from this perspective, the approval of referendum 
package will, for the first time, form the conditions of a true speech and politics 
while demonstrating this people’s desire to have a say over their own fate in 
real terms.… Those who insist on “no” can no longer dream about coming to 
power through democratic means and bringing someone they wish to 
Presidency. … In brief, those who insist on “no” are slanted towards the 
continuity of the regime of tutelage in Turkey because they foresee that the 
democratic initiatives will keep them outside politics and they are right in this 
foresight to a great extent.
74
  (Emphasis added) 
                                                          
74 “Bu kilidin açılmasıyla yaĢanacak değiĢim ise kaçınılmaz olarak bu Cumhuriyet‟in tek temel niteliğinin, yani 
vesayetçi yönetim anlayıĢının dönüĢmesine yol açacak. Bu ise, devletle toplum arasındaki dengeleri en azından daha 
eĢitlikçi hale getirirken, „millet‟ kavramı üzerinden üretilmiĢ olan ideolojik tahakkümün sonunu getirecek. Böylece 
yaklaĢık yüz yıllık bir parantezin kapanacağını ve bu toprakların halkının, yara bere içinde kalmıĢ olsa da, yeniden 
kendi özgürleĢme yolunu oluĢturacağını öne sürebiliriz. Bu açıdan bakıldığında referandum paketinin onaylanması, 
bu halkın ilk kez gerçek anlamda kendi kaderi üzerinde söz sahibi olma isteğini ortaya koyarken, yine ilk kez gerçek 
bir konuĢmanın ve siyasetin de koĢullarını oluĢturacak. ... „Hayır‟cılar demokratik yollardan iktidara gelmeyi, kendi 
istedikleri birini CumhurbaĢkanlığı‟na getirmeyi artık hayal bile edemiyorlar. ... Kısacası „hayır‟cılar Türkiye‟de 
vesayet rejiminin devamından yanalar, çünkü demokratik açılımların kendilerini siyaset dıĢı kılacağını öngörüyorlar 
ve bu öngörüde büyük çapta da haklılar.” (Mahçupyan, E. (August 13, 2010). „Evet‟çiler ve „Hayır‟cılar. Taraf. 
Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/etyen-mahcupyan/evet-ciler-ve-hayir-cilar/12459/)  
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Mahçupyan rearticulated the hegemonic discourse of the AKP which was 
structured by the grounding reference to „democracy‟ and „the people‟. Mahçupyan 
stated not the popular will of the people but tutelary regimes shaped the history of the 
Republic and regulated state-society relations while favoring ideologically and 
institutionally despotic secular elites. According to Mahçupyan, the referendum would 
be a chance for „the people‟ to voice their democratic demands for the first time and to 
challenge the despotic state if they would vote for “Yes”. In the face of these 
democratic demands, to Mahçupyan, “No” voters had no choice but to hold on to the 
tutelary regimes in order to protect their privileges. In accordance with the previous 
excerpt from Mahçupyan‟s article, „tutelage‟ remained the privileged signifier that 
identified “tutelary mentality” and “No voters” as the anti-democratic elitist 
reactionaries. 
In the August 2010, a group of intellectuals, including academics, lawyers and 
public figures from different backgrounds, gathered under the campaign “Yes, but not 
enough” (Yetmez, ama Evet). This group of intellectuals, together with the liberal 
minded youth organization Young Civilians (Genç Siviller), organized support 
campaigns for constitutional amendments. One of the leading figures in this campaign, 
Ferhat Kentel, an academician and Taraf columnist, argued that “Yes” votes in the 
referendum would challenge the supporters of tutelary establishments. According to 
Kentel, those willing to maintain their hierarchical status were at risk to lose their 
privileged position in the face of democratic transformations led by the AKP. 
They even accept the military tutelage with a great risk in order not to lose their 
status in the social and cultural hierarchy. As a matter of fact, these 
conservative and essentialist “new fundamentalists” compiled from milliyetçi 
MHP, ulusalcı CHP, racists, elitist, and orthodox leftists having become a closed 
community are right because the fear is something humane and pushes one 
towards defense; therefore, it only generates negative politics, “it cannot do 
anything,” only tries to prevent others from doing.75 (Emphasis added) 
During the referendum period of 2010, the „ulusalcı‟ feature was notably not a 
common reference in addressing the enemy camp. However, what crucial for our 
                                                          
75“Toplumsal ve kültürel hiyerarĢide sahip oldukları statülerini kaybetmemek için, risk karĢısında, askeri vesayete 
bile eyvallah diyorlar. Milliyetçi MHP‟den, ulusalcı CHP‟den, ırkçılardan, seçkincilerden, kapalı bir cemaat haline 
gelen ortodoks solculardan derlenen bu muhafazakâr ve özcü “yeni fundamentalistler” de haklı aslına bakarsanız. 
Çünkü, korku da insanidir ve insanı savunmaya iter; bu nedenle de ancak negatif siyaset üretir; “yapamaz”, 
yapılmasını engellemeye çalıĢır.” (Kentel, F. (August 14, 2010). “Yetmez ama evet”: tevazu ve özgüven. Taraf. 
Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ferhat-kentel/yetmez-ama-evet-tevazu-ve-
ozguven/12490/)  
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discussion in Kentel‟s formulation was that „ulusalcı‟ did not refer to deep state forces 
as it was in 2007 period, but mainly indicated privileged supporters of the exclusionary 
state form. While Kentel defined this group of interest as “new foundationlists”, he 
identified features of it as “ulusalcı”, “elitist”, “supporters of coups/tutelage” etc. 
Kentel‟s formulation therefore knotted „ulusalcı‟ feature together with „mentality of the 
CHP‟ and captured it as a component of cultural and political despotism of „high ranked 
conservatives‟. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that in the 2010 constitutional 
referendum period and in the light of basic determinants of the era, the AKP‟s discourse 
hegemonically defined the „ulusalcı‟ term within the context of „status quo‟ and 
„tutelary mentality‟ while contingently breaking apart from „deep state‟ aspect of 2007 
period. Thus, although „ulusalcı‟ element was not a common reference for the anti-
people camp, discursive field of the AKP in 2010 metonymically rearticulated the 
meaning of the term under the hegemonic force of the „status quo/tutelage‟ privileged 
signifier. 
Another article by Kentel crystallized the hegemonic form of the rhetorical 
articulation and organization of the political field in the AKP‟s discursive field. In his 
article in Taraf daily, Kentel argued that with the constitutional amendments and 
referendum period, the fundamental contradiction of the political history of Turkey 
eventually revealed. According to Kentel, this contradiction was the hegemonic struggle 
between “AKP, becoming one of the most significant political actors in Turkey‟s story 
of democratization and emancipation” and “the elitist hegemony that has been lasting 
for 90 years”.  
The positions re-gained vis-à-vis the class-based and cultural 
transformation in Turkey as well as the fears brought about by this 
transformation in the existing status quo and within the sovereignty 
relations occupy an important place. To put it in another way, the 
continuity of modern-nationalist docility constructed by the elitist 
hegemony that has been lasting for 90 years, but at the same time, the 
upheavals created by the “counter-hegemony” that rises outside the elitist 
hegemony assign new forms to this identification. AKP, becoming one of 
the most significant political actors in Turkey’s story of democratization 
and emancipation, creates radical influences on the other political and 
social sections through this quality. The said transformation primarily 
produces a deep fear and resistance in the status quo’s institutions of 
domination. The white, upper social and cultural classes that do not want 
to lose their class-based power and secular middle classes that are a lower 
version of the said class and that have minds and bodies tamed by the 
hegemony and do not want to lose their mental comfort [...] exist by 
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means of their anti-AKP-ism. These sections of the society reproducing 
the discourse of the “state power” as a tool of domination become more 
and more conservative at full speed. This fear of marginalization causes 
the discourse, which can be roughly called laic conservatism, to break and 
this fear provides the said discourses with a new ground for embarking on 
new quests. On the one hand, this discourse most generally represented at 
CHP places the AKP at the “center” from its marginal position; on the 
other hand, it has to seek after that central position [...].
76
 (Emphasis 
added) 
In line with this antagonism between democracy and status quo, discursive 
field of the AKP and the pro-government media attempted to position varied 
political identities and hegemonically fix heterogeneous elements as „democratic 
demands of the people‟ and „exclusionary tutelage/status quo‟. Although Erdoğan 
addressed the „coup aspect‟ with more emphasis, the pro-government media 
discursively defined „status quo‟ and „tutelage‟ in accordance with such tropes as 
„laicists‟, „mentality of the CHP‟, „white elites‟ etc. Hegemonic force of the 
privileged signifier „tutelage/status quo‟ metaphorically condensed a contiguous 
set of signifying elements including „ulusalcı‟ as constituents of the anti-people 
camp.  
In this chapter, I illustrated first major social and political dynamics that 
paved the way to the 2010 constitutional referendum and how they effected the 
articulation of the AKP‟s populist discourse. Underlining the impacts of the 
attempted closure case, Ergenekon and Balyoz trials and YAġ crises, I have 
stated that the discourse of the AKP shifted its main reference from „deep state‟ to 
„status quo‟. Transformation of the AKP‟s discursive terrain reconfigured the 
constitutive elements in the constitution of the enemy figure. In accordance, I 
have analyzed that „coup plots‟ and „mentality of the CHP‟ was knotted together 
                                                          
76 “[T]ürkiye‟deki sınıfsal ve kültürel değiĢim karĢısında yeniden alınan pozisyonlar, bu değiĢimin var olan 
statükoda, egemenlik iliĢkileri içinde yarattığı korkular önemli bir yer tutuyor. BaĢka bir ifadeyle, 90 yıldır 
süren seçkinci hegemonyanın inĢa ettiği modern-milliyetçi uysallığın devamlılığı, fakat aynı zamanda bu 
hegemonyanın dıĢında yükselen “karĢı-hegemonyanın” yarattığı altüst oluĢlar bu kimlikleĢmeye yeni 
biçimler veriyor. [T]ürkiye‟nin demokratikleĢme ve özgürleĢme hikâyesinde en önemli siyasal aktörlerden 
biri haline gelen AKP, bu özelliğiyle, diğer siyasal ve toplumsal kesimler üzerinde de radikal etkiler 
yaratıyor. Öncelikle, bu değiĢim, statükonun tahakküm kurumlarında derin bir korku ve direnç üretiyor. Sınıf 
iktidarlarını kaybetmek istemeyen, “beyaz”, üst toplumsal ve kültürel sınıflar; bunların bir alt versiyonu olan, 
zihinsel konforlarını kaybetmek istemeyen, hegemonyanın uysallaĢtırdığı zihin ve bedenlere sahip laik orta 
sınıflar [...] “anti-AKP‟cilik” vasıtasıyla kendilerini var ediyorlar. Bir tahakküm aracı olarak “devlet 
iktidarının” söylemini yeniden üreten bu kesimler alabildiğine muhafazakârlaĢıyorlar. [...] ĠĢte bu 
marjinalleĢme korkusu, kabaca laik muhafazakârlık olarak adlandırılabilecek söylemin kırılmasına, yeni 
arayıĢlar içine girmesine zemin oluĢturuyor. En genel olarak CHP‟de temsil olunan bu söylem, bir yandan –
bulunduğu marjinal konumdan- AKP‟yi “merkeze” oturturken, diğer yandan onun peĢinden koĢmak zorunda 
kalıyor [...]” (Kentel, F. (September 4, 2010). Gerçeklerin beklenmedik sonuçları. Taraf. Retrieved June 27, 
2015, from http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ferhat-kentel/gerekcelerin-beklenmedik-sonuclari-2/12813/) 
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contiguously in order to address the anti-people camp. While coup reference 
indicated „dark/dirty terror organizations‟ and ongoing coup trials, „mentality of 
the CHP‟ metaphorically subverted varied elements ranging from oppositional 
parties, legislative bodies, secular elites, disdainful middle class „whites‟ etc as 
„status quo‟. In the end of analysis, I have pointed out that through privileged 
signifiers of „tutelage/status quo‟ the AKP discursively articulated those varied 
and incommensurable elements as a particular anti-people identity. In the 
discourse of the AKP during the 2010 constitutional referendum period, enemy 
identity, including „ulusalcı‟ as a constituent in it, hegemonically referred to 
supporters of „status quo/tutelage‟ who demanded the protection of their 
exclusionary fields. In the coming chapter, I will analyze the Gezi Park protests 
and try to illustrate how the mobilization of the memory of Republican Rallies 
and the constitutional referendum period effected the rearticulation of 
„ulusalcılık‟ in the contexts of „old Turkey‟. 
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4. „ULUSALCILIK‟ AS THE „OLD TURKEY‟ 
4.1. Reinstitution of The State Power In The Hands of The AKP From 2010 To 
2013 
During the previous two chapters, I questioned how the AKP government 
configured and attempted to hegemonically dominate the political space through a 
populist logic. According to the analyses, in the first chapter I argued that along the 
Kemalist state and civil society reactions against the parliamentarian decisions of the 
AKP and rising political assassinations, the AKP‟s discourse hegemonically identified 
the „ulusalcı‟ discussions to „deep state‟ organizations. Although discourse of the pro-
government media remained instable in positioning “ulusalcı” debates, political 
assassinations in the time period overdetermined the hegemonic meaning of the term as 
„deep state‟ organizations aiming to agitate and manipulate socio-political relations. 
Following this line of conceptualization, Erdoğan recurrently addressed the organizing 
committee of the Rallies while calling them „gangs‟. In the second chapter, I focused on 
the 2010 constitutional referendum period and tried to analyze transformation of the 
component features of “ulusalcı” attribution in the AKP‟s discourse. In contrast to 2007 
period, the AKP‟s grounding emphasis on „deep state‟ shifted to „status quo‟; and 
hence, configuration of the enemy and the „ulusalcı‟ reference, as a constitutive element 
in it, shifted their hegemonic terrains. During the 2010 constitution referendum era, 
Erdoğan‟s rhetoric and the pro-government media discourse constituted the anti-people 
camp while combining different elements through tropological operations. As a result, 
in this time period, the AKP‟s discourse hegemonically defined the anti-people camp as 
the „status quo‟. In accordance, „ulusalcı‟ reference dominantly addressed „white laicist 
elites‟ favoring „exclusionary tutelary cadres‟.  
In this third chapter, I will focus on the period covering the social and political 
tensions between the period 2010 and 2013, and more specifically impacts of the Gezi 
protests in June 2013 on the political logic of the AKP in rhetorically configuring the 
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political field. In the first half of this chapter, changing political atmosphere led the 
AKP to prioritized majoritarian and authoritarian governmental policies from 2010 to 
2013. This period became an era during which the rule under the AKP government 
came under scrutiny by supporters and the oppositions alike. On the one hand, larger 
public sectors shared the perception that the AKP was influencing jurisdictional 
mechanisms due to intimidating and targeting statements of the AKP circles regarding 
the Ergenekon and the KCK
77
 trials. This critical perception made the „anti-status quo‟ 
rhetoric of the AKP more controversial. On the other hand, increasingly aggressive tone 
of Erdoğan stigmatized different social groups, habits and life styles due to use of 
alcohol or birth control methods. In this increased atmosphere of conservatism leaning 
on criminalization, the AKP favored a majoritarian rule which was based on a 
plebiscitarian understanding of democracy. Besides, bombings and tens of deaths in the 
Roboski (Uludere) and Reyhanlı towns78 led the AKP to prioritize more authoritarian 
and security based regulations against those criticizing the government. Against this 
historical background, I will trace those controversies surrounding the Gezi protests and 
analyze what discursive articulations they produced on part of the AKP. I will question 
why the AKP and pro-government media tried to define the Gezi Park protests while 
mobilizing the memory of the Republican Rallies and through the reference „ulusalcı‟. 
In this analysis, I will focus on how previous constituents of the populist discourse of 
the AKP culminated in configuring the enemy figure during the Gezi protest. 
From 2002 to 2010, the AKP increased its electoral popularity and hence 
consolidated its power over state institutions. Considering this electoral hegemony of 
the AKP (Keyman F. , 2010), the 2010 constitutional referendum presented an 
increasing threat to the former bureaucratic and military power blocs within the tutelary 
state cadres. Accordingly, the constitutional amendments that followed the referendum 
eventually curtailed military privileges in the court system and enabled active and 
                                                          
77 Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK) (Group of Communities in Kurdistan) is a Kurdish administrative organization 
that aims to practice the idea of Democratic Confederalism of Abdullah Öcalan. The KCK investigation began in 
2009 and along the investigation activists, academics, politicians and mayors have been inquired and detained in the 
name of war against terror. In the end, this anti-KCK investigation aimed to prevent organization of the Kurdish 
movement at the civil level.  
78 Roboski (Uludere) is a town in ġırnak on the southeastern border of Turkey. On December 28, 2011, 34 Kurdish 
civilians were killed by an airstrike of the Turkish military. The AKP government tried to defend the killing by 
criminalizing civilians as “smugglers” carrying arms to terrorists beyond the borders. The Reyhanlı bombings took 
place in May 11, 2013, in the town Reyhanlı in Hatay. While supposedly 52 civilians lost their lives, the AKP 
government and the pro-government media alleged that Syrian-intelligence service plotted the terror act. In order to 
emphasize the anti-Assad policy of the Turkish government, Erdoğan stated at a party conference “Reyhanlı 
bombings martyred 53 Sunni citizens of ours”; thus he rhetorically contrasted Sunni identity with the Alawite 
background of the Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad. 
90 
 
retired military personnel to be prosecuted under civilian courts. Moreover, since the 
amendments changed the composition of Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
(HSYK), different social groups including liberals, conservatives, certain left-wing 
democrats supporting the AKP supposed that the new structure of the judiciary would 
be far from a tutelary juristocratic force, to the contrary it would evolve into a 
democratic, heterogeneous composition attuned with decisions of the elected 
government.  In sum, through the amendments the AKP aimed to weaken the possibility 
of challenges to the ruling government from military and judiciary branches (Özbudun, 
2014).  
Just as during the referendum campaign, the AKP presented constitutional 
amendments as a step to confront the legacy of coup d‟état rules and their tutelary 
establishment, which the AKP circles perceived as part of the progress towards a full-
fledged democracy. Based on this discursive configuration of the referendum, Erdoğan 
and the pro-government media hegemonically defined oppositions of “No” voters as 
reactions of „tutelary elites‟ trying to maintain their exclusionary fields while hindering 
the AKP‟s democratic reforms. In line with this antagonism, the AKP discursively 
identified the party‟s effort in the elimination of tutelary cadres as the sole meaning of 
„democratization‟ (Çınar, 2011). In the doing so, the AKP downplayed varied 
democratic demands through discursively identifying maintenance of democracy with 
the survival of the AKP against tutelary interventions and coup attempts. Beside 
silencing and undermining, the AKP reduced the field of politics to the struggle against 
„status quo‟ in light of the constitutive antagonism between „democracy‟ and „status 
quo/tutelage‟. According to this discursive field, policies of the AKP and the polemics 
of the pro-government media constantly situated critical voices as threats against the 
AKP‟s reforms for an “advanced democracy”.  
Given these dynamics, contrary to the AKP‟s premises on the elimination of the 
status quo forces, the referendum results showed that the tutelary establishments were 
not eliminated, but only changed hands. In the aftermath of amendments, Ministry of 
Justice of the AKP government favored the appointment of cadres known to be close to 
the Islamist Gülen movement to HSYK, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State 
(Aydın & TaĢkın, 2014, p. 487). Therefore, the AKP eliminated former tutelary cadres 
within the military and judiciary, but the party did not aimed to overcome the 
governmental logic leading new actors to adapt tutelary institutions for their own sake. 
91 
 
Thus, the current situation “took the form of the AKP‟s prevailing over the militarist 
secular establishment and rested on the AKP‟s power position” (Çınar & Sayın, 2014). 
After this period of transformations, the AKP on the one hand increased its domination 
over key state institutions, on the other hand introduced more Islamic and conservative 
themes through legislative and bureaucratic regulations. In doing so, the AKP justified 
the condensation of state power at the hands of the elected government through the 
constitutional referendum as termination of the alienation of state from the people and 
hence as actualization of the national will.  
Although the AKP prioritized democratic values in its statements in order to 
degrade former tutelary establishments, it ensured that certain authoritative institutions 
of state apparatuses kept functioning, for instance the Council of Higher Education 
(YÖK) and Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). YÖK was 
established by the 1982 coup d‟état constitution in order to regulate, standardize and 
control universities and academic activities. YÖK reflected the official ideology of the 
1980 coup d‟état through decisions on appointments of rectors and academic degrees, 
discrimination against university student activities and upholding the headscarf ban. 
Through its interventions, YÖK functioned as a tutelary institution restricting the 
freedom of academic research and academic autonomy. Although the AKP criticized 
YÖK and the former President Sezer‟s decisions over it previously79, the party did not 
give priority to academic freedom but rather reinstituted YÖK under its own control. 
Considering promotions and appointments for academic positions and rectorate, 
President Abdullah Gül utilized the tutelary domination of YÖK over universities while 
making decisions in favor of certain academic personnel who had affinities with the 
AKP‟s ideology and party circles. In similar lines, the AKP continued to maintain the 
disciplinary function of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). In Turkey, 
Diyanet is in charge of organizing preaches and financing imams. Controlling the 
reproduction of religious codes, Diyanet serves as a state apparatus in regulation of one 
particular religious interpretation which is Sunni Islam. Alevis and non-Muslim 
communities have long suffered due to the state supported orthodoxy of the Diyanet. 
                                                          
79 According to YÖK‟s regulations on the appointment procedure of university rectors, academic personnel of each 
university votes for possible candidates and YÖK suggests candidates with high ranks to the president. However, the 
president has right to approve a different candidate for the rectorate who even could not obtain required votes and 
achieve to get into the list of appointments. Therefore, beside the tutelary regulations of YÖK, the president can 
manipulate academic autonomy of universities through authoritative interventions in line with political interests. 
Former president Sezer also utilized this function of YÖK along appointment of certain rectors. 
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The AKP did not liberalize this authoritarian religious understanding of Diyanet, but 
used it to continue to suppress heterodoxy (TombuĢ, 2013, pp. 320-23).  
4.2. The Cost of „Democratization‟ While Majoritarianism Rises 
In light the of promises and hopes attached to the AKP‟s fight against the „status 
quo‟, pro-government circles either tolerated or disregarded certain injustices and 
abuses of parliamentarian power which gradually tended to criminalize politically 
excluded groups. In this period, journalists Ahmet ġık and Nedim ġener were arrested 
during the so-called Oda TV investigation which was allegedly targeted the media arm 
of the Ergenekon terror organization. At the time, Ahmet ġık was writing a book about 
the Gülen Movement and their take-over of state institutions, and Nedim ġener 
published a book on the assassination of Hrant Dink exposing how the assassination 
was planned by the collaboration between state officers and the intelligence service. On 
the other hand, Prof. BüĢra Ersanlı, an academic worked on constitution of the Turkish 
official history and involved in civil society organizations of the Kurdish movement, 
and Ragıp Zarakolu, a publisher and public intellectual working on the Armenian 
question, were accused of colluding with terror organizations and both were arrested 
under the KCK investigation. This string of arrests in late 2011 became a breaking point 
in the public opinion. Larger number of critics argued that influence of the AKP and 
Gülen movement at the judiciary led the Ergenekon and KCK trials to become 
politicized and turned to be criminalizing oppositional groups by accusing them of 
terrorist activity. According to growing critiques against the AKP‟s prevailing over state 
institutions, the government tried to silence any critical voice against the AKP circles 
and cadres of the Gülen movement. Contrary to the believes of pro-government circles 
on the AKP‟s premises for democratization, the AKP‟s domination over state 
institutions resulted with concentration of the state power at the hands of the elected 
party. Accordingly, the AKP justified the current condition through majoritarian 
understanding of democracy which increased the government‟s security policies 
towards „threats‟ against the nation. 
 Under this rising authoritative atmosphere, then Minister of Interior, Ġdris Naim 
ġahin, in his speech at the meeting of the Directorate of Counter-Terror stated: 
The activities the terrorist organizations carry out are not limited to attacks it 
organizes by treacherously laying ambushes in mountains, hills, cities, streets 
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and in back alleys. There are also psychological terror and scientific terror. [...] 
Some support terrorism by seriously distorting the facts as well as fabricating 
and rationalizing their own facts. By drawing pictures, they reflect their 
fabricated truth on the canvas; writing poems, they reflect their fictitious facts on 
the poems; by writing daily articles… Such people try to demoralize the soldiers 
and the police who served in the fight against terrorism by turning them into the 
subjects of their art and study. The backyards of the terror are Istanbul, Izmir, 
Bursa, Vienna, London, Washington, university chairs, associations, and non-
governmental organizations.
80
 
These declarations favoring security policies and authoritarian accusations 
delimited the space of politics. While mobilizing nationalist codes on territorial unity 
and harmony, the AKP delegitimized critical demands through intimidating and 
criminalizing statements against oppositional groups. As a result, the AKP tended to 
introduce more majoritarian regulations. In a symbiotic relation with the party‟s 
discourse on „democracy‟, this majoritarian turn effected the conservative policies of 
the AKP government; such as abortion discussions, education reform, restrictions on 
alcohol consumption, and targeting unmarried boys and girls who shared the same flat. 
4.2.1. The AKP‟s Neoliberal Populism: Family And Education Policies 
After the 2011 general elections, the AKP gained almost 50 percent of the 
popular votes. Being the highest result the party obtained, the AKP sustained its power 
in the parliament while shaping a dominant party system in Turkey considering both its 
electoral power and the seat share in the Grand National Assembly (Çarkoğlu, 2011). 
Through this solidified political environment and more predictable economic relations, 
the AKP on the one hand portrayed itself as a vital actor for the continuation of 
economic growth. On the other hand, the AKP increased chances for new middle 
classes to have larger bank credits and involve in further investments, while foreign 
finance groups deepened their hold over the neoliberal economic field. In this time 
period, the government utilized urban reconstruction projects as an economic model for 
national growth. While urban reconstruction projects and flexible capital accumulation 
depriving lower income groups, this process increased precarious and informal forms of 
                                                          
80 “Terör örgütünün yürüttüğü çalıĢma sadece dağda, bayırda, Ģehirde, sokakta, arka sokaklarda haince pusu kurarak 
yaptığı saldırılardan ibaret değil. Psikolojik terör, bilimsel terör var. [...] Birileri de ciddi halde saptırma yaparak, 
kendine göre gerekçeler uydurarak makulleĢtirerek, teröre destek veriyor. Resim yaparak, tuvale yansıtarak, Ģiir 
yazarak, Ģiire yansıtıyor, günlük makale yazarak. Terörle mücadelede görev almıĢ askeri ve polisi, sanatına 
çalıĢmasına konu yaparak demoralize etmeye çalıĢıyorlar. [Terörün] arka bahçe Ġstanbul‟dur, Ġzmir‟dir, Bursa‟dır, 
Viyana‟dır, Londra‟dır, Washington‟dur, üniversitede kürsüdür, dernektir, sivil toplum kuruluĢudur.” (ĠçiĢleri Bakanı 
ġahin‟den ilginç sözler. (December 26, 2011). Milliyet. Retreived July 2, 2015, from 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/icisleri-bakani-sahin-den-ilginc-sozler/siyaset/siyasetdetay/26.12.2011/1480627/default 
.htm) 
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labor. In this era, the AKP applied social assistance programs and systematically 
encouraged religious oriented charity organizations to alleviate injustices of their 
neoliberal economic model. Therefore, while welfare policies were declining and 
subcontract labor skyrocketing, Islamic charities substituted social assistance programs. 
Through the coordination between municipalities and faith-based voluntary 
organizations, the sate subcontracted its welfare provision duties to the Islamic charities 
which eventually increased the involvement of Islamic codes at the civil society level 
(Kaya, 2015). As a result of this neoliberal populist administration (Yıldırım, 2010) 
(Bozkurt, 2013), the AKP government put significant emphasis on conservative family 
values and necessity of the cultivation „pious generations‟ through religious education. 
Accordingly, the AKP put increasing emphases on conservative codes while utilizing 
family and school education as ideological state apparatuses. 
In 2012, statics showed that Turkey‟s birth rates had fallen to an all time low of 
0.12% projecting a future population decrease and problems related to aging (Bila, 
2013). The AKP insisted that only a larger and youthful population can keep Turkey in 
the global economic competition and sustain its geopolitical vision. Erdoğan called 
attention to abortion and birth control methods on several platforms. In his speeches, 
Erdoğan stated that he did not support birth control since it would eventually help the 
“insidious plans” of foreign forces to decrease in number and weaken the Turkish 
nation. In the Congress for the Woman Branch of the AKP, Erdoğan linked abortion 
discussions to Roboski massacre while stating that he accepted neither abortion nor 
caesarean births: 
You talk about nothing but „Uludere‟ day and night. Every abortion is an 
Uludere. What is the difference between killing a baby in her mother‟s womb 
and killing her after birth, I am asking to you? We are obliged to struggle for this 
together. We need to know that abortion is an insidious plan for erasing this 
nation from the world scene; we should never rely on such games.
81
 
 On many occasions, such as press conferences and wedding ceremonies in 
which he was invited, Erdoğan emphasized the importance of the three-generational 
family and called women to have at least three children. This growing emphasis on the 
woman body and childbirth reflected the AKP‟s perception of the family as a resolution 
                                                          
81 “Yatıyorsunuz kalkıyorsunuz 'Uludere' diyorsunuz. Her kürtaj bir Uludere'dir. Anne karnında bir yavruyu 
öldürmenin doğumdan sonra öldürmeden ne farkı var soruyorum sizlere. Bunun mücadelesini hep birlikte vermeye 
mecburuz. Bu milleti dünya sahnesinden silmek için sinsice bir plan olduğunu bilmek durumundayız, asla bu 
oyunlara prim vermemeliyiz.” (Erdoğan: herkürtaj bir Uludere‟dir diyorum. (May 26, 2012). T24. Retrieved July 3, 
2015, from http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-her-kurtaj-bir-uluderedir-diyorum,204853) 
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for the social care while legitimizing this attempt through conservative and nationalist 
references. Beside the expansion of conservative policies, the government forced an 
education reform in parliament regarding the elementary school, changing eight years of 
compulsory education to twelve years with three interconnected sections; commonly 
titled as “4+4+4”. The new system legalized the establishment of secondary religious 
schools (İmam Hatip), which were banned after the February 28 military intervention. 
Education reform after the February 28 intervention the period of elementary schooling 
increased into eight years in order to prevent children from starting religious schools at 
earlier ages. With regard to the “4+4+4” system, many critics have argued that the AKP 
was taking revenge of the February 28 military intervention and policies on religious 
schools designed under the secularist military tutelage. In line with the AKP‟s reforms, 
a number of elementary schools transformed into secondary religious schools without 
consulting local stakeholders, which eventually erupted neighborhood-based protests at 
different cities. Reforms covering school curriculums and university entrance exams 
added optional religious courses and related questions about the Quran and the life of 
the Prophet Mohammed. The oppositional parties in the parliament and public critiques 
stated that the AKP was imposing Islam through state power. In the face of rising 
critical voices Erdoğan supported the education reform arguing that democratic 
conservative identity of the AKP government necessitated the cultivation of „pious 
generations‟. Erdoğan stated in a party meeting at the National Assembly as follows: 
We have drawn attention to the Jacobin and exclusionist, elitist mentality that 
still exists today. Does this mentality exist today? Yes, it does. [...]They say that 
I divide Turkey between the pious and the non-believers. There is no such thing 
as the pious and the non-believers in my statement. It includes the point about 
bringing up a religious youth. Do you expect a party with a conservative-
democrat identity to raise an atheist youth?
82
 
While reducing critiques to being prone to „atheism‟, Erdoğan legitimized the 
party‟s authoritarian use of state institutions with reference to the dichotomy between 
the „exclusionist elite mentality‟ and conservative values of „the people‟. Erdoğan used 
this polarizing logic in his speeches during public openings
83
 while addressing ongoing 
                                                          
82 “[B]ugün de varlığını sürdüren jakoben, seçkinci, elitist bir zihniyete dikkatleri çektik. Bugün bu zihniyet var mı, 
evet yine var. [...] Türkiye‟yi dindarlar-dinsizler diye ayırdığımı söylüyorlar. Benim ifademde dindarlar-dinsizler diye 
bir ifade yok. Dindar bir gençlik yetiĢtirme var. Muhafazakar demokrat partisi kimliğine sahip bir partiden ateist bir 
gençlik yetiĢtirmemizi mi bekliyorsunuz?” (Dindar gençlik yetiĢtireceğiz. (February 2, 2012). Hürriyet. Retrieved 
July 4, 2015, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19825231.asp) 
83 Erdoğan and the AKP cadres, during their rule in the government pragmatically utilized public openings, sports 
organizations or any invitation from NGO‟s as a chance to express their ideological stance regarding the current 
situation. In similar lines, Erdoğan mostly utilized public openings as propaganda platforms. 
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critiques. There, he criticized oppositional voices while emphasizing the necessity of 
religious education in terms of „national values‟: 
Whatever this country has suffered, it has suffered from the mentality that wants 
to shape students with certain ideologies and torture them in persuasion rooms. 
Books were banned in this country at one time. The mountains of books were set 
to fire in town squares. The youth in this country was prevented from learning 
their national values. Those who teach national values were treated as if they had 
been convicted of murder. [...] Do you want this youth to be thinner addicts? Do 
you want them to be a rebellious generation? Do you wish a generation with no 
issue or cause?
 84
 
Similar to abortion, pregnancy control, and the issue of creating „pious 
generation‟, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric, and the discourse of the AKP circles legitimized the 
disciplinary techniques of state power they obtained with reference to “national values” 
(Koyuncu, 2015). In line with this legitimation, for the government represented the 
unmediated interests of the people, the AKP circles assumed the party as the political 
manifestation of the actual demands of the nation. This ideological crafting of a party 
image disregarded power relations over the heterogeneity of the social and constituted 
„the nation‟ as a homogenous entity. According to this ideological configuration of the 
„people‟, the AKP defined „values of the nation‟ in line with Islamic and nationalist 
references. This synthesis of conservative, nationalist and Islamist codes determined the 
AKP‟s political agenda attempting to discipline the population through state apparatuses 
(ġen, 2010).  
Erdoğan‟s controversial statements about alcohol consumption and unmarried 
couples likewise reflected the AKP‟s authoritarian turn which utilized majoritarian 
policies favoring Turkish-Islamic codes. The AKP prepared amendments in order to 
restrict alcohol consumption in public areas, opening ceremonies in festivals, art events 
or any public opening, and use of alcoholic beverage brands for sponsorships. In one of 
his speeches, Erdoğan supported those amendments while legitimizing restrictions in 
line with orders of religion and national values. 
No matter what the religions is, a religion does not prescribe the wrong, but the 
right. If it commands the right, are you going to take a stand against it merely 
                                                          
84 “Bu ülke ne çektiyse öğrencileri belli ideolojilerle Ģekillendirmek isteyen, ikna odalarında84, öğrencilere zulmeden 
zihniyetten çekmiĢtir. Bu ülkede bir dönem kitaplar yasaklandı. Kasaba meydanlarında kitap dağları yakıldı. Bu 
ülkenin gençlerinin milli değerleri öğrenmeleri engellendi. Milli değerleri öğretenler cinayet iĢlemiĢ gibi muamele 
gördü. [...] Bu gençliğin tinerci olmasını mı istiyorsunuz? Ġsyankar bir nesil mi olmasını istiyorsunuz? Hiçbir 
meselesi olmayan bir nesil mi istiyorsunuz?” (Bu gençliğin tinerci olmasını mı istiyorsunuz?. (February 6, 2012). 
Hürriyet. Retrieved July 4, 2015, from http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=19857737&tarih=2012-
02-06) 
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because the religion prescribes so? Why does a fact, a case ordered by faith 
become a phenomenon you should defy while you consider the law issued by 
two drunkards legal? [...] We drew up this regulation so that our people can look 
towards the future in peace and safety with its national and spiritual values.
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4.2.2. The AKP‟s Neoliberal Populism: Neo-Ottomanism And Social Engineering 
Erdoğan‟s statements and the AKP‟s policies on abortion, religious education 
and alcohol consumption have to be considered together with Turkey‟s changing global 
and regional perspective after 2010. In the face of the rising skepticism in the EU 
countries against Turkey‟s accession and transformative wave of the Arab Spring, 
Turkey shifted towards a more proactive foreign policy that sought to be a role model 
for the Islamic countries in the Middle East. Although state policies on presenting 
Turkey as a model for the Middle East predated 2010, under the given political tensions 
this geopolitical vision of the AKP government redefined state-society relations while 
merging neoliberal administrations with the Muslim identity as a solution to both 
domestic and regional politics (Yalvaç, 2012). In order to cooperate with the Muslim 
countries in economic and political relations, Erdoğan and then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, employed a neo-Ottomanist discourse in their attempt to 
guide the revitalization of Islam (Ġnsel, 2012).  
Appropriation of the Ottomanist discourse in the Turkish right wing political 
parties has been a recurrent phenomenon in different time periods. During the late 80‟s 
and onwards Turgut Özal, then prime minister between 1983 and 1989 and president 
between 1989 and 1993, merged Turkish nationalist discourse with Ottomanist 
references in order to resolve socio-cultural crises at the local level and the political 
turmoil at the Balkans. At this time period, politicians rhetorically addressed the 
Ottoman legacy and nostalgic narration of a shared cultural past in order to mobilize a 
collective memory and reconstitute social bonds discursively. Throughout the mid-90‟s 
and onwards, rising political Islam gradually intensified Islamic elements in the 
rearticulation of the Ottomanist discourse (Çolak, 2006).  The AKP government highly 
utilized the references to the Ottoman heritage as social critique of Kemalist republic. 
Based on this interpretation, Erdoğan recurrently accused the Kemalist elite for 
                                                          
85 “[H]angi din olursa olsun, bir din yanlıĢı değil doğruyu emrediyor. Doğruyu emrediyorsa bunu din emrediyor diye 
karĢısında mı duracaksın? Ġki tane ayyaĢın yaptığı yasa, sizin için muteber oluyor da inancın emrettiği bir gerçek, bir 
vaka, niçin sizler için reddedilmesi gereken bir olay haline geliyor. [...]Biz bu düzenlemeyi milli ve manevi 
değerleriyle huzur ve güvenlik içinde insanımız geleceğe baksın diye yaptık.” (Erdoğan‟dan flaĢ açıklamalar. (May 
28, 2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved July 6, 2015, from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-dan-flas-
aciklamalar/siyaset/detay/1715196/default.htm) 
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denoting the Ottoman heritage and in many cases cited different works of Ottoman-
Islamist thought. Moreover party‟s attempt to reintroduce the Ottoman architecture, 
introduction of Ottoman language courses into school curriculums, reinstitution of the 
May 29 celebrations (the day Istanbul was conquered by Sultan Mehmed in 1453) 
became public manifestations of the AKP‟s articulation of the so-called neo-Ottomanist 
discourse (Ongur, 2015). Glorification of the Ottoman past ideologically reconfigured 
the conception of “Turkishness”, its past in the history and composition of national 
values accordingly. Therefore, the AKP‟s promoting neo-Ottomanist codes increased 
the circulation of conservative-nationalist interpretations of the past (Bakiner, 2013). 
Thus, in contrast with the EU driven reform policies and the party‟s pragmatic 
rhetoric on democracy during the previous terms in office, after 2010 period the AKP 
shifted towards a majoritarian understanding legislation and attempted to regulate 
homogenizing policies through their domination of the state institutions. Accordingly, 
the AKP recurrently referred to Islamic and nationalist codes in the way they 
legitimized policies of the government against rising tensions and critical voices. While 
the party enforcing neoliberal policies through encouraging privatizations and 
exploitation of precarious labor, security policies loaded with a nationalist conservative 
language targeted large sectors and increased authoritarian and non-responsive 
regulations of the state power under the AKP rule. At the discursive level, the AKP 
legitimized this authoritarian shift and the party‟s insertion of Islamic codes through 
taking over state institutions as the democratization and normalization of the „old 
Turkey‟ in favor of the „values of the nation‟ (Açıkel, 2012). In contrast, the AKP 
discursively addressed „new Turkey‟ as revitalization and self-actualization of demands 
of the people at the sate level. Based on this line of conceiving, spokesmen of the AKP 
and Erdoğan himself put significant emphases along several platforms on the dates 
2023, the hundredth anniversary of founding of the Turkish Republic, and 2071, 
millennial anniversary of Turks‟ reaching to Anatolia. 
Considering the government‟s reforms on education and social assistance as well 
as urban reconstruction projects and flexible labor policies, the AKP‟s synthesis of 
neoliberal populism with Islamic authoritarianism resulted with rising uprisings at local 
levels. Although premises of the neoliberal thought and results of authoritarianism 
apparently seem contradictory, as a matter of fact neoliberal political rationality 
promulgates conservative norms through market mechanisms. Mobilization of religious 
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and moral references in neoconservative political discourses is an important fertilizer 
for neoliberal authoritarian movements (Brown, 2006). This political logic reduces 
political problems to market solutions. In doing so, administrative technology of 
neoliberalism eradicates political antagonisms while limiting political demands into 
mere administration. Beside, the neoliberal ideology claiming the „end of politics‟ paves 
the way for the inscription of moral codes in the constitution of political identities and 
social belonging. Therefore, neoliberal logic articulates religious, nationalist and racist 
fears and resentments which cause right-wing populist politics (Mouffe, 2005). 
In Turkey, neoliberal authoritarianism of the AKP government explicitly 
manifested in urban reconstruction projects. The AKP utilized urban gentrification and 
reconstruction as an economic model, since investment to public housing trigger 
different forms of consumption. Therefore, the AKP significantly encouraged 
construction companies for further economic growth and enlargement of the 
consumption sector. Throughout the AKP‟s urban policies, urban regeneration projects 
devastated poor income communities and expelled them from central commercial zones. 
on the other hand the AKP‟s right-wing populist discourse recurrently defined local 
resistances through a criminalizing language. The TOKĠ (Housing Development 
Administration), under the command of Prime Minister‟s Office, became the central 
actor in this period with more than 450.000 constructions and gentrification projects 
which targeted mostly lower income neighborhoods (Balaban, 2011). Through the 
cooperation between private construction sector and the TOKĠ, the spatial profile of big 
cities have rapidly changed with mushrooming tower blocks, gated luxury residences 
and shopping malls. Alongside immense construction plans, such as the third airport 
project for Istanbul, Canal Istanbul project
 86
, and Marmaray railway construction, the 
wave of “crazy projects” distorted cultural memory of cities and increased 
commodification of city space through privatizations and demolition of low income 
neighborhoods. Under the motto “reinvigoration and construction” (“ihyâ ve inşa”), the 
idea of “New Turkey”, in the end, resembled a mixture of imitated Ottoman heritage, 
pragmatic use of Turkish-Islamic codes, and imperial nostalgia for lost Ottoman lands 
in the Middle East.  In sum, the discourse of “New Turkey” and the AKP policies more 
                                                          
86 Erdoğan‟s Canal Istanbul was a waterway project between the Blacksea and the Sea of Marmara which would 
become Istanbul‟s new Bosphorus. Although Erdoğan stated that Canal Istanbul would solve sea traffic this project 
was a step in a larger social infrastructure that would open the region for settlement and consumption projects.  
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and more represented authoritarian attempts of a conservative social engineering 
(Açıkel, 2012; Ġnsel, 2012; Özbudun, 2014)  
4.2.3. The Gezi Protests In The Context of The AKP‟s Neoliberal Authoritarianism 
Up until now, I illustrated key events during the period from 2010 to 2013. I 
stated that while the AKP took over key institutions, premises of the government on 
eliminating tutelary forces turned out to be their being appropriated by the AKP cadres. 
I argued that the AKP government in their third term in office became utilized 
majoritarian authoritarian regulations considering the Erdoğan‟s declarations and the 
party‟s policies on the abortion issue, alcohol consumption and 4+4+4 reform. Besides, 
under the economic and political conditions of the given period the AKP changed its 
foreign policies regarding the Middle East. In this way, while gaining the state power, 
the AKP adopted the view of “New Turkey” which merged neo-Ottomanist discourse 
with neoliberal policies along increasing authoritarian regulations. In coming pages, I 
will question how this chain of events and political tensions configured the AKP‟s 
discursive field in the course of the Gezi Park protests. While describing Erdoğan‟s 
political rhetoric and discourse of the pro-government media, I will analyze the counter-
discourse of the AKP in arresting the meaning of the Gezi protest as a collaboration of 
inner and outer enemy organizations. Scrutinizing the patterns of continuity regarding 
the constitutive elements in 2007 and 2010 analyses, I will ask how and why the AKP 
remobilized „ulusalcı‟, „Republican Rallies‟ and „status quo‟ references together with 
conspiracy elements in the context of the Gezi Park protests.  
Considering this background of events illustrated above, the Gezi Park resistance 
should not be regarded as an unexpected event. The Taksim Square in particular and 
Beyoğlu region in general can be defined as a prototype of this general transformation. 
In the name of urban renewal for reconstruction of risky zones, Istanbul municipality 
destructed historical Sulukule region, a former Roma neighborhood, through 
reconstruction projects designed with “Ottoman-style” architecture. Similarly, a low-
income neighborhood TarlabaĢı was also demolished. In this way, reconstruction 
projects removed poor and lower income communities from city centers and secured the 
place for further consumption fields. This process resulted with transformation of the 
cultural memory of big cities under a neoliberal logic. Beyoğlu region and Istiklal 
Street, one of the cultural capitals of Istanbul, rapidly lost historic bookstores, shops and 
101 
 
art centers while rising number of malls and luxury stores occupied the region. As a 
result of this transformation, the Emek cinema was demolished for the construction 
plans of a mall project. During the demonstrations held to prevent the demolition of 
Emek, the police attacked activists and used water cannon to rout people out. This 
attack reflected the unresponsive and intolerant attitudes of authorities towards critique 
and negotiation. 
The Taksim project of the government did not only include commercialization 
through privatization of city space, but also intended to reconfigure the collective 
memory through Islamic and Ottomanist references. In the light of this aim, one of the 
iconic structures of the modernization history of Turkey, the Atatürk Cultural Center 
(AKM) was closed for renewal in 2008. However, the reconstruction was postponed for 
several times, and hence the AKM was inactivated and left to perish. Besides, while 
being the mayor of Istanbul and during his former terms in office for prime minister, 
Erdoğan stated many times that he wanted to erect a grand mosque at the Taksim 
square. In what follows, together with the Istanbul municipality, Erdoğan announced 
that the Gezi Park would be demolished to “reinvigorate” in its place a replica of the 
Topçu KıĢlası (Taksim Military Barracks). Being a former Ottoman garrison 
demolished in 1940, according to Erdoğan reconstructed Topçu KıĢlası would, on the 
one hand, commemorate actual Ottoman heritage of the square, and on the other hand it 
would be used as a complex constituting of a shopping mall, city museums and luxury 
accommodation. In order to suppress the fact that the Taksim square has been the 
address of political demonstrations and traumatic memories of state violence
87
, such 
immense recreation plans would purify the region from public demonstrations and low-
income groups. Although the then Minister of Culture, Ertuğrul Günay, and 
                                                          
87 Although Taksim square have witnessed a series of political incidents, both for the revolutionary leftist movement 
and the Kurdish movement the square and Beyoğlu region have symbolic importance. In 1 May, 1977, hundreds and 
thousands of people composed of different sections of the Turkish left-wing politics and unionists gathered at the 
square for the International Labor Day demonstrations. At the middle of the meeting shots were heard and police 
forces intervened in the square through means which purposively triggered an atmosphere of panic and chaos. 
Although some speculated that the shots were a result of the disputes between demonstrators, involvement of counter-
guerilla units determined the result of the incident as well as the rising state violence against the leftist movement in 
Turkey. In the end of the May 1 1997 tens of demonstrators killed. Beyoğlu region is also a memorial site for the 
Kurdish movement. Throughout the 90‟s, restoration ideology of the 1980 coup d‟état and security forces subjected 
Kurdish civilians to systematic torture, murder and forced disappearances. Throughout the mid 90‟s, Kurdish mothers 
who lost their sons and daughters along forced disappearances tried to gather in front of the Galatasaray High School 
over the Istiklal Street on each Saturday. Facing with harsh police attacks, gathering of the Saturday Mothers were 
tried to be suppressed by security forces for years which eventually made the region a traumatic manifestation of the 
state violence against civil politics and demands for justice. Along years this demand did not extinguish. On the one 
hand, attempts of demonstrators to demand justice for the Taksim massacre and forced disappearances made the 
Taksim region a site commemorated the injuries of the state violence. On the other hand, the authorities kept 
attempting to suppress such political movements through criminalizing demonstrations and security forces. 
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Commission of Renewal of the Ministry rejected reconstruction plans for the Topçu 
KıĢlası, Erdoğan stated in February 2013: “We are going to build Taksim Barracks. The 
higher council rejected the project. We are going to reject this rejection”88. As opposed 
to authoritative tone of Erdoğan and non-transparent bureaucratic organs under the AKP 
rule, dissidents have organized under the Taksim Solidarity in order to prevent the 
Taksim Plan of the government. This shows that the Taksim square have become a 
battle ground of antagonistic desires projected on both the collective memory and 
representations attached to the space prior to the Gezi resistance (Eken, 2014).  
However, what made Gezi Park protests a mass movement of nationwide 
uprisings were the culmination of certain transformations and the polarization of the 
social field towards a shared distrust against policies of the AKP. Rising authoritative 
tone of Erdoğan, monopolization of the media in the hands of a few business groups 
that had close relations with the government, lack of freedom of press, legal injuries 
regarding crucial cases, and mounting pressure over oppositional voices ended up with 
the AKP‟s negation and silencing of claims of varied actors through coercive 
instruments. After a couple of days from the Reyhanlı bombings, what started as a 
protest of a small group resisting against the demolition of the Gezi Park in 27
th
 of May 
exploded into a series of nationwide anti-government uprisings in the following days. In 
order to prevent demolition of the park, “the protests started out as a response to the 
governing neoliberal party‟s project of urban transformation […]; yet, urban question 
quickly took a backseat as the protests became massive” (Tuğal, 2013). In the face of 
excessive police violence through paper gas, water cannon and plastic bullets, on the 
31
st
 of May hundreds of thousands of people from various backgrounds gathered in the 
streets and involved in the resistance. In the afternoon of the 1
st
 of June, police forces 
stepped back and thousands of demonstrators entered into the Taksim square while the 
protests spontaneously spread to different cities all around the country. Thus, the Gezi 
Park protest exceeded the limits of an environmental activism, and the movement took 
the form of the solidarity of a multitude of voices against the authoritative state power 
under the AKP rule. The title “spirit of the Gezi” and the tree image became the symbol 
of solidarity of different sectors that resisted against the repressive police violence and 
the non-responsive authoritarian government.  
                                                          
88 “Topçu KıĢlası‟nı yapacağız. Üst Kurul reddetmiĢ. Biz de reddi reddedeceğiz” (Avukatlar örgütte aktif. (February 
4, 2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved July 6, 2015, from http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kent/144084-basbakan-in-topcu-
kislasi-israri 
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As street clashes and police violence were continuing, the Gezi Park remained 
occupied by demonstrators until the 15
th
 of June when police forces demolished the 
commune in the park and evicted protesters through water cannons and tear gas. The 
experience derived from nearly twenty days of resistance and the aftermath of the 
events helped constitution of a new political rhetoric which was configured through 
encounters among different social backgrounds and intersubjective actions (Karakayali 
& Yaka, 2014). A vast variety of different sections, ranging from LGBT activists and 
feminists to football club fans, nationalist, Kemalists to Kurdish groups, from religious 
communities, secular identity groups, academicians to artists, and middle and upper 
middle classes from different incomes labor unions, university students to homeless 
people gathered in the square. Through humorous and creative interventions, this 
spontaneous and unorganized community developed a counter-hegemonic language and 
a set of practices which eventually reconstructed the spatial and symbolic surface of the 
place. On the one hand, „people‟ across squares and along uprisings in different cities 
pointed out privatization of common areas and authoritarianism of the government 
through slogans such as “Capitalism will cut down the tree if it can‟t sell the shadow” 
and “Shoulder to shoulder, against fascism”. On the other hand, such spontaneous 
encounters along different political affinities reflected a rhetorical affirmation of current 
tensions. Considering the restrictions against alcohol consumption people voiced the 
slogan “You shouldn‟t have banned the last beer” or “You banned the alcohol, the 
people sobered up”. Against statements of Erdoğan on the abortion and three children 
issues, the slogan “Tayyip, do you want three children like us?” highly circulated 
among the crowd (Deren van het Hof, 2015). Similarly, while Erdoğan was defining the 
people in the streets as “looters” (in Turkish “çapulcu”), crowds in the squares quickly 
appropriated the term and subverted the meaning of the “çapulcu” as the motto of their 
resistance for further liberation; i.e. “chapulling”.  
Moreover, new slogans emerging in the light of current encounters between 
heterogeneous groups challenged the ordinary limits of political identities through 
contingent articulation of a satirical language. As opposed to one of the widely 
circulated slogan “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal” shouted by Kemalist and 
nationalist groups, demonstrators created anti-militarist slogans such as “We are the 
soldiers of Mustafa Keser” who is a folk singer. Beside the subversive power of the 
Gezi protests‟ counter-hegemonic language, certain encounters among conflicting social 
104 
 
groups enabled contingent dislocation and rearticulation of political oppositions. In line 
with this, a photograph of two men standing in juxtaposition with the posters of Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, and Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the 
PKK, was shared in large numbers by protesters. Accordingly, one of the striking 
examples reflecting this encounter was the graffiti “Biji Serok Atatürk” which was 
appropriated from the Kurdish slogan “Biji Serok Apo”, meaning “Long live the Leader 
Apo”. Another important aspect during the Gezi Park resistance was the active 
involvement of Islamic conservative communities calling themselves “Anti-capitalist 
Muslims”. Hand in hand with those heterogeneous sectors referred above, those 
Islamists and pious groups prayed at the Gezi Park on the holy night, Mirac Kandili, and 
offered dessert to the inhabitants of the park in order commemorate injuries and losses 
during the Gezi protests. Thus, different sections from various social backgrounds, 
which were mostly excluded and stigmatized in the discourse of the AKP as the anti-
people groups, temporarily involved in a collective action within a shared anti-
institutionalist demand. Through the contingent configuration of an antagonism under 
the given condition claims of different sectors articulated into a popular demand 
negating the authoritarian policies of the AKP government. As hundreds of thousands of 
people were demanding the Prime Minister Erdoğan to resign, the AKP‟s hegemony 
over „the people‟ shattered. Thus, one can argue that under such a field of contingent 
encounters, counter-hegemonic articulation of a discursive field during the Gezi Park 
protest forced the AKP‟s dominant rhetoric over the political field towards dislocation 
and brought about its reconfiguration. One of the slogans shouted by protesters reflected 
how the rhetorical subversion of the signifier „the people‟ reshaped the boundaries of 
the social: “We claim religion without the AKP, Atatürk without the CHP, motherland 
without the MHP, Kurds without the BDP, we are the people”89.  
4.3. “The People” As The Ground of Hegemonic Struggle 
Under such encounters and confrontations, the Gezi Park protest gave rise to an 
idea of communitarian fullness which was shared across different social groups 
involved in the resistance. However, as I discussed in previous chapters, openness of the 
social and unevenness of dislocations prevents the conceptual grasping of community as 
                                                          
89 “Biz AKP‟siz dine, CHP‟siz Ata‟ya, MHP‟siz vatana, BDP‟siz Kürt‟e sahip çıkarız, biz halkız”. See: Çelik, B. 
(June 6, 2013). The diverse revolt of Turkish youth and the production of the political. Open Democracy. Retrieved 
July 1, 2015 from https://www.opendemocracy.net/burce-celik/diverse-revolt-of-turkish-youth-and-production-of-
political 
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a closed totality. Laclau states that “the community as such is not a purely differential 
space of an objective identity but an absent fullness, it cannot have any form of 
representation of its own” (Laclau, 2007, p. 42). The community emerges, however, in 
the field of politics through the equivalential expansion of previously repressed claims 
into a particular demand in the face of the repressive power, which resembles the anti-
community. According to Laclau, oppositional difference from the same oppressive 
establishment constitutes a community through combination of individual claims. 
Therefore, articulation of various demands along an equivalential chain constitutes „the 
people‟ (Laclau, 2005, p. 74). This tension between equivalence and difference is 
maintained through the discursive configuration of an antagonistic frontier through 
which the heterogeneous elements in both poles are reduced to the conflict between two 
homogeneous forces. As a result of this constitutive antagonism, one signifier achieves 
representing the fullness of the community, i.e. „people‟, „class‟ or „nation‟, which is 
actually a signifier standing for an impossible universality. Thus, through the production 
of such empty signifiers, the name becomes the ground of a thing which keeps an 
assemblage of heterogeneous elements equivalentially together (Laclau, 2005, p. 100). 
The name, indicating political movements, ideologies or institutions, condenses 
contingent articulation as a fixed belonging and crystallizes the content of the privileged 
signifier, that which Laclau characterizes as the operation of hegemony (Laclau, 2008). 
In sum, configuration of the antagonistic frontier constitutes equivalential chains across 
particular demands, and one particularity contingently determines the context of the 
contradiction through hegemonic articulation of the political field. To Laclau, this 
discursive articulation of the political moment is a rhetorical investment: “[p]olitics is 
the articulation of heterogeneous elements, and such an articulation is essentially 
tropological, for it presupposes the duality between institution and subversion of 
differential positions that we found as defining a rhetorical intervention” (Laclau, 2008, 
p. 73). 
From this perspective it can be argued that the event of Gezi Park protests and 
massive demonstrations in its aftermath became a political moment which challenged 
the AKP‟s hegemonic definition of „the people/millet‟. Although both protesters and 
government agreed that the Gezi Park resistance was not about a few trees, 
demonstrators defined the Gezi protests as a resistance against authoritarian tendencies 
of the government and its excessive interference into the private lives. This discursive 
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field dislocated various elements rhetorically (as discussed above Kurds, Turkish 
nationalist, LGBT people, certain Islamists, university students, left wing parties, 
environmental activists etc.) and articulated them within a counter-hegemonic context. 
Therefore, „the people‟ in the rhetoric of the multitude in streets came to mean anti-
institutionalism, anti-authoritarianism and inclusiveness.  
On the other hand, the AKP‟s discourse, as discussed in previous chapters, based 
on the political rhetoric which privileged the antagonism between status quo and 
democracy while hegemonically defining popular decisions of „the people‟ through 
ethno-religious codes and majoritarian formulations. Within the AKP‟s discursive field, 
plebiscitarian understanding of democracy and „balloting‟ legitimized the AKP‟s 
identification of „the people‟ with the party as the representation of the popular will. In 
doing so, while the AKP became the norm of democracy (Çınar, 2013), any critical 
voice against the AKP‟s policies was either defined as attempts of tutelary forces to the 
detriment of the AKP and thus the decision of the people. Therefore, the Gezi resistance 
became a political moment of struggle between two hegemonic articulations of „the 
people‟. On the one hand, the AKP‟s differential logic, which was based on the 
antagonism between democracy and impeding forces of extra-legal and bureaucratic 
cadres, shattered. On the other hand, contingent articulation of a counter-hegemonic 
articulation reconfigured the political space through rhetorically dislocating and fixing 
elements under a different representational regime which was based on a new 
contextualization of „the people‟. Thus, this clash between competing discursive fields, 
shifting of political frontiers due to the emergence of a counter-hegemonic 
contextualization of the „people‟, necessitated “the reconstitution of the space of 
representation through the construction of a new frontier” (Laclau, 2005, p. 153). In line 
with this conceptualization, the AKP reconfigured the antagonistic frontier through 
rhetorical investment. 
The AKP circles tried to construct this new antagonistic frontier by combining 
two levels of interpretation. On the one hand the AKP attempted to narrow the scope of 
demands made by protesters and lumped these protesters from various backgrounds into 
a homogeneous crowd which was agitated by the CHP through anti-democratic means. 
In the light of this interpretation, the AKP cadres argued that the Gezi was a plot staged 
by tutelary forces of the „old Turkey‟ aiming to interrupt the process of democratization 
and de-militarization. In this regard, the counter-discourse of the AKP, therefore, 
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portrayed the Gezi protests as an organization of „ulusalcı‟ forces. On the other hand, 
Erdoğan and pro-government media highly circulated the term “interest rate lobby” (faiz 
lobisi) to imply the operations of finance groups in the backstage manipulating the 
socio-economic dynamics in several countries for their own interests. Not only the AKP 
but also Necmettin Erbakan‟s party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), in the 90‟s 
addressed the domination of interest rate groups while referring to the US, Jews and 
their local collaborators. Loaded with anti-Semitic, nationalist and religious constituents 
discourse on the interest rate groups implied that a collaboration of global and local 
actors manipulated the economic sphere in order to obtain benefit from the socio-
economic turmoil. Erdoğan in a way reproduced the Welfare Party‟s discourse within 
the context of the Gezi protests through re-appropriating the “interest rate lobby”. In 
this second level of explanation, Erdoğan and the pro-government media argued that the 
interest lobby was manipulating crowds into a riot through social media and 
international media with the help of local business groups, academicians and journalists. 
Combining former constituents of „ulusalcılık‟ with current conspiracy theories, 
Erdoğan and pro-government media thus tried to capture the Gezi Park protests as a 
coup plot devised by international and local forces that seek to remove the government 
from power. In the light of this analysis, I will firstly illustrate how the AKP‟s counter-
discourse narrated the Gezi Park protests while in a way that reduced it to the revival of 
tutelary forces of the old Turkey. In the second level, I will analyze the significance of 
the “interest lobby” as a term which rhetorically combined local enemy figures with 
broader conspiracy elements.   
4.3.1. „The Gezi Protest‟ As The Plot of „ulusalcı‟ Status Quo Forces 
The AKP‟s interpretations of the Gezi Park protests in its first few days could 
not configure a solid definition of the ongoing chain of events. While some of the AKP 
cadres defined the demonstration as an environmental protests agitated by police 
violence, Erdoğan and pro-government media tended to define the ongoing chain of 
events as a failed coup attempt. Within this hegemonic articulation “ulusalcı” notion 
gained increased emphasis in the discourse of the AKP. While the Gezi resistance was 
spreading around different cities, Erdoğan expressed his ideas about the reason behind 
the uprisings for the first time at the 1
st
 of June during a meeting with business groups 
and exporters. In his speech, while contrasting other countries in crises with the 
economic growth of Turkey, Erdoğan stated that incapacities of oppositional parties in 
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the parliament let clashes along the street to emerge. According to Erdoğan, because of 
oppositional parties‟ insufficient involvement in the parliament, a minority group was 
trying to dominate the democratic will of the people through extra-parliamentary means. 
Look, if the opposition cannot reach the level of the governmental power, at 
least it cannot come close to it, then other powers will seize the duty of 
opposition in a significantly unhealthy, unlawful and anti-democratic manner; 
the extremist will take possession of that duty. Unfortunately in Turkey we have 
a serious gap in the opposition. Just as the majority cannot put pressure on the 
minority, the minority can neither exercise power over the majority nor make 
impositions, nor impose choices on the majority in this country anymore because 
democracies do not embrace the type of governments where the minority holds 
the power through the votes of the nation, but the majority accede to the 
government. But who is entitled to do so? The entitlement belongs to the nation. 
[…] Those who seek results apart from those coming out of the ballot box do not 
pursue democracy in this country; they chase anti-democratic practices. They 
are all non-democratic and unlawful.… We have experienced and unfortunately 
seen what kinds of games, scenarios and provocations those who fail at the 
ballot box, who cannot perform an effective opposition and cannot be honored 
by the courtesy of the majority resort to.
90
 (Emphasis added) 
In the end of his speech, Erdoğan defined the actions of demonstrators as 
“ideological”. Moreover, he stated that they should demolish the AKM and build in its 
place a gigantic opera house and a rebuilt version of the Taksim Barracks. In doing so, 
the regenerated Taksim square, for Erdoğan, would turn into an attractive city center for 
tourists. While implying that there was a backstage scenario manipulating the crowds in 
the streets, Erdoğan argued that the ongoing protests were reenacting the process 
leading to the 1960 and 1980 coups d‟états. Considering this manipulating scenario, 
Erdoğan addressed particularly the CHP and implied that the main oppositional party 
was agitating “extreme and marginal groups” in order to provoke larger amount of 
people against the elected government. There, in the end Erdoğan addressed the head of 
the CHP Kılıçdaroğlu and stated as follows: “I can gather 200 thousands where he 
                                                          
90 “Bakın muhalefet, iktidarın seviyesine ulaĢamazsa en azından yaklaĢamazsa o zaman muhalefet görevi son derece 
sağlıksız, hukuksuz, antidemokratik biçimde baĢka odakların eline geçer, aĢırı uçların eline geçer. [B]iz ne yazık ki, 
Türkiye'de böyle çok ciddi muhalefet boĢluğu yaĢıyoruz. ... Çoğunluk nasıl ki azınlık üzerinde baskı kuramazsa 
azınlık da bu ülkede artık çoğunluk üzerinde baskı kuramaz, dayatmalar yapamaz, tercihler dayatamaz. Zira 
demokrasiler milletin oylarıyla azınlığın iĢ baĢına geldiği iktidarlar değildir, çoğunluğun iĢ baĢına geldiği 
iktidarlardır. Ama bunun yetkisi kime aittir? Millete aittir. ... Sandığın dıĢında netice arayanlar bu ülkede 
demokrasinin peĢinde olanlar değildir, antidemokratik uygulamaların peĢindedir. Bunların hepsi demokrasi dıĢıdır, 
hukuk dıĢıdır. ... Sandıkta baĢarılı olamayanların, etkili bir muhalefet yürütemeyenlerin, çoğunluğun teveccühüne 
mazhar olamayanların hangi oyunlara, hangi senaryolara, hangi tahriklere baĢvurduğunu yaĢadık ve ne yazık ki 
gördük.” (BaĢbakan‟dan Gezi Parkı açıklaması. (June 1, 2013). Sabah. Retrieved July 11, 2015, from 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/06/01/basbakan-erdogan-konusuyor) 
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gathered 20, my party can gather one million where he gathered 100 thousands. We do 
not have such a hardship. But they better not to force the situation to this level”91.  
According to this frame of explanation, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric addressed the CHP, 
as the cause of the current situation and the culprit behind provocative scenarios. He 
defined the demonstrators as groups that seek the domination of a minority over the 
decisions of the majority of the people. This definition which claimed a connection 
between the CHP and the crowds in the streets discursively negated, silenced and 
reduced a variety of different social groups in the streets to an enemy figure 
“dominating minority”. On the other hand, rhetorical reference to „balloting‟ and 
“decision of the people” delegitimized the different demands made by demonstrators 
and discursively limited the realm of democratic claims to the ballot box. Therefore, this 
logic of justification based on „balloting‟ that we have also witnessed in 2007 and 2010 
periods intended to capture the Gezi Park protests as “anti-democratic” and “extra-
legal” attempts. Framing this interpretation onto the discourse of development which 
highlighted the economic success of the government in the service of its people enabled 
Erdoğan to deframe critical voices as those who envy the well-being of the country. 
Thus, according to this narrative, an enemy alliance led by the CHP and provoked 
minorities was losing its grip on the public and losing its ground in the ballot as 
opposed to the AKP who gained the favor of the majority of the people. Therefore, this 
enemy organization was trying to agitate the streets through plots and invoking chaos, 
simply to push the AKP government into a corner for their own selfish interests. 
Just after Erdoğan‟s statements, in the next day of June, pro-government media 
associated ongoing demonstrations heavily with the Republican Rallies of 2007. Certain 
columnists argued that the same organizers behind the Rallies were trying this time to 
reactivate the forces of „status quo‟ to enable a coup plot. While stating that “certain 
groups” were trying to turn Taksim to Tahrir square and oust Erdoğan from power as a 
continuation of the Arab Spring, key columnists in pro-government media addressed the 
CHP as the master manipulator. Ġbrahim Karagül, from Yeni ġafak daily, stated in his 
article that the protests held by demonstrators to prevent the cutting down of trees in the 
Gezi Park was only a cover for „the scenario‟:  
                                                          
91“Ben kalkarım onun 20 topladığı yerde 200 bin toplarım, onun 100 bin topladığı yerde partim olarak 1 milyon insan 
toplarım. Bizim böyle bir sıkıntımız yok. Ama iĢi buraya getirmesinler” (Ibid: footnote 88). 
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But whoever pushed the button, the second stage of the scenario revealed the 
truth in crystal clear. The CHP tried to push the party to the front when they saw 
a matured massive anger. Trying to get the incident as its own, the CHP 
increased its agitation. The event turned into a Republican Rallies-like CHP 
meeting.
92
 
In similar lines, another Yeni ġafak columnist Yusuf Kaplan, in his article titled “Do 
you still think that children of this country are the wire-pullers?” stated as follows: 
“Through these demonstrations, which started at Taksim and spread quickly Ankara, 
Izmir and other large cities of the country, they will not hesitate to commit what they 
could not achieve during the Republican Rallies” 93 . Following this stream of 
interpretation, Mehmet Ocaktan, a columnist in Star daily, argued that the Gezi was the 
enactment of a plot devised by the status quo forces of the „old Turkey‟. He stated in his 
article as follows: “Similar to the attitude during the State Council killing and the 
Republican Rallies, we come up against a minority yearning for the „old Turkey‟”94.  
Analyzing the process, Yeni ġafak daily was narrating the Gezi event through 
mobilizing the memory of May 27 and February 28 military interventions. While stating 
that the CHP and the Labor Party (İşçi Partisi/ĠP) were organizing a “provocation”, 
Yeni ġafak daily argued that „ulusalcı‟ organizations were terrorizing squares in order 
to manipulate crowds against the government: 
Leftist organizations were at the bottom of the Taksim events; the CHP and the 
Labor Party were at the surface thereof. [...] The innocent demonstration 
initiated to protect trees in Gezi Park was drifted apart from its cause due to the 
trick of the many organizations that were involved in “Ergenekon” case. The 
protestors‟ demonstration with pots and pans provoked by some forces reminded 
of February 28 period. With the cooperation among ulusalcı, racist, and marginal 
organizations, Taksim and BeĢiktaĢ turned into a battlefield.95 
                                                          
92 “Ama düğmeye kim bastıysa senaryonun ikinci aĢaması gerçeği çırılçıplak ortaya koydu. CHP ise, hazır kitlesel 
öfkeyi görünce durumdan vazife çıkarma pozisyonuna geçti. Olayı sahiplendi, alabildiğine kıĢkırtmaya baĢladı. Olay 
CHP mitingine, bir tür Cumhuriyet Mitingi‟ne dönüĢtü.” (Karagül, Ġ. (June 2, 2013). Taksim‟den Tahrir çıkmaz. Yeni 
Şafak. Retrieved July 11, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/taksimden-tahrir-cikmaz-
37970?mobil=true) 
93 “Cumhuriyet mitingleriyle yapamadıklarını, Taksim‟de baĢlayan, Ankara‟ya, Ġzmir‟e ve ülkenin belli baĢlı büyük 
Ģehirlerine hızla yayılan bu gösterilerle yapmaya kalkıĢmaktan çekinmeyecekler.” (Kaplan, Y. (June 2, 2013). Ġplerin 
bu ülkenin çocuklarının elinde olduğunu mu sanıyorsunuz siz hala?. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 12, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/yusufkaplan/iplerin-bu-ulkenin-cocuklarinin-elinde-oldugunu-mu-saniyorsunuz-
siz-hala-37967) 
94“[T]ıpkı DanıĢtay cinayeti dönemindeki ve Cumhuriyet Mitinglerindeki görüntülerden aĢina olduğumuz bir uslupla 
„eski Türkiye‟ özlemiyle yanıp tutuĢan bir azınlıkla karĢı karĢıyayız.” (Ocaktan, M. ( June 4, 2013). Provokatörlerden 
ayrıĢın. Star. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/provokatorlerden-ayrisin/yazi-759657) 
95“Taksim olaylarının altından sol örgütler, üstünden ise CHP ve ĠĢçi Partisi çıktı. [...] Gezi Parkı‟nda ağaçları 
korumak için baĢlatılan masum eylem, adı „Ergenekon‟ davasına karıĢmıĢ çok sayıda örgüt marifetiyle amacından 
kopartıldı. Bazı odaklarca provoke edilen halkın tencere-tavalı gösterisi 28 ġubat sürecini hatırlattı. ... Ulusalcı, ırkçı, 
marjinal örgütlerin ortaklığında Taksim ve BeĢiktaĢ savaĢ alanına çevrildi.” (Altı örgüt üstü CHP. (June 3, 2013). 
Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 16, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/alti-orgut-ustu-chp-528994)  
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In this framework, the AKP‟s discourse tried to capture the meaning of the Gezi 
event by configuring the movement as the organization of coup supporters against the 
AKP government. While separating “innocent demonstrators” from “ulusalcı marginal 
organizers”, the AKP‟s discourse argued that the same actors involved in the Ergenekon 
and February 28 military interventions were agitating this time apparently naïve 
protests. Following this interpretation, Orhan Miroğlu, current Star columnist and the 
AKP‟s MP, stated in an interview for Yeni ġafak that the Gezi demonstrations were 
similar to the Republican Rallies. While arguing that „ulusalcı‟ groups were leading the 
hidden plot behind the process on the surface, Miroğlu stated that the Gezi protests were 
reflecting the latest efforts of „ulusalcı‟ groups to regain the state power they have lost96. 
From a similar point of view, the Deputy Prime Minister BeĢir Atalay argued that 
certain groups dominated the innocent claims of the Gezi Park protesters for purposes of 
protecting their status quo. While defining those groups as „ulusalcı‟, Atalay stated that 
their aim was to prevent democratic openings: “There is an ulusalcı section. They both 
opposed Kurdish opening [and] wise people commission, and protested the commission 
where they held meetings. Ulusalcılar was the most active group during the protests. In 
Turkey, those who want to protect the status quo opposes us, this has always been the 
case” 97. These formulations which are akin to the AKP‟s discourse on „ulusalcı‟ in 
2010 enabled the AKP‟s spokesmen and pro-government media to define the Gezi as 
the continuation of the tutelary cadres of the „ulusalcı‟ status quo. Contrary to the fact 
that former tutelary forces in the military and the judiciary have been eliminated and the 
AKP consolidated the state power in its own hands following the 2010 amendments, the 
AKP narrated the Gezi event by remobilizing the discursive antagonism between the 
AKP‟s struggle for democracy against the reactions of status quo forces. Below is a 
quotation from Mehmet Metiner, then a columnist of Yeni ġafak and the AKP‟s MP for 
two terms which illustrates this level of explanations that tries to capture the motivation 
behind the Gezi as a coup attempt: 
The set-up is the same. The powers staging the play are the same. … Forces 
within the Ergenekon-status quo-ulusalcı circles call the army to duty, saying 
that laicity and the republic are in danger. Those who terrorized streets by using 
                                                          
96 See: Eylemlerin nedeni yenilgi psikolojisi. (June 8, 2013). Yeni Şafak. p. 12 
97 “Burada bir ulusalcı kesim var. Bunlar bizim çözüm sürecine de, [...] akil insanlar mekanizmasına da karĢı 
koymuĢ, akil insanları gittikleri yerlerde protesto [etmiĢlerdir]. Onlar burada en aktiftir. Türkiyede statükoyu 
korumak isteyenlerin bize muhalefeti var, baĢından beri böyledir" (Atalay: Gezi Parkı‟nın en aktifi „ulusalcılar‟. (June 
15, 2013). Zaman. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_atalay-gezi-parkinin-en-aktifi-
ulusalcilar_2100836.html) 
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environmental sensitivity target the democratization and peace process of 
Turkey in the personage of the Prime Minister.
98
 (Emphasis added) 
By rearticulating the discourse on „democracy‟ and „coup attempt of deep state‟ 
in a manner that resembles the context in 2007 and 2010 periods I analyzed previously, 
the AKP circles intended to capture the Gezi event as the plot of the tutelary forces of 
the „old Turkey‟. According to this framework, Mustafa Karaalioğlu from Star daily 
argued that „ulusalcı‟ motivations were agitating the environmental concerns of 
protesters at the Taksim square, trying to (mis)lead the demonstrators towards the „old 
Turkey‟: 
An alliance, which could not get what they wanted from the Republican Rallies, 
attempts to go out to the streets again. It is beneficial to remind hereby that there 
will be no return to the Old Turkey. We will never live in a country governed by 
the military tutelage, elite, media as well as by the deep alignments. There will 
be no return from the resolution of the Kurdish question. […] Shortly, the 
ulusalcı dream will not take place.99 (Emphasis added)  
Several other columnists in pro-government media also defended the argument 
that status quo forces were manipulating the Gezi protests in order to gain the support of 
larger crowds so as to prevent the AKP‟s democratization process and Kurdish opening. 
From this perspective, Yalçın Akdoğan, then a columnist in Star daily, argued that the 
CHP and several “marginal parties” were steering the sincere concerns of protesters 
about the Gezi Park away from democratic and legal grounds. According to Akdoğan, 
this reflected the interests of status quo forces that try to abuse the current situation in 
order to violate the peace process and preparations for the new constitution: 
[...] CHP and some marginal parties turn the struggle with the government into 
an uprising and [try] to pull the ground of political fight into a non-democratic 
and illegal point. ... Particularly the positive developments regarding peace 
process and the new constitution cause the block of status quo supporters to 
desperately cling onto other methods. [...] We will adopt a wise and determined 
                                                          
98 “Tezgah aynı. Oyunu sahneleyen güçler aynı. [...] „Cumhuriyet mitingleri‟ni düzenleyen ve bizzat yer alan 
Ergenekoncu-ulusalcı-statükocu güçler laiklik ve cumhuriyetin tehlikede olduğunu söyleyerek orduyu göreve 
çağırıyorlardı. Gezi parkındaki çevreci duyarlılığı kullanarak sokakları terörize edenlerin BaĢbakanın Ģansında 
hedefledikeri Ģey, Türkiye‟nin demokratikleĢme ve barıĢ sürecidir” (Metiner, M. (June 6, 2013). BaĢbakanı 
Yedirmeyiz. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 16, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/mehmetmetiner/basbakani-yedirmeyiz-38020) 
99 “Cumhuriyet mitinglerinden hevesini alamamıĢ bir ittifakın kendisini yeniden sokağa atma çabası var. Bu vesileyle 
hatırlamakta fayda var, bir daha Eski Türkiye‟ye dönüĢ olmayacak. Bir daha askeri vesayetin, seçkinlerin, medyanın, 
derin ittifakların idare ettiği bir ülke de yaĢamayacağız. Kürt meselesinin çözümünden geri dönüĢ de olmayacak. ... 
Hasılı, ulusalcı rüya da gerçeklemeyecek.” (Karaalioğlu, M. (June  2,2013). Taksim‟den „Eski Türkiye‟ye çıkılır mı?. 
Star. Retrieved July 16, 2015, from http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/taksimden-eski-turkiyeye--cikilir-mi/yazi-759168) 
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stance vis-à-vis the coalition of status quo powers trying to re-build the Old 
Turkey and their schemes instigating violence and conflict.
100
 
Although the emphasis on local dynamics of „status quo‟ and „coup intervention‟ 
were more emphasized, pro-government media also introduced international media and 
the US in their interpretations as conspiracy figures. According to Oliver and Wood, 
conspiracy theories are “narratives about hidden, malevolent groups secretly 
perpetuating political plots and social calamities to further their own nefarious goals” 
(Oliver & Wood, 2014). Through predispositions and content framing, conspiracies 
assert a type of political discourse for public events through compelling explanations. 
Although conspiracies are often perceived as paranoiac style of politics, they constitute 
a “popular imagination, they comment and provoke thought about real contradictions” 
(Hellinger, 2003, p. 205). Through simplifying a socio-political turmoil and offering an 
explanation in comprehensible and popularized forms, political elite use conspiracy 
theories as narrations provided for opaque and non-transparent political actions. In this 
way, through condemning and delegitimizing opponents, “both conspiracy and 
conspiracy theory frequently serve as political strategies” (Fenster, 2008, p. 10).  
 From this point of view, by constituting a narrative replete with conspiracy 
elements, the AKP‟s discourse blanked the heterogeneous actors and reduced demands 
of the demonstrations to interferences of an enemy collaboration. Through this 
conspiratorial rhetoric, the AKP circles on the one hand tried to overcome the 
legitimacy crisis that the party faced, on the other hand they aimed to mobilize a 
popular reaction through demonizing the protesters as „traitors‟ against the national 
interests. Based on this political strategy, pro-government media addressed both local 
and international actors as manipulators behind apparently reasonable environmental 
demonstrations. According to the analyses published in Yeni ġafak, a mysterious IP 
address from Houston was giving directives to the CHP and the Labor Party to control a 
crowd of 200 thousands. While stating that the crowds were mobilized through zello
101
 
                                                          
100“[...] CHP ve bir kısım marjinal partilerin hükümetle mücadeleyi bir baĢkaldırıya dönüĢtür[mekte] ve siyasi 
mücadelenin zeminini demokratik ve hukuki olmayan bir noktaya çekmeye [çalıĢmaktadır]. ... Özellikle çözüm süreci 
ve yeni anayasayla ilgili olmulu geliĢmeler statüko bloğunun can havliyle baĢka yöntemlere sarılmasına sebep 
olmaktadır. [...] Eski Türkiye‟yi geri inĢa etmek isteyen statükocu güçlerin koalisyonuna, Ģiddet ve çatıĢmayı 
körükleyen tertiplerine karĢı ise ferasetli ve kararlı bir duruĢ içinde olacağız.” (Akdoğan, Yalçın. (June 4, 2013). 
Ağaç hassasiyetinden siyasi tertip ve vandalizme. Star. Retrieved July 18, 2015, from 
http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/agac-hassasiyetinden-siyasi-tertip-ve-vandalizme/yazi-759658) 
101  Zello is a smart phone application enabling to use the phone as a walkie talkie device through online 
communication. 
114 
 
communication, Yeni ġafak argued that the ultimate aim was a “civil coup” supported 
by the international media and the US
102
.  
Besides these explanations which prioritized the manufactured coup aspect, 
there were critical voices within the pro-government media as well. For example, at the 
early days of the Gezi Park resistance, KürĢat Bumin, then a columnist in Yeni ġafak 
who was fired from the newspaper after the Gezi protests, defined the Gezi protest as a 
democratic urban movement. While criticizing authorities for their intolerance and 
imprudence, Bumin stated that “It is impossible to apprehend the Gezi Park protests 
through attributions such as „ideological, plot, game‟ which eventually works to 
disguise the real cause of the protests”103. In a similar vein, Ali Bayramoğlu from Yeni 
ġafak warned the government about political morass of shortsightedness, given the 
divergent elements involved in the movement and its actual content: “The political 
authority‟s highlighting only one of the dissident actors and movements, for example 
ulusalcı or violent groups, and shutting their eyes to different segments and actors is 
heavily wrong”104. Along these lines, Fehmi Koru, then a columnist in Star who was 
transferred to Haber Türk daily after the Gezi protests, stated that the government would 
be mistaken if they perceive any political movement as an act of agitation. Criticizing 
authorities for their top-down dictations, Koru stated that “One cannot govern the „new 
Turkey‟ with the methods of the „old Turkey‟”105. Following this critical stream within 
the pro-government media, Star columnist Mustafa Akyol admitted that many 
supporters of the government were conceiving the Gezi event as a „coup intervention‟ in 
the line of February 28 and the Republican Rallies. However, he warned his readers and 
the AKP circles by stating that “[N]o, this is something different. Identifying current 
                                                          
102  See: Houston‟dan ölüm emir. (June 6, 2013). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 18, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/houstondan-olum-emri-529835 
103“Gezi Parkı protestolarının „ideolojik, tertip, oynanan oyun‟ gibi olayların gerçek nedenini gizlemeye çalıĢan 
nitelemelerle anlaĢılması imkansızdır.” (Bumin, K. (June 2, 2013). “Tertip” değil, sahici bir “Ģehir hareketi”. Yeni 
Şafak. Retrieved June 18, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/kursatbumin/tertip-degil-sahici-bir-sehir-
hareketi-37963) 
104“Siyasi iktidarın muhalif aktör ve hareketlerden sadece birine, örneğin ulusalcılara, Ģiddet eylemine soyunan 
gruplara vurgu yapması, diğer katman ve aktörleri, iĢin özünü görmezden gelmesi son derece yanlıĢtır.” 
(Bayramoğlu, A. (June 5, 2013). Yangını kim, nasıl söndürecek?. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 19, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/alibayramoglu/yangini-kim-nasil-sondurecek-38002?mobil=true) 
105“Eski Türkiye‟nin ölçüleriyle „yeni Türkiye‟ yönetilemez.” (Koru, F. (June 4, 2013). Ok yaydan çıktı, ama kim 
çıkardı oku yaydan. Star. Retrieved July 19, 2015, from http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/ok-yaydan-cikti-ama-kim-
cikardi-oku-yaydan/yazi-759652) 
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protests with former anti-democratic attempts […] would be a desperate mistake. 
Besides, it both damages the government and Turkey”106.  
Although critiques were emerging from different sections of society including 
the AKP cadres, Erdoğan and the pro-Erdoğan media circles insisted on defining the 
Gezi movement as an attempt targeting the Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP‟s 
economic and geopolitical success in the region. This stance had an impact on the 
rhetoric of the AKP and brought about a stigmatizing language in the light of an 
intensified conspiratorial logic. In a press interview, Yalçın Akdoğan stated that “We 
won‟t let you eat up Erdoğan” (“Erdoğan’ı yedirmeyiz”). This saying became the motto 
for narrating the current situation as the latest attempt of tutelary forces to overthrow 
Erdoğan for the continuation of the „status quo‟ which overthrew Adnan Menderes and 
Turgut Özal before. Under the twitter hashtag #yedirmeyecegiz, the AKP‟s social media 
campaigns and Erdoğan‟s supporters circulated an image which shows the pictures of 
Menderes, Özal and Erdoğan side by side. Under that was written: “You hanged, you 
poisoned, we won‟t let you eat up Erdoğan”. Thus, the AKP tried to narrate the current 
situation as the continuation of anti-democratic tutelary interventions in the political 
history of Turkey. 
According to this level of interpretation, the term „ulusalcı‟ functioned as a 
metaphor which resembled in the discourse of the AKP the „old Turkey‟ and the „anti-
democratic aims of the tutelary forces of status quo‟. While rhetorically enabling the 
elimination of a variety of claims and heterogeneity of actors of the Gezi protests, the 
AKP circles introduced the „ulusalcı‟ term in order to rearticulate the field of politics in 
the light of a comprehensible narrative. This narrative recollected certain elements from 
the populist formulations of the AKP government which I analyzed with regard to the 
Republican Rallies and constitutional referendum periods; such as the balloting, 
developmentalist discourse, status quo and being impeded as the underdog. Thus, at the 
first level, the terms „ulusalcı‟ and the „status quo‟ framed the narration of the Gezi 
uprisings throughout the AKP‟s campaigns as the reactivation of „tutelary‟ forces. 
According to this narrative, the ultimate aim of the Gezi movement was to overthrow 
Erdoğan and the AKP was the true representatives of „the people‟. Invested in this 
rhetorical articulation, Erdoğan and pro-government media fabricated stories to 
                                                          
106“[H]ayır, bu baĢka türlü bir Ģey. Bunu, daha önceki anti-demokratik giriĢimlerle bir tutmak […] vahim bir yanılgı 
olur. Iktidara da büyük zarar verir, Türkiye‟ye de.” (Akyol, M. (June 10, 2013). Hayır, bu filmi henüz görmemiĢtik. 
Star. Retrieved July 19, 2015, from http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/hayir-bu-filmi-henuz-gormemistik/yazi-761191) 
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mobilize the religious and conservative motivations of the AKP‟s popular base. On the 
one hand, Erdoğan argued that protesters were entering the mosques with their shoes on 
and drinking beer inside. On the other hand, Elif Çakır from Star daily narrated the story 
of a woman who claimed that she was beaten in broad daylight by tens of half naked 
men wearing leather accessories, just because she wore a headscarf.   
4.3.2. „The Gezi Protest‟ As The Manipulation of The “Interest Rate Lobby” 
At the second level, Erdoğan and pro-government circles introduced the term 
“interest rate lobby” in order to address a collaboration conspiring against the AKP. 
This narration of the Gezi protests implied that local business groups supporting the „old 
Turkey‟ and „status quo‟ collaborated with international finance groups in order to 
speculate the economic and political structure of Turkey and overthrow the AKP 
government for their own interests. Introduction of the term “interest rate lobby” 
invested further conspiracy formulations about the manipulating campaigns of the 
international media. In the light of this second line of explanation, the AKP‟s 
interpretations framed the Gezi protest as the scenario of counter-interest groups which 
sought to destabilize economy and overthrow Erdoğan. , I will illustrate how this larger 
conspiracy theory articulated the elements of the AKP‟s counter-discourse, including 
the CHP‟s malicious aims, terrorist groups in the streets, the international media, and 
the interest lobby. 
At the peak of the turmoil, Erdoğan flew to Morocco and Tunisia for a 
diplomatic visit.  During one of the interviews he gave to Turkish reporters in his visit, 
Erdoğan stated that they have received intelligence information about the preparations 
for such a movement three months ago. He responded to a question asking him whether 
there were any “deep organizations” behind the events: “Currently, we are investigating 
on the issue. It can be everything”107. After his return to Turkey, Erdoğan started to call 
for public meetings in order to fabricate consent. In these public meetings and 
declarations Erdoğan introduced the term “interest rate lobby” as the culprit behind the 
large scale scenario. In a speech he gave at the airport, Erdoğan compared the protesters 
in the street whom he called “vandals” with the progressive achievements of the 
                                                          
107“ġu anda onlar üzerinde çalıĢmalar yapılıyor. Her Ģey olabilir.” (Demokratik taleplere canımız feda. (June 7, 2013). 
Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 20, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/demokratik-taleplere-canimiz-feda-
530031) 
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government. From this developmentalist context, Erdoğan situated the interest lobby as 
stock market speculators stealing the wealth of the nation: 
We have no truck with fight and conflict; we have nothing do with vandalism, 
with knocking out, ravaging or smashing down. My brothers, we know how to 
build; we have come to these days by building, producing, constructing and 
growing Turkey. At this point, I would like to highlight a fact: we have to come 
these days despite the interest rate lobby. This lobby thinks that it can threaten 
us by way of producing speculations in the stock market. They had better know 
this: we will not sacrifice the great efforts of this nation to them.
108
 
This conspiratorial term “interest lobby” was invested with meaning through 
speculative interpretations maintained by pro-government columnists. Drawing on 
Erdoğan‟s comments, economic analysts of the Star newspaper, Süleyman YaĢar and 
Cemil Ertem defined the “interest lobby” as the former Kemalist bourgeoisie trying to 
prevent a liberal economic model led by the Anatolian bourgeoisie. Cemil Ertem stated 
that the “interest rate oligarchy” was demanding a return to the „old Turkey‟ by 
eliminating Erdoğan through the May 31 uprisings in a manner that is similar to their 
support for the February 28 military intervention: “The social classes encouraging May 
31 uprising are the same classes and capital owners who managed and supported 
February 28. In this respect, May 31 is the continuation of February 28 which was 
intended to last for a thousand years”109. In similar lines, Süleyman YaĢar stated that the 
interest lobby intended to protect the status quo by maintaining a closed national 
economic model. YaĢar argued that the demands of the Anatolian bourgeoisie for an 
open economic model disturbed the interest lobby:  
Then, why the interest rate lobby does not want the AKP? Because the AKP is 
the representative of the Anatolian bourgeoisie competing at the global level. 
The party does not support a closed economic model. They are on the side of an 
open economy. In doing so, the AKP prevents the accumulation of state revenue 
in the hands of the status quo bourgeoisie.
110
  
                                                          
108“Bizim kavga ile çatıĢma ili iĢimiz, olmaz, bizim vandallıkla, vurup kırmayla, yakıp yıkmakla, kırıp dökmekle 
iĢimiz olmaz. KardeĢlerim, biz yapmayı biliriz ve bugüne kadar da yaparak, üreterek, inĢa ederek, Türkiye‟yi 
büyüterek bugünlere geldik. ġimdi altını çiziyorum; faiz lobisine rağmen buralara geldik. Bu faiz lobisi Ģu anda 
borsada spekülasyonlara girmek suretiyle bizi tehdit edeceğini zannediyor. ġunu bir defa çok iyi bilmeleri lazım; bu 
milletin alın terini onlara yedirtmeyeceğiz.” (BaĢbakan Erdoğan yurda döndü. (June 7, 2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved 
July 21, 2015, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23451417.asp 
109 “31 Mayıs kalkıĢmasını destekleyen  toplumsal sınıflarla, 28 ġubat‟ı yapan ve destekleyen toplumsal sınıflar ve 
sermaye çevreleri [aynıdır]. Bu anlamda 31 Mayıs, bin yıl sürecek denilen 28 ġubat‟ın bir baĢka biçimde devamıdır” 
(Ertem, Cemil. (June 5, 2013). 28 ġubat‟ın devamı olarak 31 Mayıs. Star. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from 
http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/28-subatin-devami-olarak-31-mayis/yazi-759953) 
110  “Peki faiz lobisi niye AK Parti'yi istemiyor? Çünkü AK Parti küresel düzeyde rekabet eden Anadolu 
sermayesinin temsilcisi. Ġçe kapalı bir ekonomiyi savunmuyor. DıĢa açık bir ekonomiden yana. Böylece statükocu 
sermayenin lehine çalıĢan devlet rantlarının oluĢmasını engelliyor.” (YaĢar, S. (June 1, 2013). Faiz lobisi, AK 
Parti‟ye karĢı milliyetçi cephe kurdurdu. Sabah. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/yasar/2011/06/01/faiz-lobisi-ak-partiye-karsi-milliyetci-cephe-kurdurdu) 
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This contextualization of the “interest lobby” implied the local interests of the 
former state bourgeoisie who speculated against the liberal economic model. However, 
the pro-government media debates provided another formulation of the “interest lobby” 
which addressed the manipulations of global finance actors. According to this level of 
explanation, George Soros, big capital owners and international NGO‟s were 
manipulating the existing tensions in countries in crisis through international media and 
global-scale declarations. Following this line of interpretation, Yeni ġafak reported that 
the Gezi demonstrations were a part of the project supported by George Soros. 
According to this plan the Gezi was the continuation of a speculative wave that 
intentionally triggered the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Arab Spring in 2010: 
The powers that initiated the Orange Revolution in 2004 and tried to gather 
power from the Arab Spring that shook up the Islamic world took action in Gezi. 
The trio consisting of Jadaliyya Magazine, Georgetown University and 
speculator George Soros led these powers that transformed the social demand of 
environmentalist circles into a smear campaign against Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan.111 
According to this narrative, this three-headed coalition organized a deceitful 
smear campaign against the successful image of the AKP government in terms of 
democratization and economic growth. Similarly, Yeni ġafak argued that four 
unidentified people, an academician, a journalist and two foreigners, were controlling 
Twitter mobilization to escalate protests. While arguing that this organization triggered 
15 million of tweets during the Gezi demonstrations, Yeni ġafak narrated the network 
conspired against Turkey as follows: “It has been detected that the mentioned twitter 
users actively involved in the „green revolution‟ in Iran in 2009 and the Arab Spring 
including Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain”112. Based on these conspiracies, 
pro-government media therefore argued that the aim of the protesters was to harm the 
public reliability of Erdoğan and prevent the projects of the AKP by getting the help of 
the international media, academicians and global speculators.  
The AKP‟s spokesmen and pro-government circles saw particular events that 
took place during the Gezi events the justification of their conspiratorial explanations. 
                                                          
111“2004'teki Turuncu Devrimleri baĢlatan ve Ġslam dünyasını sarsan Arap Baharı'ndan güç devĢirmeye çalıĢan 
odaklar Gezi'de de harekete geçti. Çevreci kesimlerin toplumsal talebini BaĢbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a yönelik 
bir karalama kampanyasına dönüĢtüren bu odakların baĢında ise Jadaliyya (Mücadele) dergisi, Georgetown 
Üniversitesi ve spekülatör George Soros' üçlüsü geliyor.” (ġeytan üçgeni. (June 10, 2013). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 
21, 2015, from http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/seytan-ucgeni-530641) 
112  “Söz konusu kullanıcıların 2009 Ġran „yeĢil devrimi‟ ile sonrasında geliĢen Tunus, Libya, Mısır, Yemen ve 
Bahreyn‟deki Arap Baharı gösterilerinde de aktif olarak yer aldıkları tespit edildi.” (Dört hesaplı kaos planı. (June 13, 
2013). Yeni Şafak. p. 13) 
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For example, according to Yeni ġafak, a play titled “Mi Minör” was a rehearsal of the 
Gezi uprising: “The play Mi minor, staged by Mehmet Ali Alabora in the last December 
with the support of England, became almost a rehearsal for the Gezi protests” 113 . 
Beside, the Taksim Solidarity, during negotiations with the AKP‟s deputies, stated their 
environmental concerns and declared that the demolition of the AKM, the construction 
of the Kanal Istanbul and the third airport projects should to be cancelled. According to 
the AKP circles, these demands reflected the interests of an international coalition. 
Certain pro-government columnists argued that since profit of international finance 
groups would be hindered by these projects of the AKP, England and Germany were 
dictating their demands with using the Taksim Solidarity. In the news channel 24 TV, 
Yiğit Bulut stated that England was against the Kanal Istanbul project and pressuring 
the government for months to prevent the construction project of the second channel to 
be opened in Bosphorus. Moreover, Germany was against the construction of the third 
airport to Istanbul, for it would displace the central position of the largest airline in 
Europe, Lufthansa. Thus, according to Bulut and counter-discourse of the pro-
government media, the uprising was nothing but a western plot to undermine the 
successful projects of the AKP (Yörük, 2013). The AKP circles argued that global 
actors utilized the international media to manipulate the public opinion and represent 
Erdoğan as such an authoritarian government that even suppressing environmental 
concerns with intolerance and violence. Thus, pro-government media recurrently argued 
that a collaboration of local actors, i.e. the CHP driven coup supporters terrorizing 
streets, with international forces, i.e. international media and finance speculators 
degrading the AKP and exaggerating the scope of events, was targeting successes of the 
democratically elected government and Erdoğan himself.  
Based on this framework, the AKP prepared a half an hour long propaganda 
moviein order to manufacture public consent in the light of the counter-hegemonic 
perspective of the government. In this propaganda film certain images, snapshots and 
several video cuts captured during the Gezi protests have been used, and a male voice 
over was used which narrated the story during the whole clip. The propaganda movie 
titled “The Big Scenario” defined May 2013 before the Gezi Park demonstrations as 
“the brightest May in the history of Turkey” while referring to successes of the AKP 
government in the economic and political fields. Through highlighting the AKP‟s mega 
                                                          
113 “Mehmet Ali Alabora‟nın Ġngiliz desteğiyle geçtiğimiz aralık ayında sahnelediği „Mi Minör‟ adlı oyunda Gezi 
eylemlerinin adeta provası yapılmıĢ.” (Taksim tiyatrosu. (July 10, 2013). Yeni Şafak. p. 15) 
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projects on the third airport and Kanal Ġstanbul together with democratization and peace 
processes, the video stated that “It is obvious that such positive improvements upset 
some groups. It is obvious that some groups tried to extinguish Turkey‟s rising at the 
global level as a rising star. It is obvious that some groups aimed to restage the same old 
game replicated along years”114. The movie, having a highly conspiratorial language, 
implied that particular “dark forces” wrote “the scenario” for demonstrations in order to 
mobilize their agitating local collaborators and interrupt the successful path of Turkey 
under the AKP rule. The voice over in the video defined a coalition of forces in four 
groups; the starring CHP as the actor manipulating the anti-democratic movement, 
“marginal organizations” terrorizing streets through violence, “the interest lobby” 
speculating economic systems of countries to constrain them according to their own 
behalf, and finally the international and local media disrupting Erdoğan‟s and the 
AKP‟s successful image in governance to shape global pressure on Turkish parliament. 
Therefore, the AKP‟s counter-hegemonic narration of the Gezi protests as the 
collaboration of local and global actors rhetorically converged old motifs, such as the 
Welfare Party‟s emphasis on the interest rate groups, with new combinations in the 
given context. 
4.4. Achieving Contiguity Through Metaphoric Subversion: „The Gezi Protest‟ In 
The AKP‟s Counter-hegemonic Discourse 
This simplified narration of the Gezi Park protests eventually crafted the 
counter-hegemonic field of the AKP in arresting the meaning of the Gezi Park protests 
as an anti-democratic attempt of a global coalition using manipulative and provocative 
means. On the one hand, the AKP‟s counter narration of the Gezi protests enabled a 
ground to connect local „ulusalcı status quo‟ forces with international „hidden‟ enemies. 
Counter-discourse of the AKP rhetorically knotted these two levels of interpretation 
together through rearticulating „ulusalcı‟ and „old Turkey‟ metaphors in contiguity with 
the fabricated conspiracy element the „interest lobby‟. This tropological investment 
eventually shaped the social space while excluding discursive constituents the Gezi 
demonstrations as an anti-people enemy organization. On the other hand, through 
circulation of mentioned conspiracy figures the AKP aimed to mobilize a popular 
                                                          
114 “Belli ki bu kadar olmulu geliĢme birilerini mutsuz etti. Belli ki birileri dünyanın yükselen yıldızı olan türkiyeyi 
söndürmeye çalıĢtı. Belli ki birileri yıllar boyu tekrarlanan o bildik oyunu tekrar sahneye koymak istedi” (The Big 
Scenario (Büyük Oyun) [Video file]. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x11a6b1_akp-nin-28-dakikalik-gezi-parki-filmi-buyuk-oyun_news)  
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reaction through manufacturing consent about the nature of the Gezi. Conspiracies, as a 
counter-discourse seek to convince through rhetoric and repetition while challenging 
conventional or accepted explanations (Gray, 2008). Thus, while manufacturing 
consent, conspiracy theories constitute social imaginaries through plausible narratives 
which open up the space for collective action (Iqtidar, 2014). Aiming to arrest the 
meaning of the Gezi protests over a counter-hegemonic frame, the AKP reconstituted a 
representational regime in order to dominate other discursive fields through restating an 
antagonistic frontier. In sum, discourse of the AKP located the heterogeneity of the Gezi 
protests onto an explanation of a coup plot through retroactive articulation of previous 
local crises and introduction of global scale conspiracy elements. 
Based on this frame of explanation, President Erdoğan organized a series of 
nationwide meetings titled as “Respect for the National Will” (“Milli İradeye Saygı 
Mitingi”) with the motto “Let us destroy the grand big scenario, Let us write history” 
(“Büyük oyunu bozmaya, haydi tarih yazmaya”). According to the AKP‟s counter 
discourse, Erdoğan along those public meetings tried to convince its public base while 
negating peaceful language of protests and eliminating multitude of voices from 
divergent backgrounds. In the light of a conspiring narration of events, throughout 
meetings Erdoğan tried to speak in the name of „the people‟ about an enemy 
organization. According to the counter-discourse of the AKP, Erdoğan had to be stand 
still in the face of this collaboration of enemy organization threatening the economy, 
national will, the AKP and Turkey in general. Reflecting this call for mobilization, one 
of the widely circulated slogans of the AKP supporters was “Stand strong, do not bow, 
the nation is with you” (“Dik dur eğilme, bu millet seninle”). 
In 15
th
 of June, Erdoğan organized a public meeting in Ankara with hundreds 
and thousands of audience and he warned demonstrators in Istanbul to leave the Gezi 
Park as soon as possible. A few hours later from the AKP‟s meeting, police forces 
routed people out form the Park with excessive use of tear gas and water cannon.  In the 
next day, Erdoğan organized the last step of this meeting series in Istanbul which 
gathered according to official records more than one million people, while calculations 
by oppositional sources stated the number as not more than three hundred thousand. 
During his almost two hours long speech, Erdoğan combined different layers of the 
Gezi protests in light of the AKP‟s counter discourse which I have analyzed above. 
Erdoğan‟s formulations addressed the audience as the „real people‟ of Turkey while in 
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opposition to the Gezi protesters. Through disregarding the heterogeneity of 
demonstrators and narrowing the scope of claims shouted by protesters, Erdoğan 
defined the Gezi Park protests a coup attempt designed by the coalition of local and 
global force. 
Erdoğan opened his speech with saluting not only the audience in Istanbul but 
also several Muslim countries in different parts of Asia and Africa including former 
Ottoman territories in the Balkans. While greeting cities like Kuala Lumpur, Sarajevo, 
Jerusalem, Mosul, Gaza, Erdoğan stated as follows: “Istanbul means the Middle East. 
Istanbul means the Balkans; it means the North Africa, Europe, Asia. I am saluting all 
of our sisters and brothers from the ageless capital of the Ottoman Empire” 115 . 
Referring to this imagined geography, Erdoğan attempted to mobilize a popular 
subjectivity in the light of the neo-Ottomanist ideology. In doing so, Erdoğan criticized 
international media channels, such as the CNN and the BBC, for purposively 
misrepresting the real image of Turkey by broadcasting nothing but demonstrators in 
Taksim and Ankara. Erdoğan stated that “[I]f there is anyone who wants to see the 
image of Turkey, the picture is here. International media, will you hide this, too? You 
produced fabricated news for days. You broadcasted Turkey to the world differently”116. 
While harshly criticizing international media channels and the Gezi protesters in the 
streets, Erdoğan defended the AKP and public support to the party as the true image of 
Turkey: “If there is anyone who really wants to learn Turkey, who really wants to 
apprehend, they should better try to understand the AK Party and then realize the 
truth”117. 
In order to legitimize his rhetorical formulation, Erdoğan referred to the ballot 
box and a developmentalist discourse as two grounding features of the AKP‟s political 
discourse which I have analyzed in previous chapters. While mobilizing the memory of 
military interventions and tutelary reactions, Erdoğan constantly referred to the ballot 
box in order to imply the democratic will of the people. Through repetition and 
shorthand connections between events- ranging from hanging of Menderes, February 28 
                                                          
115“Ġstanbul demek Orta Doğu demektir. Ġstanbul demek Balkanlar demektir, Kuzey Afrika, Avrupa, Asya demektir. 
ĠĢte bu kadim Osmanlı baĢkentinden, yer yüzündeki tüm kardeĢlerimizi selamlıyorum” (AK Parti‟nin KazlıçeĢme 
mitingi. (June 16, 2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=23520443 
116“[E]ğer Türkiye fotoğrafı görmek isteyen varsa, fotoğraf burada. Uluslararası medya, bunu da gizleyin olur mu? 
Günlerdir yalan haberler ürettiniz, Türkiye‟yi dünyaya farklı gösterdiniz.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
117 “[E]ğer Türkiye‟yi gerçekten tanımak, gerçekten anlamak isteyenler varsa, AK Parti‟yi tanımaya çalıĢsınlar ve o 
zaman gerçeği görsünler.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
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military intervention, interest lobby to the Gezi- Erdoğan‟s rhetoric configured 
„balloting‟ as the undisputable representation of the popular will (“milletin kararı”) for 
democracy, and hence justification of the AKP‟s power at the  parliament. Erdoğan 
stated as follows:  
You know them; the Republican Rallies, the closure case against our party, the 
State Council killing, scenarios of interventions against the AK Party, against 
democracy, the laws and against the national will [milli irade]. This nation 
showed patience on July 22 and June 12
118
, and called such plots to account.
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Through retrospective articulation of previous events, Erdoğan rhetorically 
implied the continuing tutelary power of the same forces which endured itself from the 
Republican Rallies period to the Gezi protests. Considering the developmentalist 
discourse, Erdoğan utilized developmentalist themes in the context of the Gezi protests 
in order to imply the interests of demonstrators in contradiction with that of the 
„people‟. To Erdoğan, both “scenario writers” at the backstage and actors involved in 
the Gezi protests aimed to destabilize the well-being of Turkey: “I always stated that I 
am your servant, not the master. Our service for Istanbul are obvious[.] Turkey makes 
some groups jealous, it drives them. Turkey had a series of improvements, they cannot 
bear this any longer” 120 .  According to this logic of formulation, firstly, the Gezi 
protests violated the popular will of the real people of Turkey, and Erdoğan defined the 
protests as anti-democratic for they aimed to prevent decisions of the elected 
government. Secondly, to Erdoğan, the series of anti-government uprisings were against 
the economic and political progress of Turkey under the AKP rule, and they were 
instrumentalized by the „status quo forces‟ provoking at the backstage. Therefore, 
Erdoğan‟s rhetorical articulation insisted that the initial aim of the Gezi protests to 
overthrow Erdoğan‟s party through the same means practiced in the May 27 military 
intervention: 
Adnan Menderes put an end to the great tyranny [.] He ended up the constraints, 
dictations and social engineering of the CHP‟s single party rule. Those who 
cannot bear and admit, those who have no respect to the national will 
                                                          
118 July 22 is the date for the general elections in 2007, and June 12 is for the 2011 general elections. Thus, Erdoğan 
refers to those dates for balloting which enabled the AKP to remain in the governing power. 
119“Bunlar, biliyorusunuz, Cumhuriyet mitinglerini, partimizi kapatma davalarını, DanıĢtay saldırılarını, müdahale 
senaryolarını AK Partiye karĢı, demokrasiye karĢı, hukuka, milli iradeye karĢı tertip ettiler. Bu millet sabretti, sükut 
etti 22 Temmuz‟da, 12 Haziran‟dabunun hesabını sordu.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
 
120 “Ben sizin hizmetkarınız olduğumu hep söyledim. Efendi değil hizmetkarım. Ġstanbul‟umuzdaki hizmetler 
ortada[.] Türkiye birilerini kıskandırıyor, birilerini tahrik ediyor. Türkiye nereden nereye geldi, artık buna tahammül 
edemiyorlar.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
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overthrown Menderes in May 27[.] You the remorseless, you hanged him, 
executed him. Now, you are using the same threat against Erdoğan.121  
According to Erdoğan, the Gezi protests were an attempt of „tutelary forces‟ 
against the “national will”. Through mobilizing the memory of the Republican Rallies, 
the killing of a judge in the State Council and coup d‟états, Erdoğan and the AKP‟s 
counter-discourse implied that the Gezi was the last resurgence of the tutelary reactions 
of the status quo elite in conflict with the “national will”: “Under the pretext of Taksim 
Gezi Park, overall attitude of demonstrations is nothing but the attempt of a minority to 
dominate the majority through discarding national will. In this country, no minority can 
dominate the majority”122. 
The Gezi demonstrations have started with the resistance at the Gezi Park and 
gained its anti-authoritarian language and spontaneous form of organization along 
nationwide uprisings and the Gezi commune inside the park. However, the AKP‟s 
counter-discourse defined the Gezi protests as an enemy collaboration for a designed 
coup plot organized on the one hand by tutelary forces and the CHP, and on the other 
hand by the interest lobby and international media. Thus, in the representational regime 
of the AKP‟s discourse the Gezi protest represented as an anti-people organization 
targeted the AKP government and the interests of the people. Based on this frame of 
explanation, in his speech at the Istanbul meeting Erdoğan stated: “The Gezi Park and 
Taksim has been evacuated; both have been delivered to the nation”123. 
In this chapter, I first illustrated the transformations between 2010 and 2013 
while stating that dynamics of the era lead the AKP to adapt majoritarian and 
authoritarian regulations together with their neoliberal economic policies. On the one 
hand, the AKP‟s premises on eliminating the tutelary cadres of the former status quo 
establishments turned out to be their consolidation in the hands of the AKP cadres. In 
consequence, after the 2010 constitutional reforms, the AKP adopted state institutions, 
which the party accused for serving to tutelary cadres, and utilized them as ideological 
apparatuses. I argued that during this period the AKP intensified the introduction of 
                                                          
121  “[A]dnan Menderes büyük zulme son verdi [.] Tek parti CHP döneminin baskıları, dayatmaları, toplum 
mühendisliği tek tek sona erdi. Bunu hazmedemeyenler, bunu kabullenemeyenler millet idaresine saygısı olmayanlar 
27 mayıs‟ta o BaĢbakanı devirdiler[.] Astınız be vicdansızlar, idam ettiniz. ġimdi Erdoğan için de bunu 
kullanıyorsunuz.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
 
122“Takism Gezi Parkı bahanesiyle, Türkiye genelinde ortaya konan tavır […] milli iradeyi bir tarafa koymak 
suretiyle azınlığın çoğunluğa tahakküm etme gayretinden baĢka bir Ģey değildir. Bu ülkede azınlık, çoğunluğa 
tahakküm edemez.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
123“Gezi Parkı, Taksim boĢaltıldı; bu millete teslim edildi.” (Ibid, footnote 109) 
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conservative regulations considering family, education and social security policies 
which favored ethno-religious codes. On the other hand, this majoritarian nature of the 
government reduced politics into a plebiscitarian understanding of democracy based on 
balloting. The AKP discursively justified its non-responsive and non-negotiating way of 
administration through addressing the ballot results and the popular support that the 
government gained. During this period, while appropriating a neo-Ottomanist discourse 
in light of the changing geopolitical vision of the party, the AKP constantly referred to 
Turko-Islamic codes as discussing abortion, alcohol consumption and the education 
reform. Thus, regulations of the AKP and the criminalizing tone of Erdoğan gradually 
included more authoritarian reactions. As a result, towards 2013 various social sections 
from different backgrounds shared a feeling of distrust against the AKP‟s premises on 
democratization and elimination of tutelary regimes on the judiciary. In this period, the 
Gezi Park protests made this tension and polarization of the social into two camps 
explicit. While the Gezi protest produced an anti-authoritarian language and inclusive 
social organization, the AKP‟s populist hegemony over the political space has shattered. 
I argued that political antagonism configured during the Gezi demonstrations made the 
reference to „the people‟ a hegemonic battleground resembling two representational 
regimes. The AKP, in order to dominate the field of politics, necessitated to reconstitute 
an antagonistic frontier in accordance with a counter-discursive arrestment of the 
meaning of the Gezi protest.  
The AKP articulated this counter-discourse through intertwining two frames of 
explanations. On the one hand, the AKP rearticulated previous constitutive elements 
which I analyzed in the context of the Republican Rallies in 2007 and the constitutional 
referendum period in 2010. Through discursive remobilization of such signifying 
elements, Erdoğan‟s rhetoric and discourse of the pro-government media recurrently 
attempted to locate the Gezi protest as a continuation of the Republican Rallies. In 
doing so the AKP circles argued that the CHP manipulated ongoing demonstrations to 
reactivate former „ulusalcı‟ tutelary forces for reestablishing the status quo. From this 
point of view, the AKP‟s counter-discourse reduced and simplified the heterogeneity of 
demands shouted by protesters while defining the Gezi event as the resurgence of 
„ulusalcı/status quo‟ forces. According to this first frame of explanation, the initial aim 
of the Gezi protests was to prevent democratization process and development of Turkey 
under the rule of the AKP government. 
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In the second level of interpretation, the AKP circles and the pro-government 
media tended to define the Gezi Park demonstrations as a cover scenario which aimed 
to hide the aims of the “interest lobby”. The AKP circles argued that the interest lobby 
was targeting Erdoğan to prevent his development project of his party through 
speculating economic and political atmosphere with local and international campaigns. 
From this point of view, the AKP‟s counter discourse stated that international forces 
were organizing a manipulation campaign together with „ulusalcı‟ status quo supporters. 
This conspiring logic tried to configure a political frontier which aimed, on the one 
hand, to portray demands of the demonstrators as provocations of status tutelary forces. 
On the other hand, the AKP‟s rhetoric utilized conspiracy elements, such as the “interest 
lobby”, in order to mobilize a political resentment against the Gezi protesters and to 
blanket the AKP‟s legitimacy crises at the political level. 
 Considering the main question of this thesis, i.e. the rhetorical effect of 
„ulusalcı‟ reference in the AKP‟s populist discourse, it can be argued that during the 
2013 Gezi Park protests, in the counter-discourse of the AKP the term „ulusalcı‟ meant 
the „old Turkey‟ and functioned as a metaphor that rhetorically condensed different 
references which the AKP‟s populist discourse articulated in 2007 and 2010 periods. 
Based on this fixation of the term, the AKP circles argued that „ulusalcı‟ supporters of 
the „old Turkey‟ conspired together with the „interest lobby‟ against Turkey. This 
hegemonic fixation of the term „ulusalcı‟ invested to the antagonistic frontier in 
constituting the anti-people pole; i.e. a coup plot of an enemy collaboration by „ulusalcı‟ 
status quo supporters and international forces. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I analyzed the formation of “ulusalcılık” as an empty signifier in 
the AKP‟s populist discourse and its transformation across the AKP‟s changing 
discursive fields from 2007 to 2013. Contrary to the conceptualization of the 
phenomenon as a movement or cultural identity, in the thesis I questioned the discursive 
articulation of “ulusalcılık” as a constitutive element in the AKP‟s rhetorical 
configuration of the enemy figure. Based on this theoretical approach, I tried to 
illustrate how „ulusalcılık‟ as a signifying element in the AKP‟s populist discourse 
rhetorically combined and condensed heterogeneous elements. In line with this 
reasoning, I traced the contextual overdetermination of the hegemonic meaning of 
„ulusalcılık‟ along three different time periods through analyzing textual material 
covering the pro-government media discussions and political declarations of Erdoğan 
and the AKP circles. 
I mainly focused on three political events which were the Republican Rallies 
period in 2007, the Constitutional Referendum period in 2010 and the Gezi Park 
Protests in 2013. The pro-government media and the AKP cadres considered these 
events either as the strengthened or downgraded manifestations of the “ulusalcı” circles. 
In accordance with the dynamics of the given periods, contingent configuration of the 
enemy figure overdetermined the content of “ulusalcı” attribution differently; as I have 
noted in the thesis in 2007 period it was the „deep state‟, then shifted to „status quo‟ in 
2010, and „ulusalcı‟ reference resembled the „old Turkey‟ in 2013.  
In the first chapter, I illustrated rising tensions between 2002 and 2007. 
Accordingly, I portrayed the emergence of a defensive nationalism in line with the 
AKP‟s reformist administrations, the rise of political assassinations by deep state forces, 
and lastly the political crisis between the bureaucratic state cadres and the AKP 
government due to concerns on secularism and upcoming presidential elections. Against 
the AKP‟s attempt to elect Erdoğan as the president, different oppositional sectors, 
including the military, judiciary, political parties like the CHP and Kemalist civil 
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society organizations, such as the ADD and the ÇYDD, voiced their concerns on 
secularism and protection of Kemalist principles against an Islamist candidate. Under 
the heading of the ADD, an organizing committee programmed a series of meetings 
titled Republican Rallies in order to publicize a critical stance against the AKP‟s 
possible candidate. Pro-government media instruments defined the organizing 
committee as „ulusalcı‟ groups trying to agitate the presidential elections. Pro-
government media argued that „ulusalcı‟ organizing committee included the Masons, 
Abdullah Öcalan supporters, terror groups, secular state elite and they aimed to 
manipulate the meeting in order to agitate the crowds against Erdoğan and successes of 
the AKP government. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan, on the other hand, addressed the 
organizing committee while calling them “gangs”. According to Erdoğan, illegal 
“gangs” were about to manipulate the Rallies in order to violate the public trust for the 
AKP government, that which Erdoğan discursively legitimized through a 
developmentalist discourse and rhetorical reference to the ballot box. In 2007 period, 
although the appropriation of “ulusalcı” reference in the AKP‟s discursive field shifted 
from „Masons‟, „Öcalan supporters‟, „gangs‟ and „secular state elites‟, what 
overdetermined the hegemonic articulation of the term was the deep state killings. After 
the Zirve publishing house massacre the pro-government media retrospectively knotted 
the Republican Rallies with the ongoing political assassinations while rhetorically 
identifying „ulusalcı‟ phenomenon with the deep state activities. 
Between the 2007 and 2010 periods the AKP prioritized the discourse on 
„democratization‟ and struggle against the „status quo‟ which they formulated as the 
elimination of „tutelary cadres‟ of the „secular state elite‟. Along the attempted party 
closure case and together with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, the pro-government 
media and the AKP‟s discourse formulated the „deep state‟ as the Kemalist tutelary state 
cadres in the military and the judiciary aiming to overthrow the AKP government 
through terror organizations and coup plots. The AKP, on the one hand, discursively 
limited the problem of „deep state‟ to the „secular tutelary cadres‟ and „coup attempts 
against the AKP‟; on the other hand, portrayed the government as the sole actor for 
democratization and normalization of state-society relations. Thus, the antagonism 
between „democracy‟ and „status quo‟ took the place of the „deep state‟ in constituting 
the enemy-figure in the 2010 constitutional referendum period. Based on this 
antagonism, in the AKP‟s discursive field “Yes” votes for the amendments resembled 
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supporters of democratic changes and demands for the constitution of the people, in 
contrast, the “No” votes addressed supporters of the coup d‟état constitutions and 
interests of the secular elite. Through rhetorical identification of shorthand labels, such 
as the „mentality of the CHP‟ and „secular white elites‟, the AKP‟s discourse merged 
„deep state‟ with „status quo‟ while designating an anti-people community. While the 
privileged signifier shifted from „deep state‟ to „status quo‟, the AKP‟s discursive 
terrain that captured the „ulusalcı‟ attribution reconfigured accordingly. In the 2010 
constitutional referendum period the AKP‟s discourse hegemonically captured 
„ulusalcı‟ reference as one of the tutelary groups supporting the „status quo‟ in order to 
protect their exclusionary fields in the state and civil society realms. 
In the last chapter, I analyzed the rhetorical effect of „ulusalcı‟ reference in the 
AKP‟s counter-discourse on the Gezi Park protests. I analyzed the Gezi event and 
counter-hegemonic discourse emerged along the nation-wide protests as a challenge 
against the AKP‟s neoliberal, majoritarian and authoritarian policies.  I argued that the 
Gezi protests confronted the AKP‟s hegemony on the political field and its discursive 
configuration of „the people‟, which eventually forced the AKP to reconstitute the space 
of representation through the construction of a new antagonistic frontier.  At this point, 
the AKP attempted to arrest the meaning of the Gezi protests as a „coup plot‟ organized 
by former status quo forces of the „old Turkey‟ and the „interest lobby‟ at the 
international level. According to the first level of interpretation, the AKP circles argued 
that the Gezi Park protests were an attempt to reinstitute tutelary regime of secular elites 
who were against democratization and the Kurdish opening led by the AKP 
government. Based on this frame of explanation, „ulusalcı‟ reference metaphorically 
condensed different references provided in configuration of the enemy pole during 2007 
and 2010 periods. On the other hand, through conspiracy figures like „the interest 
lobby‟, pro-government media and Erdoğan argued that the AKP‟s mega projects were 
disturbing interests of international finance actors. Because of that, according the AKP‟s 
counter-discourse, the „interest lobby‟ tried to manipulate crowds during the Gezi 
protests with the help of international media in order to overthrow Erdoğan from the 
rule and prevent those investments. Therefore, through this counter-discourse the AKP 
reinstituted the antagonistic frontier and attempted to define the Gezi Park protests as a 
coup plot not only against the AKP but also against the interests of the „real people‟ of 
Turkey on „democratization‟ and „development‟.  
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By the 2013 Gezi Park protests till the time I wrote this thesis, debates on 
“ulusalcılık” almost moved out from the AKP‟s discursive field as well as mainstream 
public discussions. Considering the grounding inquiry of the thesis, i.e. operation of 
„ulusalcılık‟ as a rhetorical figure in the AKP‟s populist discourse in configuring the 
anti-people camp, vanishing of „ulusalcı‟ reference is crucial in order to follow how the 
changing political landscape dislocated former signifying elements like „tutelage‟ and 
„status quo‟ while recapturing them through a different representational regime. In the 
aftermath of the Gezi protests, when the anti-government atmosphere was still dominant 
in shaping the political field, the corruption scandal unfolded in December 17 which 
eventually turned the rift between the AKP and Gülen movement into an all-out war.  
On December 17 police arrested three cabinet ministers‟ sons, several 
businessmen from the construction sector known to be close to the government, and the 
manager of state-controlled Halkbank. Prosecutors alleged that suspects engaged in 
corruption, bribery and illegal transfer of gold to Iran. The corruption investigation was 
orchestrated by three prosecutors including Zekeriya Öz, who was also the prosecutor of 
the Ergenekon trial and known to be one of the followers of Gülen movement in the 
jurisdiction. Although it was publically known that the alliance between the Gülen 
movement and the AKP government has weakened in years, especially after the 
government‟s decision to close down dershanes, a sector of special weekend schools in 
which the Gülen community was highly dominant and educated its cadres for university 
entrance exams, the fight approached to a point of no return
124
.  Just three months 
before the municipal elections in March 2014, cadres of the Gülen movement in police 
and judiciary departments serviced wiretaps via internet which uncovered the supposed 
networks of bribery and illegal transfers among business and parliamentarian circles. As 
a reaction, Erdoğan announced a cabinet reshuffle while branding the probe as a “dirty 
organization” of “traitors” involved in a “parallel state” trying to overthrow the 
government. According to Erdoğan and the pro-government media, ongoing 
detainments were a part of a designed „coup attempt‟ against the AKP government. 
Influencing the judicial investigations, Erdoğan blamed the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK) for protecting prosecutors of the corruption investigation who 
were, to Erdoğan, abusing their power in order to weaken the government through 
                                                          
124  See: Tuğal, C. (December 22, 2013). Towards the End of a Dream? Erdogan-Gulen Fallout and Islamic 
Liberalism‟s Descent. Jadaliyya. Retrieved July 25, 2015, from 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15693/towardstheendofadreamtheerdogangulenfallo 
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blackmails and manufactured evidences. As a result of the period commonly called “17-
25 December”, prosecutors of the corruption investigation have been suspended from 
duty while thousands of state personnel in police and judiciary departments, who were 
supposed to be close to the Gülen community, were transferred and reassigned. 
What is important for our discussion is that the battle between Gülen and 
Erdoğan resulted with the AKP‟s renegotiating the party‟s position against certain 
historic events such as the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials and the 2010 constitutional 
referendum. Previously, the AKP discursively portrayed these events as the 
manifestations of the party‟s democratic struggle against tutelary establishments of the 
„old Turkey‟. Based on this contextualization, the AKP‟s discourse defined those trials 
and constitutional amendments as the downgrading of Kemalist status quo and 
elimination of tutelary mentality of secular elites. Within this hegemonic struggle, the 
AKP‟s discourse recurrently addressed „ulusalcı‟ phenomenon in a way to designate the 
suppressive elites supporting status quo. In sum, the AKP discursively located the 
attempts of the party and transformations in the aftermath as the pillars of 
democratization and normalization in the „new Turkey‟. However, after the 17-25 
December corruption scandal and deepening of the rift between the Gülen movement 
and the AKP, the pro-government media rearticulated the narration of mentioned events 
while demonizing the Gülen community as one of the „tutelary‟ force within the „status 
quo‟ establishments against the AKP government. Then PM Erdoğan‟s advisor Yalçın 
Akdoğan accused Gülen‟s cadres in the judiciary for plotting against Turkish army 
while indicating Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, and stated that through blackmails and 
intimidation they betrayed Erdoğan and interests of the nation125126.  
In line with this shift, after arriving country from abroad visits during the 17-25 
December period, Erdoğan declared in a meeting organized in the airport that ongoing 
prosecutions were far from being corruption investigations, to the contrary it was a plot 
against the „new Turkey‟. While rhetorically combining the Gezi Park protests with the 
corruption operations Erdoğan merged both events in the context of a „plot‟ designed by 
the same traitors against the well-being of Turkey. 
                                                          
125  http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/ellerinde-nur-mu-var-topuz-mu/yazi-820061 ellerinde nur mu var topuz mu 
akdoğan 
126 After a couple of months, the Constitutional Court decided that rights of the suspects in the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz cases have been violated during the trials. In doing so, the Court paved the way for a retrial, which eventually 
resulted with the release of all convicts in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. 
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This country suffered a lot because of Gezi. Now they force Turkey to pay a 
price with corruption operations. Don‟t you see the instabilities at interest rates, 
exchange rates and the stock market? What is their account for this loss? How 
they are going to give an account for setting-up this game?
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According to Erdoğan, a global coalition was trying to degrade the public 
image of the AKP government to be able to decrease the vote rates of the party in the 
coming municipal elections. Erdoğan stated in a party meeting in February 2014: 
“This election is not solely about municipal elections. […] All these incidents reveal 
that certain groups are in an effort to decrease the AKP‟s votes. It  is all about this”128.  
Based on this counter-discourse, after the 2014 municipal elections and the 
AKP‟s relative success at the ballot box, Erdoğan directly targeted Gülen in his 
“balcony speech” at the party building. While addressing “Pennsylvania” where 
Gülen stays in his resident, Erdoğan rhetorically merged „Gülen‟ and „status quo‟ 
together as the enemy defeated at the „ballot box‟ by the popular will of the 
„people/millet:  
Today, status quo suffered a heavy blow. Today, dirty associations, unnamed 
alignments failed to win. The people hit any kind of tutelary mentality with an 
Ottoman slap. […] You Pennsylvania, your media supporters, your capital 
circles; what happened to your cries about being suppressed by anti-democratic 
forces? In the end, democracy and national will won at the ballot box today. […] 
Today, the people destroyed such insidious set-ups
129
. 
Within this period rhetorical reference to „Gülen‟ and „parallel state‟ gradually 
took the place of „secular elite‟ and „ulusalcı‟ in the discursive configuration of „status 
quo‟ and „tutelage‟ as enemy figures. Based on this transformation of the AKP‟s 
discursive field, Star daily rearticulated the history of the 2010 constitutional 
referendum. While addressing „insidious plans‟ of the Gülen movement which 
„deceived‟ the AKP government in the name of eliminating anti-democratic judiciary 
                                                          
127 “Gezi'de ülkeye çok Ģey kaybettirdiler. ġimdi de bununla [implying the corruption operation] ülkeye çok Ģey 
kaybettiriyorlar. Faizin oynaması ortada, döviz kurları ortada, borsa ortada. Bunun hesabını nas ıl verecekler 
bunlar. Bu oyunu, bu tezgahı kuranlar, bunun hesabını nasıl verecekler”. (Olaylar dershane sürecinin devamıdır. 
(December 27, 2013). Akparti.org.tr. Retrieved July 25, 2015, from 
https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/olaylar-dershane-surecinin-devamidir/57205#1)  
128 “Bu seçim, herhangi bir Ģahsın belediye baĢkanı seçilme seçimi değildir. […]. Bütün geliĢmeler Ģunu 
gösteriyor; bu seçimde AK Parti'nin oyunu nasıl aĢağı çekebiliriz. Bütün gayretler buna yönelik.” (Bu seçimin 
ayrı bir özelliği var. (February 11, 2014). Akparti.org.tr. Retrieved July 25, 2015, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/bosnadaki-olaylari-kaygi-ile-izliyoruz/59397#1) 
129 Statüko bugün çok büyük bir darbe almıĢtır. Kirli iliĢkiler adı konulmamıĢ ittifaklar bugün kaybetmiĢtir. 
Vesayetçi odakların her türlüsü bugün milletten tam bir Osmanlı Ģamarı yemiĢtir. [...] Ey Pensilvanya, buradaki 
yandaĢları medya, yandaĢları sermaye hani siz demokrasinin karĢısına konumlandırılmıĢtınız. Ne oldu sandıkta bugün 
demokrasi kazandı sandıkta bugün irade kazandı. [...] Millet sinsi planları, ahlaksız tuzakları bugün bozmuĢtur. (30 
Mart balkon konuĢması. (March 31, 2014). Hürriyet. Retrieved July 25, 2015, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26119975.asp) 
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cadres, Star daily argued that the Gülen community took over the cadres in HSYK and 
the intelligence service for a future coup plot against the government
130
. In line with to 
this discursive shift and rearticulation of „status quo‟ and „Gülen movement‟, Yeni 
ġafak daily published two series of pseudo documents in April 2015. Through those 
“documents” Yeni ġafak alleged that the founder of the Turkish Republic Kemal 
Atatürk was poisoned by Ismet Inönü who served as the second president after 
Atatürk‟s death. In the second series, Yeni ġafak argued that Gülen was a crypto Jew 
who was protected by the US and several „dark hands‟, and involved in the hanging of 
Menderes. According to the daily‟s reports, Gülen was a member of “Hür ve Kabul 
EdilmiĢ Masonlar” (Free and Accepted Masons) which we have witnessed in the 2007 
Republican Rallies period as one of the alleged features of the debates on 
„ulusalcılık‟131. Yeni ġafak combined both of the narrations in order to configure a 
frame for rearticulating the conceptualizations of „tutelage‟ and „status quo‟ as a „global 
coalition‟ aiming against Turkey‟s power at local and interregional relations. Thus, on 
the one hand through utilizing conspiracy figures implying foreign and disguised 
threats, on the other hand excluding local actors such as Gülen and the CHP as traitors, 
the AKP‟s discourse portrayed the ongoing corruption operations as a „big scenario‟ 
designed by a „global coalition‟ against the AKP government and Turkey‟s proactive 
policies at the region. Erdoğan and the pro-government media rhetorically identified 
this situation as the second War of Independence. In his speech at the opening ceremony 
of the Marmara University, Erdoğan stated as follows: 
A hundred years ago, there were blind traitors who betrayed Ottomans in return 
of gold coins. Today, those traitors still exist. […] Sometimes having an outlook 
of a cleric, sometimes of a service volunteer [implying the Service movement of 
Gülen], of a journalist and author, or even a terrorist, there are new Lawrences132 
trying to throw this region into fire.
133
  
                                                          
130 See: Paralel yapı 17-25 Aralık darbesinin temellerini2010 referandumu ile attı. (March 15, 2015). Star. Retrieved 
July 26, 2015, from http://haber.star.com.tr/politika/darbenin-temeli-2010da-atildi/haber-1009878 
131 See: Fethullah Gülen‟in sırlarla dolu karanlık dünyası. (March 30, 2015). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 26, 2015, 
from http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/fethullah-gulenin-sirlarla-dolu-karanlik-dunyasi-2110893 
132 T.E. Lawrence was a British archeologist and diplomat who played a role in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman 
rule in the early twentieth century. In the Turkish nationalist imaginary, Lawrence became a figure representing the 
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Great powers and their „agitations‟ triggered nationalist uprisings in the 
region. In this quote, Erdoğan addresses Lawrence as a figure in order to emphasize the resemblances between the 
World War I and the current „threats‟ against territorial integrity and betrayals against national unity. 
133 “100 yıl önce, egemen güçlerden çil çil altın alarak Ģuursuzca Osmanlı‟ya isyan edenler ve bu coğrafyaya en 
büyük ihaneti yapanlar vardı. Bunlar bugün de var. [...] Bakıyorsunuz din adamı görünümüde, hizmet eri 
görünümüde, gazetci yazar görünümde, hatta terörist görünümde yeni Lawrence‟lerin bölgeyi ateĢe atmak için 
çabaladığını görüyoruz.” (CumhurbaĢkanı Erdoğan‟dan önemli açıklamalar. (October 13, 2014). Hürriyet. Retrieved 
July 26, 2015, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27376911.asp) 
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Due to ongoing rise of social conflicts and the legitimacy crisis which the 
government tries to overwhelm, both the AKP cadres and a majority of actors in the 
pro-government media circles highly utilize conspiracy theories at the current moment 
of a political turmoil. To have a deeper understanding of the AKP‟s current state of 
perception and the pro-government media‟s changing discourse on „status quo/tutelage‟, 
column articles of Yeni ġafak writer Ġbrahim Karagül provide a good case. Along his 
articles we realize that the AKP‟s discourse broadened the rhetorical scope of „tutelage‟ 
towards the War of Independence in 1923. To Karagül, till the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire and the War of Independence the same „global actors‟ were and are trying to 
manipulate Turkey. In accordance, Karagül argued that the Gezi Park protests and 
recent 17-25 December operations were revealing attempts of the „global coalition‟ to 
turn Turkey into Ukraine or Egypt. 
The Gezi uprising and 17-25 December intervention were coup plots. It was an 
attempt to turn Turkey, which they could not manage to make it like Ukraine, 
into Egypt. In fact, there was a multinational project at the hand. For us, the First 
World War did not end. At the moment when the tutelage is over the War will 
come to an end with its leftovers and effects. Therefore, Turkey is having a 
struggle as important as it did during the First World War. Actually, this struggle 
is a new war for independence.
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Through Karagül‟s formulation, we can trace the transformation of „tutelage‟, as 
a signifying element representing the enemy figure in the AKP‟s discursive field, from 
„secular white elite‟ to „global forces‟. Shared by Karagül and many other pro-
government media actors, conceptualization of „tutelage‟ gradually addressed the 
domination of global forces on Turkey and their abuse of local forces for their own 
favor. In line with this reasoning, which came to a level lately that captured any 
oppositional voice as a threat of „manipulation‟ and „coup preparation‟,  Karagül argued 
in above quote that aftermath of the Gezi protests and the 17-25 December eventually 
uncovered the „tutelary aims‟ of a „multinational project‟. Investing to this counter-
discourse, in his current articles Karagül mostly utilizes such conspiratorial analyses 
while addressing emerging oppositional tensions against the AKP‟s security politics on 
local administrations and foreign policies on the Middle East and the ISIS question. 
                                                          
134“Gezi isyanı ile 17-25 Aralık müdahalesi birer darbe planıydı. Ukrayna‟ya döndüremedikleri  Türkiye‟yi Mısır‟a 
döndürme müdahalesiydi. Gerçekten de ortada çokuluslu bir proje vardı. [...] Bizim için Birinci Dünya SavaĢı 
bitmedi. Vesayet bittiği anda dünya savaĢının izleri de, kalıntıları da, etkisi de bitecek. Bu yüzden Türkiye aslında en 
az Birinci Dünya SavaĢı kadar büyük bir mücadele veriyor. Aslında bu yeni istiklal mücadelesidir.” (Karagül, Ġ. 
(March 20, 2015). Yeni Şafak. Retrieved July 26, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/kozmikodasirlariturkiyeilkikibuyuksavasikazandi2009580) 
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After the ISIS‟ suicide bomber attack in July 20 2015 at Suruç, which killed 32 socialist 
activists gathered to assist reconstruction of Kobani, Turkish armed forces began air 
strikes which targeted ISIS camps as well as Kurdish militants in northern Iraq. 
Turkey‟s bombing PKK camps after ISIS‟ attack burst controversies on the AKP‟s 
perception of „terror‟ and their way of identifying ISIS with the PKK. Till then, police 
arrested hundreds of socialists, Kurds as well as some members of ISIS in Turkey in the 
name of terror operations. By the time I finish the thesis, Turkey is passing through a 
period of airstrikes and shootouts between the PKK and security forces of Turkey 
almost each day resulting with political killings including civilians. To Karagül, behind 
the rising „terror‟ activities there is the „global coalition‟ trying to maintain their 
„tutelage‟ over Turkey. After the Suruç massacre Karagül states: 
What remained was their ugliest and dirties scenario. In a time when Turkey, for 
the first time till the First World War, was striving for releasing from the 
tutelage, gaining an ultimate freedom, accumulating power by itself and through 
its relations and rising like a star while leaving many European countries behind, 
they are making plans on how to invade Turkey from inside in order to surround 
the country like a hostage. Up to this day, all of their dirty organizations 
smashed to the national reflexes of this country and blew into air. There was no 
coup d‟états, no economic crises, no laicist obsessions, no disputes on Iranian or 
any other country models. But there was Ukraine and Egypt. They tried to turn 
Turkey into those countries, but it did not work. They started to cooperate with 
terror organizations.
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Before concluding the overall discussion and leaving the floor to further 
analyses on the AKP‟s changing political discourse, highlighting certain symptoms 
might be fruitful in having a broader conception of the constraints of the AKP‟s populist 
logic. One significant aspect is that beside new discursive maneuvers we witness at the 
moment it is also possible to trace how they actually draw on enduring motifs in the 
dominant political discourse in Turkey, such as territorial integrity, foreign threats, local 
collaborators and agitating disguised organizations. The other aspect is that although 
Erdoğan and the AKP circles refer to „the people‟ as „millet‟ (nation) certain 
intellectuals in support of the AKP, for example Etyen Mahçupyan, perceive the 
„people‟ as „halk‟. As I remarked in the introduction part, „millet‟ is a term addressing 
                                                          
135“Geriye en çirkin, en kirli senaryo kalmıĢtı. Türkiye, Birinci Dünya SavaĢı'ndan bu yana ilk kez vesayetten 
kurtulma, gerçekten özgür olma, gücünü kendinden ve çevresinden alma mücadelesi verirken, birçok Batılı ülkeyi 
geride bırakan bir hızla yıldızlaĢırken onlar iç iĢgal üzerinden iç iktidar hesapları yapıyor, ülkeyi yeniden rehin 
almaya dönük projeler uyguluyordu. Bugüne kadar yaptıkları bütün bu kirli organizasyonlar ülkenin milli refleksine 
çarpıp un ufak olmuĢtu. Artık darbe yoktu, ekonomik kriz yoktu, laiklik saplantısı yoktu, Ġran veya Ģu ülke modeli 
tartıĢmaları yoktu. Ukrayna vardı, Mısır vardı. Onları da denediler yine olmadı. Terör örgütleriyle iĢ tutar oldular.” 
(Karagül, Ġ. (July 31, 2015). Geriye en çirkin, en kirli senaryo kaldı. Yeni Şafak. Retrieved August 16, 2015, from 
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/geriyeencirkinenkirlisenaryokaldi2018411) 
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the Islamic community „ummet‟ and it is akin to mobilize the memory of the Ottoman 
heritage as the roots of Turkish national identity. To the contrary, „halk‟ is a neutralized 
term which abstracts various backgrounds within the society and rhetorically negates 
the ethnicist-religious determinants of the term „millet‟. Therefore, preferring „millet‟ 
instead of „halk‟ represents more than a difference between daily language routines. In 
fact, this difference reveals two distinct discursive fields in imagining the Turkish 
nation as well as its enemies.  Therefore, hegemonic domination of „millet‟ in the 
AKP‟s discourse as opposed to „halk‟ effected the contextualization of anti-people 
constituents such as „white Turk‟ and „status quo‟.  
Although the „white Turk-black Turk‟ formulation depends on a relation of 
oppression, the AKP‟s discursive appropriation of „millet‟ precludes the 
problematization of the class background of the socio-cultural hierarchies. To the 
contrary, the AKP‟s discourse privileges the antagonism between the uncorrupted 
cultural codes of „millet‟ and alienated and disdainful „elites‟ as „white laicists‟. 
Consequently, although the reference to being „white‟ tends to address privileged 
groups in the capital accumulation, the AKP discursively eliminates class antagonisms 
and configures the political field through moral codes which assume „millet‟ as a 
homogeneous ethno-religious community.  
Being the second aspect the AKP‟s populism captures „status quo‟ references 
with a similar line of reasoning. Although it appears to be transforming in the current 
context towards addressing a „global coalition‟, the AKP circles and the pro-
government media addressed the „status quo‟ while implying laicist bureaucratic cadres 
and elite supporters of tutelary institutions during the 2010 constitutional referendum 
period. According to the AKP‟s discourse, status quo worked against the AKP 
government in order to prevent conservative movements and oppress the religious 
character of the political demands of the people/millet. Although it was unquestionably 
true that the tutelary reactions of the military and the judiciary previously aimed to 
prevent the AKP‟s parliamentarian power, shaping „status quo‟ as „coup plots against 
the government‟ enabled the AKP to legitimize their domination over the state 
institutions through the discourse on „democracy‟. Constituting the antagonism between 
„democracy‟ and „status quo‟, the AKP rhetorically configured the „tutelary state 
establishment‟ as the oppression of a culturally privileged community against the 
essential claims of „millet‟. Therefore, the AKP‟s populist discourse privileging 
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„democracy‟ assumed the „people‟ as „millet‟ while inscribing the population as a 
homogeneous entity regarding its moral and cultural features. In doing so, the AKP 
defended their utilization of tutelary institutions as ideological apparatuses through their 
political rhetoric on servicing to the claims and values of „millet‟. Based on this 
discursive field, just like „millet‟ disguised class conflicts, the relation between 
„democracy‟ and „national values‟ eventually resulted with the rise of majoritarianism. 
Accordingly, this discursive constitution of „the people‟ as „millet‟ constituted the 
enemy figure as „traitors betraying the „nation‟.  
Lastly, elimination of class antagonisms, rising majoritarianism, and hence 
configuring the enemy as „traitors of moral and national unity‟ resulted with the rise of 
conspiratorial thinking in the face of emerging political tensions and critiques of various 
circles. The AKP at the current state highly utilizes conspiracy theories in their political 
discourse. The party cadres and the pro-government media circles interpret the Gezi 
protests and the corruption operations as malicious plans of the „global coalition‟ 
against Turkey. Through simplified narrations and replacing incomprehensible 
phenomena with comprehensible figures, the AKP condemns opponents as part of a 
conspiracy while demonizing certain groups. Therefore, political elites and ideologues 
of the AKP utilize conspiratorial thinking in order to mobilize a popular reaction against 
„traitors‟ while simultaneously attempting to disguise the legitimacy crises that the party 
faces. Aiming to downplay and silence dissatisfaction of oppositional groups, the AKP 
utilizes conspiracies as a political strategy in order to delegitimize critiques by calling 
those groups „dirty organizations‟, „coup attempts‟ or „collaborators of a global 
coalition‟ who work against the well-being of „millet‟. 
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